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Abstract 
In political philosophy, power and responsibility are known to be two sides of 
the same coin. Yet surprisingly, corporate political power has not been 
strongly featured in the long-standing debate surrounding Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), despite the parallel debate on the influence of business 
in policy-making. The political dimension of CSR and its intrinsic relationship 
with Corporate Political Power (CPP) has been under-researched. This thesis 
adds to the CSR debate by investigating the processes and mechanisms by 
which CSR activities contribute to the power of the firm in the political arena, 
in the context of the British construction industry. 
Drawing on the literature on power, political activity and extended corporate 
citizenship, a conceptual model of the relationship between CSR and CPP 
was developed. The model was underpinned by insights from the Institutional 
Theory, the Resource Dependence Theory, and the Resource-Based View of 
the firm. Using a hybrid constructivist-realism epistemology and a process-
based analysis, three exploratory case studies were carried out in 
construction companies operating in the UK. Data were collected through 
archival research and semi-structured interviews, and analysed by means of 
within and cross-case analyses. The results revealed that the political 
environment of the firm was analogous to a marketplace where companies 
traded political goods with policy-makers. CSR activities produced four 
political goods, namely public image, technical expertise, social capital and 
indebtedness, which were identified as the mechanisms by which CSR 
contributed to CPP. The impacts of CSR activities on CPP were three-fold: 
CSR strengthened the privileged structural position of companies; helped 
them gain easier access to policy-makers; and this privileged access gave 
companies more opportunities to influence regulatory outcomes.  
The key theoretical contribution of the thesis is a processual model that 
illustrates how CSR contributes to CPP. There are also implications for 
practice. CSR activities are velvet curtains that hide the operationalisation of 
political power. The social and political implications call for the attention of 
government officials who favour a neoliberal doctrine for the promotion of 
CSR to business. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
Since the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, the waves of deregulation and 
privatisation programs have allowed companies to operate in areas that had 
traditionally been the responsibility of the state (Hertz, 2001; Monbiot, 2001; 
Pollock, 2005). As a result, companies have become essential parts of our 
daily lives and they have now a large influence over culture, lifestyle, and 
government policies (Wilks, 2013). For instance, seven companies dominate 
today’s world media (AOL, Time-Warner, Disney, Vivendi-Universal, 
Bertelsmann, Viacom, and News Corporation) (Jan, 2009). These media 
companies skew the content and structure of private and public debates on 
various topics, shape public opinion, and the outcomes can be wars between 
countries (Herman and Chomsky, 1994). The hegemony of the modern firm 
manifests itself in six crucial spheres of society, namely economic, socio-
cultural, work (employer-employee relationship), technological, environmental 
and political. This hegemony is generally referred to as corporate power 
(Epstein, 1973). The exercise of corporate power in the political sphere, 
named Corporate Political Power (“CPP”), is the most important of the six 
because whoever writes or influences the writing of the rules of laws, can 
align society around their interests (Xuetong, 2011). Historical examples of 
the persecutions of wealthy ethnic minorities by governments show the 
security procured by holding political power rather than economic power only. 
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Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nation (1776) echoed this dichotomy between 
economic power and political power: although wealth can be a mechanism to 
acquire political power, it does not necessarily provide it. 
While the power of business was growing under neoliberalism during the 
1980s, a phenomenon was spreading in parallel: “Corporate Social 
Responsibility” (CSR). As put by Sadler and Lloyd (2009), as the welfare state 
rolled back, CSR rolled in as substitute for regulations, driven by deliberate 
actions of governments and inter-governmental organisations like the United 
Nations (Newell, 2012). From the 1990s onwards, governments joined civil 
society organisations in the promotion of CSR to companies, asking them to 
develop, adopt, and promote voluntarily industry standards and internal codes 
of conduct (Bendell, 2004; Moon and Vogel, 2008). CSR came to be seen by 
governments and civil society as a means to economic and social ends for the 
wellbeing of society. 
Since the appearance of the modern company in the late 19th century, the 
contemporary CSR phenomenon is the latest manifestation of the 
longstanding debate over the relationship between business and society 
(Jenkins, 2005). This debate – to whom and for what the company is 
responsible for – is implicitly about the regulation of corporate power. 
According to Morris (2002) who made one of the first philosophical analysis of 
the power concept, we cannot mention one without implicitly referring to the 
other. Power and (social) responsibility are two sides of the same coin. To say 
that an actor is (socially) responsible or has obligations, is to admit the actor 
has the capacity to affect some outcomes. To say that an actor is powerful is 
to assign to this actor a responsibility for actions that affect outcomes, or the 
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omission to act despite having the capacity. The disinclination to act when 
one can, meaning the disinclination to exercise power, is to refuse 
responsibility. But this refusal does not prevent one from being held 
accountable for the outcomes. In the words of Lord Salisbury (1884): "Those 
who have the absolute power of preventing lamentable events and, knowing 
what is taking place, refuse to exercise that power, are responsible for what 
happens" (cited in Gwendolen, 1931/2013, p.98). The intrinsic relationship 
between power and responsibility explains why some scholars such as 
Bendell (2004) argue that the CSR debate is a debate on the hegemony of 
corporate power. CSR and corporate power are two inseparable subjects, 
although most scholars do no stress this point explicitly. Corporate power has 
been under-research in the CSR field. The reason is the difficulty associated 
with conceptualising power itself. What is power? Who has it, how is it 
exercised and who benefits? Contemporary economists have also tended to 
exclude corporate power from theories, except in the analysis of monopoly 
markets. Williamson (1985) justified this exclusion on the basis that “the 
concept is so poorly defined that power can be and is invoked to explain 
virtually anything” (p. 237-238). This would explain why the findings of any 
corporate power study are prone to be denounced as more representative of 
the researcher’s assumptions than reality (Luger, 2000). But as Galbraith 
(1973) and some Marxist economists (Schutz, 1995; Dementyev, 2006) 
argued, the exclusion of corporate power in theories hinder their effectiveness 
in explaining the reality of trades and social relations.  
Accounts of the relationship between CSR and corporate power are usually 
found in historical surveys of CSR and business (e.g. Eberstadt, 1973; Vogel, 
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1991; Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2005). In a thought-provoking historical 
analysis of CSR in the US, from the mid-18th century to today, Carroll and 
colleagues (2012) show that CSR engagements by the business community 
correlate with public perception of corporate economic and political power. 
The more companies appear to hold significant influence and power over 
people’s lives, the more people expect them to solve societal issues. More 
social obligations are expected to be fulfilled by businesses. Failure to meet 
those expectations of engagement in social and environmental activities, 
called “CSR activities”, has usually resulted in conflicts that jeopardised 
corporate legitimacy and revenues (e.g. boycotts, strikes) (Carroll et al., 2012). 
Some of these conflicts mobilised the public and required the government to 
intervene and regulate business activities. Such regulations came at the 
expense of the power and profits of business. Mitchell (1986), Carroll et al. 
(2012) and the consultancy firm SustainAbility (2002) identified a 10-year gap 
in average between visible conflicts, and the prevalence of CSR activities by 
business that addressed the issues that created those conflicts. According to 
these three, the 1920s, 1970s and 2000s were periods during which CSR 
activities gained in popularity in the US. The 1920s followed the progressive 
era during which the power of large companies and the so-called robber 
barons were scrutinised. The 1970s followed the rise of the environmental 
movement during the 1960s. The CSR period of the 2000s emerged from the 
“name and shame” campaigns of the 1990s, epitomised by the “Battle of 
Seattle” at the World Trade Organisation in 1999. Another pattern found by 
these historical studies is that since the 1970s, when a crisis occurs, 
companies react immediately to public criticism with various social initiatives 
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to protect their image. Recent evidence can be found in the after-effects of 
corporate scandals such as Enron, and the 2008 financial crisis. Companies 
responded to these crises by pledging to be more socially responsible. Today 
93 percent of the 250 largest global companies report on their social and 
environmental practices, compared to only 12 percent in 1993 (KPMG, 2005, 
2013).  
 
A number of contemporary authors have tried to bring corporate power in the 
CSR debate through descriptive accounts of social reality (Richter, 2001; 
Doane, 2005; Barley, 2007; Conrad and Abbot, 2007; Devinney, 2009; Newell, 
2012; Stiglitz, 2011). According to them, CSR opens up opportunities for 
companies to exercise CPP and capture the public policy-making process by 
moving it from the public arena to the private. Ironically these critics of CSR 
who are often against neoliberal capitalism and globalisation, echo claims on 
the political consequences of CSR made by a number of neoliberal 
economists such as Levitt (1958), Friedman (1962) and Bauer (1982). 
According to these neoliberal scholars, laissez faire capitalism “promotes 
political freedom because it separates economic power from political power 
and in this way enables the one to offset the other” (Friedman, 1962, p.9). The 
arguments against CSR were summarised in the widely cited New York Times 
article by Friedman (1970), The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase its Profits. In the article, Friedman (1970) called CSR a political and 
subversive doctrine that relied on political mechanisms to bridge economic 
and political powers, and turn a corporate philanthropist into a “legislator, 
executive and, jurist” (p.33). He framed the CSR debate as a trade off 
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between welfare provided by business, and consumers’ political power 
(freedom in a democracy), and claimed that the corporate philanthropist would 
end up with great political power to the detriment of the beneficiaries of its 
social actions. For Friedman, CSR shared the same objectives as government 
welfare to address the externalities of the market to achieve a certain level of 
economic equality in society. Although these are admirable goals, Friedman 
argued that they diminished the economic and political freedoms of recipients 
as the philanthropists imposed decisions on them.  
Since the publication of this famous essay, much has been written to refute 
Friedman’s central argument, namely that the role of the firm in society should 
be to focus on making profits within legal and ethical boundaries, rather than 
attending to the practice of CSR (Banerjee, 2007; Feldman, 2007). However 
his other argument, that the beneficiaries of corporate welfare might lose their 
political power and freedom in the exchange, has been lost in the debate 
between advocates and opponents of CSR. This thesis is motivated by the 
theoretical problem that Friedman (1962, 1970) and other neoliberal 
economists (e.g. Bauer, 1982) raised: governments and civil society 
encourage business to undertake CSR for the public interest, yet more CSR 
might strengthen CPP that would be used to undermine the interest of the 
public. Therein lies a possible paradox of CSR, which invites for theoretical 
and empirical research on the political nature of CSR. Scholars have neither 
theoretically discussed this CSR paradox, nor provided empirical accounts of 
how the relationship between CSR activities and CPP unfolds. However the 
analysis of the paradox of CSR itself is problematic because, it requires 
investigating the impact of CPP on companies’ stakeholders and the public at 
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large. As Mitchell et al. (1997) have argued, the identification and selection of 
stakeholders are always open to challenge. For this reason this study will not 
research the paradox of CSR per se (i.e. the effects on stakeholders), but will 
focus on its mechanisms (i.e. how the link CSR-CPP comes to exist). 
 
1.2 Purpose and Research Question 
CSR and CPP are timely topics because of the effects of globalisation, the 
crisis of welfare state programmes, and the constant debates on climate 
change and corporate malpractices (Albareda et al., 2007). On the one hand, 
CSR and broader sustainability issues are now of interest to all citizens, 
including academics, businesses, government officials1, civil society2 and 
general members of the public (Vallentin and Murillo, 2012). On the other 
hand, the influence of business in public policy-making is of increasing 
concern, as corporate wealth is perceived to corrupt elected government 
officials and corrode the principles of democracy (Carroll, 2004; Barley, 2007; 
Ellis, 2008). Given their current importance, CSR and CPP are therefore 
critical fields of research. But scholars tend to study them in parallel, as if they 
were without affinity. The insufficient attention paid theoretically and 
empirically to the intrinsic relationship between responsibility and power might 
explain the dearth of research on how CSR and CPP are connected (Mitchell, 
1986). How does this relationship work? What are the mechanisms by which 
CSR activities lead to CPP? The literature still lacks clear answers to these 
questions despite recent calls to study the political dimension of CSR (Lyon 
                                                
1 The terms “policy-maker”, “politician”, “government official” and “public official” are used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
 
2 “Civil society” refers to the association of “civil groups” that are formal or informal not-for-
profit organisations and networks not connected to governmental institutions. 
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and Maxwell, 2008; Hadanis and Coombes, 2012; Hond et al., 2014). The 
exploration of CSR activities through a political lens could advance our current 
understanding of this contested concept, which remains difficult to define and 
operationalise (Gond and Moon, 2011). Given the research problem identified, 
the mechanism of the relationship between CSR and CPP, the main research 
question addressed by this study is: How does CSR contribute to CPP? 
This research question will guide the study in the identification of the methods 
and processes by which CSR activities link to corporate power in the political 
arena.  
  
1.3 Contributions  
There are a number of reasons why this study is significant for theory and 
practice. Firstly, it examines the political dimension of CSR and its political 
effects from a business perspective. This approach departs from mainstream 
research on CSR that neglects corporate power, and have tended to 
emphasise its economic dimension (Vogel, 2005). As such the study draws 
attention and contributes to the political theory of CSR “extended corporate 
citizenship” (Matten and Crane, 2005), which is still predominantly theoretical 
and descriptive, by giving empirical evidence to its proposition that CSR 
activities are political acts. The study built on Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) claims 
that the political environment of the firm is comparable to a marketplace, and 
a successful exercise of CPP requires an exchange of political goods 
between the firm and policy-makers. It was found that political goods were the 
mechanisms by which CSR activities contribute to the power of the firm in the 
political arena. CSR activities produce four political goods, namely public 
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image, technical expertise, social capital and indebtedness, which are used 
by companies to get access to policy-makers, and then persuade them to 
adopt the firm’s propositions on a public issue. These findings will expand 
knowledge in the field of management and political sciences, because they 
present CSR activities as substitutes of “traditional” political activities, such as 
financial donations. 
 
Secondly, the study narrows the gap in knowledge on the political nature and 
impacts of CSR, which have received relatively little attention in the 
management literature to date. The study did not find evidence that 
businesses engaged in social or environmental activities for the public but to 
advance or protect their own interests. By adding this finding to the first one, 
that is CSR contributes to CPP by giving more opportunities to companies to 
shape government policies, the results of this thesis lend support to the 
existence of a paradox of CSR: CSR yields CPP, and the political effects of 
CSR could be harmful to the public because, when the interest of companies 
and the public are at odds, it is unlikely that companies use their strengthened 
CPP by CSR to support regulations that goes against their self-interest.   
This observation challenges the mainstream discourse on the merits and 
social benefits of CSR, encapsulated in the motto of the business case for 
CSR, “doing well by doing good”. The societal implications of this finding 
should encourage all actors engaged in the debate on CSR, to put power 
back at the centre of the discourse. CSR needs to be seen as a set of 
activities that have political consequences. 
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Thirdly, the study develops a conceptual model that depicts the relationship 
between CSR and CPP. The model exposes what I call the “political case for 
CSR”, which is the undertaking of CSR activities on political grounds (the 
advantages brought by CSR activities to the firm by political means). The 
model provides researchers with a novel framework to research the link 
between CSR and corporate financial performance, through the analysis of 
the political effects of CSR on the firm.  
Finally, the study answers calls by scholars to contextualise research on 
corporate social and political activities. Both concepts, CSR and CPP, are 
contingent upon time, culture, industry and situations (Skippari et al., 2005; 
Carroll et al., 2012). Yet the majority of empirical studies mix data from 
various industries that face different social and political issues. Research on 
corporate political activities (CPAs), which are associated with CPP, has been 
particularly criticised for being US-centric (Skippari et al., 2005; Frynas et al., 
2006; Rasche, 2015). This prevalence is explained by the availability and 
easy access to quantitative data on corporate political expenditure in the US, 
data that are not available to the same extent in other countries (Shaffer, 
1995; Lawton et al., 2013). However cultures and business practices vary 
between nations, therefore research in this field needs more data with a non 
North American perspective (Barron, 2010). This thesis addresses these gaps 
by focusing on the UK, and more particularly the British construction industry. 
Three arguments motivated these choices. Firstly, the UK is one of the 
leading advocates of CSR and neoliberal capitalism in Europe (Crouch, 2011; 
Kinderman, 2012). Therefore we should expect CSR activities to be prominent 
in the country and the political effects observable. Secondly, the 
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characteristics of the British construction industry make it attractive for this 
research. Not only does the industry create products that shape social life in 
communities (e.g. houses and office buildings), but the industry has also a 
very close relationship with the British government because it is the largest 
client. The industry is known to have “the greatest propensity to bribe public 
officials and exert undue influence on government policies and regulations” 
(Transparency International UK, 2008). Last, there is limited knowledge on 
CSR and political activities in the British construction industry (Murray and 
Dainty, 2008). These characteristics made this industry a good contextual 
background to expand knowledge in the fields of CSR and CPP. 
 
1.4 Scope and Structure of the Thesis 
The research problem addressed is CSR as a paradoxical promoter of CPP. 
The scope of this study is therefore restricted to the political environment of 
the firm, and to the study of the business-government relationship. Since it is 
the firm that practices CSR and enters the political arena to influence 
government policies, the firm is the unit of analysis. The analysis takes place 
at the organisational level from the firm’s perspective. The study is in one 
direction only, from the firm to the government. The study focuses on the 
British construction industry, the reasons for which will be given in details in 
Chapters 3 and 4.   
The thesis is divided into six chapters. This first chapter introduced the topic 
of the research, the rationale and the main contributions expected. Chapter 2 
consists of the literature review on power and corporate political activities, 
followed by the review of the political aspects of CSR. The chapter starts by 
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defining CPP and discussing the nature of the firm in order to clarify the unit of 
analysis of the research. It then discusses the operationalisation of CPP, and 
the factors that drive companies to seek CPP and how. The results of these 
discussions then guide the review of the CSR literature. Chapter 2 culminates 
in an initial conceptual model upon which the research is based. 
Chapter 3 discusses the philosophical approach, assumptions and contextual 
background that led to the methodology and methods employed for the 
research. A multiple case study approach was adopted, which looked for 
literal replication across three cases of the mechanisms of CSR-CPP 
identified in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 4 consists of the presentation of the industry in which the three case 
study companies operate, followed by the presentation of the findings from 
individual cases. Chapter 5 presents the cross-case analyses of findings of 
the case studies, and discusses the significance of the results in relation to 
the existing theoretical and empirical understanding of both CSR and CPP. 
Also presented is the final model that captures the CSR-CPP relationship.  
Finally chapter 6 is the concluding chapter of the study. It highlights the key 
contributions of the thesis for government officials, practitioners and 
academics. The limitations of the study, and opportunities for future research, 
are also discussed. 
 
1.5 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has introduced the research topic and the research rationale. 
The objectives and a summary of the research contribution have also been 
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presented, as well as the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the 
relevant literature. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
On the basis of the main research question presented in the preceding 
chapter, this thesis’ interest lies in the study of the political mechanisms and 
processes by which CSR activities contribute to the political power of the firm. 
To this end, this chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature that 
will support the research objective. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the 
two concepts under study, corporate power and CSR, the study will draw on 
various disciplines, but particularly management and political economy. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section brings attention to 
the meaning of power and CPP as employed in this study. As put by Nye 
(1990), power “is like love…easier to experience than to define or measure, 
but no less real for that.” (p.177). The concept is so subjective and amorphous 
that there is no single operational definition or measurement method of it 
(Chassagnon, 2009). The definitions are brought early on to avoid confusion 
and misunderstanding from the reader.  
The second section reviews the nature of the firm and its purpose, in order to 
clarify the actors that the study focuses on, and the level of analysis. The third 
section reviews the existing literature on the theories of power and the related 
term “Corporate Political Activity” (CPA). From the review and the discussion 
that follows, CPP is conceptualised and operationalised to facilitate the 
identification of the CSR-CPP mechanisms. The fourth section reviews the 
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literature on CSR from a political perspective, including its determinants and 
effects. Finally, the chapter concludes with a synthesis of the preceding 
sections. It presents the gaps in the literature, the research question, and a 
conceptual model of the relationship between CSR and CPP. 
 
2.2 Defining Power 
A critical element that often leads to a misunderstanding of power is the lack 
of distinction between “power” and “influence”, even among students of power. 
For instance, Dahl (1961) tends to use the term “influence”, whereas his 
colleague Polsby (1960) favours the use of “power”. The distinction is not a 
mere concern of semantics because, as discourse theory explains, how we 
think and talk about a subject determines how we act in relation to that subject 
(Foucault, 1977, 1980). Therefore how one decides to differentiate (or not) 
power from influence affects (a) his or her definition of power by enlarging or 
restricting its operationalisation; (b) how he or she perceives power to 
manifest itself and be exercised; (c) the methods of measurement and 
ultimately, (d) the theory of power that one develops.  
Some researchers treat the terms power and influence as synonyms and 
others do not; this contributes to the plethora of power theories found in the 
literature (Mann, 1986). Moscovici (1976) insisted on making the distinction 
between influence, power and dependence. According to him, we should not 
consider that if B is under influence of A, it means that B is dependent on A, 
or that A is more powerful than B. For instance in medieval time, a king was 
supposed to be the most powerful individual in a kingdom, but the queen or 
the priest may have had more influence on him than the barons. “Karl Marx’s 
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ideas were influential but the man himself was not powerful, but Stalin…. 
[was] a man of influence only because he [was] first a man of power” 
(Bierstedt, 1950, p.731-732). The nature of the difference between power and 
influence has taken several forms in the literature. Two that are noteworthy 
are the sanction-based distinction (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950) and the 
intention-based distinction (Wrong, 1979) (for a full review see Zimmerling, 
2005). 
The central argument of the sanction-based distinction is that power is 
coercive persuasion and exercised by coercion and sanctions. Influence is 
non-coercive persuasion and takes place by means of information and advice. 
This distinction between power and influence is the predominant paradigm in 
our society, with the underlying assumption that the exercise of power implies 
an adversarial relation between actors (Karlberg, 2005). Power is perceived 
like an ability or potential yet to be realised (i.e. a ‘stored’ capacity), and 
influence is the manifestation of that capacity by the power-holder (Scott, 
2001a; Karlberg, 2005).  
In contrast to the sanction-based distinction, the intention-based distinction 
argues that power represents a special case of influence. Influence is the 
general concept and power is a sub-category of it. “Power is the capacity of 
some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others” (Wrong, 
1979, p.2). Wrong’s definition implies that any accidental effect on others is 
not a manifestation of power but influence. According to him, the tendency for 
people to use the terms power and influence alternatively is due to the fact 
that in European languages, there is no verb for “power”. Instead of “the boss 
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powers the workers”, we say “the boss influences the workers”, with 
“influence” meaning that the boss exercises power (Willer et al., 1997). 
 
From a sanction-based distinction perspective, power could be effected 
without being exercised when for instance, people behave in a certain way 
due to their belief that the actor with the capacity to exercise power might do it 
at any moment. Scott (2001a) sees this alteration of behaviour based on an 
anticipated reaction as an effect of the person’s power, but for Wrong (1979), 
this change in behaviour is an effect of the person’s (unintended) influence. 
The belief of future power manifestation is imaginary; its origin is the result of 
the influence’s halo effect perceived through resources attributed to the 
individual, such as physical force, money or authority. Once individuals are 
aware of someone’s power capacity and believe this power can affect them, 
they will modify their behaviour by themselves and behave according to what 
they think the actor expects or not. More importantly, this belief of anticipated 
reactions could increase an actor’s power at the expense of those who hold 
this belief: 
“If an actor is believed to be powerful, if he knows that others hold such 
a belief, and if he encourages it and resolves to make use of it by 
intervening in or punishing actions by the others who do not comply with 
his wishes, then he truly has power and his power has indeed been 
conferred on him by the attributions, perhaps initially without foundation, 
of others” (Wrong 1979, p.9) 
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The clarity of the argument put forward by Wrong (1979) convinces me to 
adopt his definition of power for this thesis. Building on it, CPP is defined as 
the capacity of a firm to produce intended and foreseen effects on the 
regulatory processes and outcomes. 
 
Following this explanation of the distinction between power and influence, and 
having defined CPP accordingly, in the next section I clarify the analytical 
approach of the study with a discussion on the nature of the firm and its 
purpose. 
   
2.3 The Nature and Purpose of the Firm 
One of the legacies of the Roman Empire that is still with us today, is the 
invention of the company and corporate laws. Their form of companies, the 
‘societates’, were originally social institutions created for the common good of 
the community such as municipalities and colleges, but also associations of 
craftsmen and merchants to form guilds (Keay, 1991; Branco, 2006). Over 
time the corporate form has changed, from its Roman origin with a non-for-
profit and community-orientation, to its present for-profit orientation. Many 
theories from various disciplines have been proposed to explain the nature 
and purpose of the firm. Three are prevalent in social science: (1) the agency 
theory that presents the firm as a legal fiction, (2) the real entity theory that 
views the firm as a legal person, and (3) the corporate personhood theory that 
describes the firm as a moral person. Each view is discussed in turn. 
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The dominant view among economists is that the company is a fictional entity. 
First posited in Coase’s (1937) contractual theory, and then developed by 
agency theorists (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the company is described as 
an entity that comes to existence to reduce transaction costs that take place 
in the market between contracting parties. The company acts as a nexus of 
contracting relationships between rational individuals, whether inside or 
outside the firm. Each individual part of the nexus (workers, managers, 
shareholders, customers, creditors…) legally contracts with each other to gain 
economically, by exchanging their property voluntarily, whether that is labour, 
products, services or money (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Since the 
company consists of an aggregation of individuals who agree to trade with 
each other for efficiency reasons, the company itself is largely fictitious 
(Phillips, 1994). The corollary is that the firm as a legal fiction has no power, 
rights or responsibilities, but the individuals who contribute, gain or suffer a 
loss in a transaction do. They are the ones who should be legally liable and 
responsible for the transactions, although they can include a clause of limited 
liability in their contract (Rönnegard, 2015). As put by Milton Friedman (in The 
Corporation, 2003: video):  
“If a building can’t have responsibilities what does it mean to say that a 
corporation can’t? A corporation is simply an artificial legal structure. It 
doesn’t have any [social responsibility], it’s neither moral nor immoral. 
It’s simply what it is. But the people who are engaged in it, whether the 
stockholders, whether the executives in it, whether the employees, they 
all have moral responsibilities”. 
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Under agency theory, shareholders delegate the responsibility of managing 
the company to managers, their agents, who then oversee the transactions 
between contracting parties in the best interest of shareholders. This 
arrangement is typical in the modern form of the public limited company. The 
creditors, managers and other contracting parties have fixed claims against 
corporate revenue. They are usually compensated in advance of shareholders, 
who have a contractual claim on the residual value of the company once all 
obligations have been paid. In that sense, shareholders are residual risk 
bearers and residual claimants (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). In addition to 
providing the initial capital that allows the formation of contractual 
relationships, they are the only ones to bear the costs of contracting 
relationship. For this reason, agency theorists claim that the rights of 
shareholder are prima facie and therefore, their objectives should be the only 
ones to be pursued by the company. This idea has evolved into the 
“shareholder primacy” argument that holds that the interests of the company 
and shareholders are one (Stout, 2002). Corporate managers owe 
shareholders the fiduciary duty to maximise shareholder value, which is 
measured by the rise of the share price and dividend payments. 
 
A number of critiques have been levelled against agency theory, in particular 
for its proposition that the main purpose of the firm is to maximise shareholder 
value. Cyert and March (1963), who proposed a behavioural theory of the firm 
to explain how decisions were made within companies, consider this 
argument too theoretical, and argue that it is not representative of companies 
in the real world. In reality, corporate managers have difficulties to manage 
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resources efficiently and make the right decisions, because they do not have 
perfect knowledge of the market. More importantly, not all companies try to 
maximise shareholder value. For instance family firms, public or private, 
invest cautiously because their objective is to create socio-emotional wealth 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), and pass the firm on to the next generations (Lee, 
2006). Making a profit is essential to keep the business running, but it would 
be short-sighted to claim that the only satisfaction in the life of the principal, or 
its agent, is to maximise their personal wealth. Because shareholders are 
human beings with diverging interests, there is no single metric of 
“shareholder value” argues the legal scholar Stout (2012). Just as all do not 
share the same view on a company’s strategy, it cannot be assumed that all 
agree on what constitutes an acceptable level of profit and dividend (i.e. 
shareholder value). 
Another opposition to the assumptions and predictions of the contractual and 
agency theories is articulated by Blair and Stout’s (1999) team production 
theory. The team production theory posits that all contracting parties in the 
nexus of the firm invest time, money, and expertise into developing a working 
relationship with the firm, albeit to varying degrees. Their investment has a 
value that contributes to the firm’s success, so the contribution of all these 
parties is a team effort. This effort cannot be fully protected by formal 
contracts, and all team members are at risk of having the value of their 
investment undermined if one member (e.g. shareholders) is given control of 
the company, or control of how profits generated by the team should be 
divided. Due to the incompleteness of contracts, to protect the investment of 
all the contracting parties ex-ante, corporate governance mechanisms must 
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be put in place. For instance an independent board of directors could mediate 
the conflict of interests between the team members. The team production 
theory suggests the firm is not a nexus of contracts but a nexus of firm-
specific investments, with many residual claimants that must be 
accommodated. Blair and Stout’s (1999) claim of incomplete contracts is 
echoed by Zingales (2000), who calls for a distinction between the theory of 
the firm as a nexus of explicit contracts as described by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), and a theory of the firm as a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts. 
The latter suggests that not all possibilities are predictable and contractible, 
therefore not all contracting parties are fully protected in a contract.  For 
instance, most employees cannot negotiate the terms of their employment.  In 
addition, some implicit elements like reputation and legitimacy are built over 
time after an explicit contract has been agreed. Under this new conception of 
the nexus-of-contract, the firm is responsible for protecting the interests of all 
parties part of the firm-nexus, shareholders and others. Moreover, because 
some decisions regarding the allocation of the firm’s resources affect 
individuals who do not contract but are victims of externalities, the firm has an 
implicit responsibility toward all individuals that the nexus affects (Freeman, 
1984).  
 
 The second view on the nature of the firm is captured by the real entity theory, 
popular among legal scholars (Phillips, 1994; Avi-Yonah, 2005). The theory 
conceptualises the company as a legal person in its own right. It is not the 
sum of its members but a separate and legal entity, amoral, that pursues its 
own interest, which is firm value creation (Bakan, 2005; Rönnegard, 2015). 
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The main claim of the theory is that the firm has rights of its own that are 
distinct of its members. In a way the theory advocates “corporate primacy”, 
but as Rönnegard points out (2015), in practice the firm has rights and 
interests that cannot be entirely different of the interests from its members. 
Today this second view of corporate nature is the prevalent opinion in practice. 
In UK corporate law, a private company is not a legal fiction but a legal person 
with perpetual life, separate and distinct from its members. The company has 
the right to own property, sue and be sued, bears responsibility and civil and 
criminal limited liability (French et al., 2014). The main characteristic of the 
Anglo-American model of the firm is its shareholder-centric orientation, but UK 
corporate law has made attempts to balance shareholder’s interests, and the 
ones of other corporate members, by promoting “enlightened shareholder 
value” (Williams and Conley, 2005; Brammer et al., 2012). The UK 
Companies Act 2006 requires corporate managers to create value for the firm 
by taking into account the short and long-term effects of corporate activities 
on the environment and communities. 
  
The third and final perspective on corporate nature is found in corporate 
personhood theory, which holds that the firm is a real and moral person. This 
attribution of a metaphysical status to the firm, built on the real entity theory, 
has been championed by French (1979, 1996). The corporate personhood 
theory claims that the company is a moral entity, with its own personality like 
any individual, distinct from those who work in it. The company bears legal 
and moral obligations, and it is this legal person that should be the only one 
liable for corporate misconduct. Corporate moral theorists advance three 
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arguments to support their theory (French, 1996; Goodpaster; 1984; Arnold, 
2006): firstly, a company has a name and identity independent of the 
members that create and work in it. People refer and treat organisations like 
real persons, for example through statements like “company X damages the 
environment”. Secondly, the company is formed of the aggregation of several 
people, including workers and shareholders that compose it, but it has a 
personality of its own. The company is not the sum of its parts; it has its own 
culture that influences and is influenced by its internal and external 
environment (Phillips, 1994). By indoctrination, employees adopt the “cult” of 
the company. As research on group behaviour indicates, one’s behaviour 
change when one joins or is affiliated with a social group (Held, 1970; French, 
1979; Nesteruk, 1991; Rhee, 2008). Finally, the purpose of the corporate 
person is incorporated in its structure by default when it is created, i.e. the 
articles of incorporation of the firm, and the act of incorporation issued by the 
government state the purpose of the business. Hence the intentions of a 
company do not emerge suddenly in the course of actions as part of an 
unexpected desire by the owners or managers. And if a company during its 
existence decides to change the goal of its activities, it is legally obliged to 
submit new articles of incorporation that describe its new purpose to 
Companies House, the British government agency that issues and monitors 
corporate “birth certificates”. 
This last view of the firm as an independent moral agent with a conscience of 
its own has been heavily criticized, the main objection being that the corporate 
entity is not truly independent of its members because it does not develop 
intentions and act by itself (Velasquez, 1983, 2003; Werhane, 1985; Phillips, 
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1994; Metzger and Dalton, 1996). Critics also argue that the firm is not merely 
a legal entity in contemplation of the law, but a legal instrument invented to 
further the interest of its owner(s) (Rönnegard, 2015). The distance between 
“corporate primacy” and “shareholder primacy” is not large. 
 
In spite of their differences, these three views on corporate nature (legal 
fiction, legal person, moral person) share the belief that a company is by 
nature a revenue-seeking entity. Without revenues, its life expectancy is short 
(Carroll, 1991; Phillips, 1994). The revenue activities of the firm are 
constrained by the legal framework set by government that determines, 
monitors and enforces corporate activities, accountability, responsibility and 
liability (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Since government policies affect the 
operations of the firm and therefore its revenues, it must engage in political 
advocacy. The firm must either convince the government to provide a legal 
framework that gives it opportunities to operate and obtain revenues, or 
mitigate the effects of public policies that threaten these opportunities 
(Buchholz, 1994). How the firm does any of those through CSR is the subject 
of this thesis. Consequently the analysis is about the inter-organisational 
relationship between these two actors, the firm that seeks CPP to exist, and 
the government that designs and implements public policies that assist or 
hinder corporate activities (Stevens et al., 1986). The study is from the firm’s 
perspective only. To be close to reality within the scope of this thesis, I follow 
UK corporate law with its concept of “enlightened shareholder value” that sits 
between the American shareholder wealth-maximising orientation, and the 
Continental European stakeholder model of the firm (William and Conley, 
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2005). Therefore I view the firm as described by the real entity theory. That is 
the firm, the unit of analysis, is a legal person, an amoral citizen that seeks to 
further its own interests by social, environmental and political activities. 
 
Having clarified the level of analysis of the study, I turn next to the review of 
the power literature. 
 
2.4 Corporate Political Power 
The theories of power by the political scientists Dahl (1957, 1961), Mills (1956, 
1958), Bachrach and Baratz (1962), Lukes (1974), Foucault (1977, 1980) and 
Giddens (1984), have greatly contributed to our understanding of the political 
power of business by explaining the different forms that power can take when 
it manifests. I will first review the main forms of power in the literature for an 
overview. This will provide the basis for the later discussion of their 
applications to the business firm in the political arena. 
 
2.4.1 Forms of Power  
The first form of power is “overt power”, which consists in observable actions 
by actors in the public decision-making arena. This theory is associated with 
Dahl’s (1961) pluralist view of power, which claims that power is exercised by 
several interest groups3 and is therefore pluralistic. The pluralists emphasise 
study of the visible exercise of power, that is power is analysed only during 
observable conflicts to see who gains and loses during the bargaining. This 
approach aims at demonstrating there is no elite group that has more power 
                                                
3 An interest group is a single actor, or group of actors, with preferences for or a stake in a 
particular issue  (Baron, 1995). 
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than any other interest group. It also follows the conventional scientific 
analytic methods that require studying visible and quantifiable facts for 
demonstration (McGettigan, 2002).  
 
The second form of power is “hidden power”, also called “covert power”. It is 
found in the capacity of an actor to suppress decision-making processes 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). The actor uses the structures of a social, 
economic or political system to create or reinforce barriers to public debates 
of policy conflicts. Contrary to “overt power” that is instrumental because it 
relies on agency/actions where causes and effects are observable, “hidden 
power” is structural (Bernhagen and Bräuninger, 2005). The central claim of 
this second form of power is that the control of the agenda is a crucial aspect 
of the exercise of power, so the powerful actors are the ones able to 
manipulate to their advantage the bias (‘rules of the game’) inherent in the 
structure of institutions. By doing so, an elite group can define the agenda 
outside the public decision-making process to prevent certain actors, issues 
or conflicts to appear or being raised in public (Mills, 1956, 1958). As Langer 
(1948) remarked, “the way a question is asked limits and disposes the way in 
which any answer to it, right or wrong, may be given”(p.1).   
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) oppose the overt face of power as a full 
representation of the nature of power, but agree with Dahl (1961) for a 
scientific analysis of it. They claim that non-decision barriers are observable 
and that for power to exist, observable overt or covert conflicts must be 
present (McGettigan, 2002). If there are no observable conflicts, we cannot 
judge accurately whether “consensus is genuine or instead has been enforced 
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through non decision-making” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p.49). They 
suggest that researchers focus on who decides what, when and how, who 
remains outside the public decision-making arena, how it is done, and the 
interconnections between the overt and covert faces of power. But for Lukes 
(1974), the flaw of covert power is its similarity to overt power: both recognise 
the existence of power only in situation of conflicts, when actually the most 
effective use of power is to prevent such conflicts from arising in the first place. 
For this reason, he proposed a third form of power. 
 
The third form of power is “radical power”, also called “invisible power”. It 
consists in preventing conflicts from arising altogether, by the creation of false 
consciousness in the mind of opponents during overt and covert conflicts, but 
also in situations of potential or latent conflicts (Lukes, 1974). Put simply, the 
invisible face of power refers to A’s ability to set the agenda and influence 
norms and ideas without directly targeting B, but by embedding A’s 
knowledge in social structures through discourses (Strange, 1994). Discourse 
is the combination of knowledge and communication, a “complex mixture of 
ideas and expressions through which individuals both perceive and in turn try 
to explain social reality” (Goverde et al. 2000, p.14). Power holders 
manipulate their opponents’ real interests by institutionalising them through 
education (family, church, school), mass media (newspaper, TV, radio), and 
socialisation processes (social clubs, work place, political parties). 
Institutionalisation leads to the self-regulation of opponents, who then 
voluntarily make decisions that might be against their real preferences and 
interests. Power used this way creates illusions to manufacture consent of 
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opponents, making conflicts of opinion non-existent or never being raised in 
public (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). This mechanism of invisible power 
overlaps to some extent with Foucault’s (1977) claim that knowledge 
produces power and power produces knowledge. The power-knowledge circle 
institutionalises certain values and beliefs in society (e.g. belief in laissez faire 
capitalism), and disciplines the thoughts and behaviours of people. The 
difference between Luke (1974) and Foucault (1977) is that the latter was a 
post-modernist, who believed power was not the property of an actor, but was 
embedded within the social fabric of society. For Foucault, power was 
everywhere and everyone was subject to it. No single actor could hold and 
exercise power. 
The critics of invisible power (Bradshaw, 1976; Clegg, 1989; Berenskoetter, 
2007) argue that it cannot be operationalised, because to recognise it requires 
first to identify intentionally manipulated referents and discursive information 
by A that interrupt B’s true interests. Benton (1981) called this impasse the 
“paradox of emancipation” (p.162). People do not know their real interests 
until they are emancipated from the effects of invisible power, yet becoming 
emancipated from it requires becoming aware of it first. Because invisible 
power prevents one‘s ability to recognise and challenge it, emancipation 
cannot occur. Therein lies the paradox. Lukes, despite his strong case against 
the other two forms power, acknowledged that the third form could not be 
easily examined empirically (Shapiro, 2006). 
 
Having reviewed the three facets of power generally found in the literature, 
they will now be applied to politically active firms.  
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2.4.2 Framework of CPP 
Building upon these general theories on the forms of power, Veneklasen and 
Miller (2002) created a framework called the Power Matrix that operationalises 
power. It breaks down the forms into three types (visible, hidden and invisible), 
and presents the instruments (activities, norms and practices) that put in 
motion the mechanisms of each power form. 
 
Forms of 
Power 
Visible 
(observable 
decision-making) 
Hidden 
(setting the political 
agenda) 
Invisible 
(shaping meaning) 
Descriptions The formal rules, 
structures, 
authorities, 
institutions, and 
procedures of 
decision-making. 
Power by 
controlling who gets 
to the decision-
making table, and 
by setting the 
options visible on 
the agenda before 
the observable 
bargaining starts. 
Problems and issues 
are not only kept from 
the agenda, but also 
from the 
consciousness of 
actors who get to the 
decision-making table. 
Mechanisms Visible actions that 
shape the formal 
rules of society. 
Exclusion and 
delegitimation of 
certain groups by 
unwritten rules, 
practices, and 
institutions. 
Institutionalisation by 
control of 
knowledge/information. 
Instruments Laws, constitutions, 
budgets, 
conventions, 
standards. 
Any actions that 
silence, intimidate, 
misinform or co-opt 
(e.g. private 
meetings outside 
the public decision-
making arena; 
chairing of a 
meeting to set the 
agenda). 
Practices and cultural 
norms that shape 
people’s 
understanding of their 
needs and possibilities 
in ways that deter 
effective actions for 
change (e.g. religious 
education, 
advertising). 
 
Table 1: Power Matrix (adapted from Veneklasen and Miller, 2002) 
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The Power Matrix is popular among students of CPP (e.g. Levy and Egan, 
2003; Fuchs, 2005; Berenskoetter, 2007; Hathaway, 2013a) due to its 
simplicity in applying it to business and therefore, operationalising CPP. The 
matrix helps visualising, identifying and exploring the sources and 
mechanisms of power that affect a given issue, to then develop the 
appropriate response to reinforce or tackle them. When using the matrix, one 
must assume that the mechanisms of one power form can create or 
complement the exercise of another power form. This forces the researcher to 
uncover their interplay and effects when collecting data, and prevent 
privileging one power form over others. As put by Hathaway (2013b), “the 
Sicilian Mafia is powerful not only due to its use of violence (visible power) but 
due to its corruption of officials (hidden power) and Omerta – its code of 
silence (invisible power). Exploring only one form of power would not allow an 
understanding of the power of the Mafia.” (p.2).   
 
To discuss the application of the Power Matrix in the political arena, I refer to 
the forms of power as ‘forms of CPP’. Scholars and practitioners use various 
general terms to refer to the multitude of instruments of the three forms of 
CPP. They include lobbying, corporate political activity, corporate political 
tactic, public affairs, government relations, public issues management, 
political marketing, or still political public relations (McGrath et al., 2010). It 
needs to be pointed out that the popularity of “lobbying” as an umbrella term is 
not merited. Lobbying consists only in the provision of information as input on 
a current or future public policy on behalf of a company (Anastasiadis, 2006). 
In this thesis, Corporate Political Activity (CPA) will be used as the umbrella 
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term to refer to the firm’s instruments – visible, hidden and invisible – used in 
the political environment to produce political outcomes that ensure its 
economic success (Getz, 1997).  In what follows I discuss each form of CPP. 
 
Visible CPP: 
Visible CPP is instrumental, in the sense that it consists of observable acts 
perpetrated by corporate actors. The taxonomy of CPAs presented in Table 2 
below lists the main corporate activities recognised as instruments of visible 
CPP in the literature on corporate political activity.   
 
Table 2: Types of CPAs 
(adapted from Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 1999) 
                                                
4  Constituency building is an “attempt to influence public policy by gaining support of 
individual voters and citizens, who, in turn, express their policy preferences to political 
decision makers” (Hillman and Hitt, 1999, p. 834). 
5 Astroturfing are political activities created and sponsored by companies that are designed to 
look like grassroots efforts and bottom-up activism that support companies' position on a 
public issue. 
Type of CPA Function Activities 
Financial Persuade policy-makers 
through financial 
contributions 
Donations to policy-makers and 
political parties, speaking fees, 
personal services provision, bribery, 
hire of board members with political 
experience (revolving door) 
Informational Persuade policy-makers 
through the provision of 
information 
Lobbying (i.e. the provision of 
information, such as commissioning 
and reporting research and survey 
results, private meeting, testifying as 
expert witness before government 
bodies, responding to government 
consultations, supplying position 
papers or technical reports, press 
releases diffusion), advocacy 
advertising, newspaper op-eds, 
litigations, revolving door 
Relational Persuade policy-makers 
through political ties 
Constituency building4, coalition 
building, Astroturfing5, revolving door  
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The financial type of CPAs encompasses economic contributions to 
government officials directly (e.g. political campaign donations) and indirectly 
(e.g. event sponsorships). These incentives enable the firm to gain access to 
those policy-makers, and convince them to align their political decision to the 
view of the firm on a particular issue (Bonardi et al., 2006).  
CPAs of the informational type consist in informing policy-makers on issues 
faced by the firm or group of firms in an industry, and recommending to them 
political responses to those issues. The company can take a pro-active stance 
to convey information by seeking private meetings with government officials, 
or take a passive approach and provide information during official government 
consultations mainly (Meznar and Nigh, 1995). In the UK, proposals for new 
policies are normally drafted by government agencies, which then invite 
citizens to respond to a consultation on the proposal before it is submitted to 
the Parliament for ratification. The consultation stage is usually where 
companies and other interest groups compete to have their policy preferences 
included in the final draft of the proposed policy. According to Rajwani and 
Liedong (2015), the informational type of CPA is under researched in the 
literature because it is difficult to measure, but it could be the most effective. 
Companies use particularly this type of CPA with government agencies, as 
they are the ones that draft the majority of government policies. The provision 
of information at an early stage of the policy-making process can influence the 
objective, content and scope of a policy proposal. 
 
 34 
The third type of CPA is the most complex of all. It consists of building trust 
with government officials through political ties, in order to facilitate lobbying in 
favour of the firm’s interests (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). Indirect political ties 
can also be built by cultivating networks (e.g. group of constituents, political 
parties) that have an influence on politicians (Bell and Hindmoor, 2014). 
Each of these types of CPA fulfils a specific function, but they are not always 
used separately. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2009) has demonstrated that the three types of CPAs are 
integrated within the political activity “revolving door”. This particular CPA 
involves the hiring of a (former) government official as an adviser or non-
executive director, to lobby her or his former employer, often for the benefit of 
the company she or he was regulating. The revolving door also occurs when a 
corporate manager is elected to a public office, or is seconded to a 
government agency charged to regulate the industry where she or he comes 
from, and then returns to work in the industry in question (Dal Bó, 2006). 
During the secondment, the corporate manager befriends and builds ties with 
government officials, who later on will trust her or him when she or he will 
lobby them in the company’s interest.  
 
Hidden CPP: 
Hidden CPP is congruent with the concept of covert power described in 
Section 2.4.1. From a business perspective, a first mechanism of hidden CPP 
is the privileged relationship that exists between the top officers of large 
companies and senior government officials. This particular political tie comes 
from their attendance of the same elite schools, and membership of the same 
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private clubs and political parties where they meet behind closed doors 
(Mizruchi and Bunting, 1981; Mizruchi, 1996). Useem (1984) gave evidence of 
this mechanism of CPP by exposing the existence of a business elite network 
in the 1970s, comprised of the leading companies and their top officers in the 
US and UK. The corporate members constituted a closed network by means 
of interlocking directorates and share-ownership ties. Useem (1984) found 
evidence of the three forms of CPP were transformative into one another. 
Corporate members of the network used the three types of CPA associated 
with visible power to build and maintain close relations with policy-makers, 
then framed political debates and set the agenda of political issues of interest 
to them. In exchange for developing a favourable political environment that 
advanced their interests, the elite network provided policy-makers with 
financial contributions to their political campaigns, information for policy-
making, and post-political career employment through the practice of the 
revolving door. Three decades after Useem’s (1984) work, McLean et al., 
(2010) and Vitali et al. (2011) gave further evidence on the existence of 
business elite networks. The former studied the directors of the 100 largest 
companies in the UK and France. They concluded that in each of these two 
countries, CPP was concentrated in the hands of a corporate elite, the 
“captains of the industry” who acted together to promote business interest. 
Vitali et al. (2011) reached a similar conclusion. They discovered that a small 
elite of 147 companies controls 40 percent of all multinational companies in 
the world through an interlocked network. 
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A second mechanism of hidden CPP in a market economy is the structural 
dependence of the state on business to provide employment and capital 
(Block, 1977). The argument, grounded in Marxist philosophy, holds that for 
the economy of a country to flourish, government’s policies must be biased 
towards business. Public policies cannot be radically averse to business’ 
interest (Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1988). As the British Foreign 
Minister Palmerston commented in 1841, “it is the business of the government 
to open and to secure the roads for the merchant” (cited in Snyder, 1993, 
p.157). According to Newell (2012), globalisation increases the structural 
power of companies by giving them more opportunities and flexibility for 
capital flight, i.e. capital can easily exit a national economy. Hathaway (2013a) 
reports how companies important to a local economy, for instance due to the 
size of the workforce employed, rarely have their demands ignored by local 
politicians. Structural dependence gives companies leverage in negotiations. 
They can play one government off against another when determining their 
sites of operation, and each government will attempt to be attractive by 
offering subsidies and by weakening their fiscal, labour or environmental 
policies.    
Although the second mechanism of hidden CPP is theoretically convincing, it 
has been subject to a number of criticism for the lack of empirical evidence 
(Smith, 1999a). If the business community had a structurally privileged 
position, it would not need to invest in political advocacy. Yet it does because 
it is often defeated in the political arena; regulatory outcomes can be against 
industry interests (Vogel, 1989; Mitchell, 1997).  
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Invisible CPP: 
Invisible CPP refers to Lukes’ (1974) radical power concept, and 
encompasses both visible and hidden forms of CPP. Invisible CPP relies on 
discourses; it can exclude certain knowledge/information from political 
debates, and frame such debates in a way that leads actors to certain forms 
of actions rather than others (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007). Thus invisible CPP is 
discursive. It shapes beliefs and ideas to legitimise corporate activities, and to 
gain political support in order to advance corporate interests (Domhoff, 2005).    
Discourse instruments that act as media of invisible CPP include corporate 
advertising, and testifying before parliamentary committees (Fooks and 
Gilmore, 2013; Fooks et al., 2013). Political ideology (e.g. environmentalism, 
communism and neoliberalism) is also an instrument of CPP. An ideology 
institutionalises certain values in society, and these values are taken for 
granted and rarely, if ever, questioned by those who adopt the ideology. For 
instance, the importance given to individual wealth and economic growth in 
the UK ensures that public policies do not impede business competitiveness. 
Politicians prefer market-based solutions to government interventions; the 
ideology of “economic growth” is rarely disputed (Levy and Egan, 2003).  
One particular subtle instrument of invisible CPP is “sound science”, a CPA 
that merges the mechanisms of visible and hidden CPP, to create false 
consciousness among the general public and policy-makers about scientific 
evidence. Sound science is comparable to Astroturfing because it usually 
requires the establishment of “front groups” to hide corporate involvement in 
the promotion of the sound science discourse. The impact can also take years 
to materialise. Levi and Egan (2000, 2003) gave an example by their exposé 
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of the negotiations for climate change policies in the 1990s. To avoid 
mandatory emission controls, the main strategy of the fossil fuel industry (oil, 
coal, utility) has been to use findings of its own scientific research to challenge 
the ones adopted by the United Nation and national governments. In 1991, 
the industry created a front group called the Information Council for the 
Environment (ICE), whose purpose was to reposition global warming as a 
controversial theory that was not based on empirical evidence. ICE hired 
scientists and sponsored a number of academic studies. The research results 
pointed to the lack of consensus among scientists, and invoked the need for 
higher standards of evidence to demonstrate causation between business 
activities and climate change. This “sound science” was promoted in the 
media, congressional testimonies and advertising campaigns. With time, the 
belief that global warming was not happening, or was not a threat to the 
planet, took hold among many policy-makers. The positive outcomes of this 
invisible CPP exercise for the fossil fuel industry materialised a decade later, 
with the Bush administration’s stance on environmental policies. In 2001, the 
American president opposed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol agreed by 
his predecessor in 1998. 
In a similar fashion, a “sound science” discourse was used by the tobacco 
industry to claim the lack of correlation between smoking and cancer. It 
delayed for decades stricter healthcare policies against the industry (Michaels, 
2008).  
 
To summarise this discussion, the three-dimensional view of CPP presents 
different perspectives on how power can be exercised by the firm in the 
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political realm. The three forms can be exercised one at the time or 
simultaneously; they also complement each other and can transform into one 
another. But whereas the study of visible CPP is reduced to the observation of 
visible actions, both hidden and invisible CPP point to the capacity of actors to 
leverage their position and role in society. Doing so, an actor can covertly 
manipulate social and political relations by defining and setting the agenda 
before any observable bargaining or conflict begins. From this perspective, 
CPP is also systemic, that is a full analysis requires considering the way 
social structures influence an actor’s ability or capacity to act (Giddens, 1984). 
It is no more simply a question of “who” but also “what” has power that shapes 
an actor’s behaviour. CPP is both within actions and structures. Actions and 
structures are inseparable; we cannot analyse one without the other. To 
overcome the difficult to empirically analyse hidden and invisible CPP, Levy 
and Egan (2000, 2003) and Hathaway (2013a) recommended doing event 
studies (longitudinal, historical, case study). They also suggested taking a 
long-term view because the mechanisms of power "work prior to, after and 
outside of political arena decision-making" (Hathaway, 2013a, p.86). These 
recommendations require the contextualisation of any research on CPP. As 
Sadan (1997) explained, the exercise of CPP “cannot be fully understood 
without relating to the social structure in the context of which it occurs” (p.68). 
These recommendations will be followed in this study. 
The result of this discussion is a framework that operationalises CPP: 
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Forms of CPP Visible Hidden Invisible 
Characteristics Agency Structural Discursive 
Mechanisms Visible actions that 
shape the policy-
making process 
and policy 
outcomes 
Certain actors and 
issues are 
excluded from 
public debates 
and decision 
making  
Institutionalisation 
and control of 
knowledge 
Instruments 
(CPAs) 
Financial and 
informational types 
of CPA; 
constituency 
building; coalition 
building 
Capital flight 
threats; front 
groups and third 
party sponsorship 
(Astroturfing); 
political ties; 
revolving door 
Dominant 
neoliberal 
ideology 
(economic 
growth, free 
market, 
consumer 
choice); sound 
science 
 
Table 3: CPP Framework 
 
The CPP framework provides an overview of the facets of CPP and how they 
can be exercised. The framework suggests that any corporate activity that is 
able to set in motion one of the three mechanisms of CPP, is to be considered 
an instrument of CPP. Thus the CPAs listed in Table 3, which are the 
common ones found in the literature, should not be considered to be the only 
instruments of CPP. One way to find out what other corporate activities could 
be instruments of CPP, is to identify the factors that encourage companies to 
become politically active. The rationale within the context of the study is that 
asking ‘why does a company undertake CPAs?’ is another way of asking ‘why 
does a company seek CPP?’ Understanding the “why” for CPAs is a prelude 
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to understanding the “how”, that is the mechanisms and processes employed 
by companies to achieve political power. 
 
2.4.3 Determinants of CPA  
The identification of factors that influences companies to undertake political 
activities is a topic that has attracted the attention of scholars from different 
academic disciplines such as management, organisational behaviour, political 
science and economics. Corporate size (turnover, asset, number of 
employees), firm dependence on government contracts for revenues, industry 
structure and performance, and costs of regulations, are the usual 
determinants of CPA found in the literature (Schuler et al., 2002; Hillman et al., 
2004). Nevertheless across the disciplines and their different theoretical 
perspectives, the underlying assumption has been that companies engage in 
CPA for economic reasons: by their nature discussed in Section 2.3, 
companies attempt to maintain and/or obtain revenues to survive (Lux et al., 
2011). By and large, research points to the political environment of the firm as 
the key determinant, particularly regulatory uncertainty (Lawton et al., 2013).  
As Moore (1980) observed, a “business cannot hire, fire, determine salaries, 
price its products and services, advertise, buy other companies, merge with 
other companies, deal with unions, without reference to one or another 
government regulation” (p.6). In this regards, three explanatory frameworks 
resonate in the literature to justify the political activities of business. Two of 
them, Institutional Theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and the Resource-
Dependence Theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) share the view that 
the external environment force companies to engage in CPAs. In contrast the 
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Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991) argues that the main 
motive is the desire to improve corporate performance by political means 
(Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). These three explanatory frameworks are 
discussed in turn. 
 
Institutional Theory: 
Isomorphism and legitimacy are at the core of the institutional theory, which 
seeks to explain homogeneity of actors’ behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991).  According to the theory, companies are part of their environment and 
like an ecosystem, their activities are shaped by coercive, normative and 
mimetic institutional forces. To be accepted and survive in the communities 
where they operate, companies must gain legitimacy by conforming to the 
social, political and legal norms of their environment. Legitimacy refers to 
whether organisational actions are appropriate to the beliefs, norms and 
values in the social structure within which they take place (Suchman, 1995). 
By meeting the expectations of society, companies are seen legitimate and 
given access to the resources they need to exist (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Given that institutional forces are contextual, the political activities of a 
company change with time, space and the institutional pressures it 
encounters. It is been noted that companies that belong to the same industry 
face common institutional pressures in the same national context, as a result 
they tend to have isomorphic activities (Baum and Oliver, 1992; Campbell, 
2007; Hillman et al., 2009). Research shows that uncertainty in the political 
environment drives industry leaders to undertake certain CPAs and to stay 
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competitive, rivals respond by adopting the leaders’ practices (Lux et al., 
2011). 
The use of institutional theory in CPA research has been primarily confined to 
international business and political economy scholarship, in order to describe 
how different institutional settings (local laws, culture, state institutions, etc.) 
affect CPA pattern and corporate performance (Hillman and Wan, 2005; Doh 
et al., 2012). For instance Rajwani and Liedong (2015) reviewed the CPA 
literature and found that a relational type of CPA was more effective in 
developing countries than developed ones. Mahoney (2007) compared the 
EU and US political systems, and concluded that the successes of CPAs 
depend not only of the importance of the political issues to the public, but the 
political values prevalent in the environment. According to her, the EU political 
system promotes compromises to allow each competing interest group to 
attain some of its goals on a given issue. In contrast, the U.S. system is a 
zero-sum game with a winner-take-all approach dominated by business. 
 
A shortcoming of institutional theorists is their disregard of the role of 
autonomous agency. They assume that a company is the product of 
institutional forces only; it complies with external pressures without opposing 
resistance. But the interweaving of external pressures and corporate strategic 
efforts to counter them is a more realistic assumption. As argued by Thelen 
(1999), the institutionalisation of anything is a power struggle, marked by 
conflicts and compromises between actors. Because of this corporate 
resistance to external pressures in practice, which is not accounted for by 
institutional theory, it is recommended to combine the theory with others to 
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better comprehend corporate engagement in political activities (Lawton et al., 
2013; Walker and Rea, 2014).  
 
Resource-Dependence Theory: 
 Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) RDT posits that companies are not self-
sufficient, and must acquire from their external environment the critical 
resources they need to survive.  These resources can be market orientated 
(e.g. technology) or non-market based, including social resources (e.g. 
legitimacy) and political resources (e.g. regulations). Companies are 
particularly dependent on the government to operate. The government can 
affect the demand for an industry’s output directly by being a consumer, and 
indirectly by being a regulator (Grier et al., 1994). A number of studies show 
that this dependency on government is a major determinant of CPA: 
companies whose revenues are primary derived from government sales are 
more prone to CPA ceteris paribus (Hillman et al., 2004), and a highly 
regulated industry is a strong predictor of a high level of CPAs in that industry 
(Hillman, 2005; Hillman et al., 2009). From this premise, there is a power-
dependence relationship between those who control the supply or access of 
resources, and those who need those resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Oliver, 1991). To minimise dependence and uncertainties of access to the 
resources they need, companies undertake CPAs to create a political 
environment that best suit their interests. We might say therefore that their 
environment is the dynamic outcome of their political activities. 
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Despite the attractiveness and popularity of RDT among students of power 
and CPA, its authors admit that the theory suffers from a lack of empirical 
support for predicting organisational behaviour according to Casciaro and 
Piskorski (2005). The reason is that RDT fails to address the conditions under 
which CPAs will be effective. Organisational characteristics also play a role. 
Companies that face the same external environment, and have the same 
dependences, may not have the same behaviour because they are structured 
differently. In practice, the size of a company determines its resources and 
therefore, the types of CPA it can undertake (Hillman et al., 2004). For 
instance in the European political system, large companies have the 
necessary resources to undertake CPAs by themselves at the local, national 
and supranational levels. Small companies in contrast are resource 
constrained; they tend to build coalitions to lobby governments at various 
levels (Lawton et al., 2013). The assumption that organisational 
characteristics determine the firm’s engagement in political advocacy is a 
central feature of the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm. 
 
Resource-Based View:  
Strategic management research focuses on how companies develop 
competences in different markets, using their internal resources and 
organisational capabilities. Not surprisingly, RBV has received great attention 
in the management literature as the theory proposes that companies able to 
develop and deploy resources and capabilities that are rare, valuable, difficult 
to imitate and substitute by competitors, will achieve a competitive advantage 
and earn above-average returns (Barney, 1991; Lawton et al., 2013). 
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Intangible assets such as reputation or skills in issues management can be 
such resources (Fernandez et al., 2000). Capabilities refer to organisational 
skills to manage the co-ordination of assets to create valuable resources 
(Grant, 1991). To simplify writing, the term “resources” will refer hereafter to 
both capabilities and tangible and intangible resources (Barney, 1991). 
 
CPA studies based on RBV consider public policies as means for companies 
to achieve a competitive advantage (Baron, 1995; Dahan, 2005; Oliver and 
Holzinger, 2008), or remove their rivals’ one (McWilliams et al., 2002). Certain 
organisational characteristics, in particular the size and culture of the firm, 
increase the likelihood of political activity. Some companies have a culture of  
“corporate political entrepreneurship”, and constantly look for opportunities 
through public policies (Yoffie and Bergenstein, 1985). Overall companies 
follow the corporate nature of being a revenue-seeking entity, and undertake 
CPAs to acquire or protect by political means the resources that will increase 
their revenues, or minimise their costs. On the revenue side, CPAs might be 
used to obtain government contracts and protectionist policies. In terms of 
costs, CPAs might attempt to create a friendlier business environment with 
subsidies and tax relief programs, or by eliminating a strong competitor (Vogel, 
1996; Hansen and Mitchell, 2000). For instance in 1995, the rivals of Microsoft 
played a key role in the instigation of the antitrust actions against the 
company by the Federal Trade Commission in the US, and the European 
Commission in Europe (Vogel, 1996; Lord, 2000). Notwithstanding its 
emphasis on the internal resources of the firm, RBV recognises two external 
resources valuable to the success of the firm in politics. One is political 
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access, a resource that is only granted to the firm by policy-makers. As put by 
Frynas et al. (2006, p.325): 
“access to a key government minister, experience in dealing with 
corrupt officials and other political resources, which result in a firm’ s 
advantageous treatment by political decision-makers, are frequently in 
scarce supply and difficult to obtain.”   
The second resource is legitimacy. From a strategic viewpoint, certain authors 
(e.g. Pfeffer, 1981; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Tornikoski and 
Newbert, 2007; Brammer et al., 2012) argue that organisational legitimacy is 
similar to reputation; it is extracted competitively from the external 
environment by manipulating the perception of stakeholders. According to 
these scholars, legitimacy is acquired by conforming passively to institutional 
norms, and by actively shaping these institutional norms at the same time. 
The more legitimate the firm appears, the more credibility (goodwill) it gets 
from its environment. Legitimacy acts like a special resource that underpins all 
the activities and performance of the firm (Scott, 2001b). From this 
perspective, corporate legitimacy meets the criteria of RBV as an 
operationally valuable resource. This approach to legitimacy also overlaps 
with RDT as legitimacy is viewed as a critical resource needed by the firm to 
exist. In that sense, legitimacy functions like a strategic meta-resource that 
permits or not other resources to provide a competitive advantage to the firm 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002; Queiroz et al., 2007).  
 
Despite these considerations for political access and legitimacy, the limitation 
to RBV is its narrow focus on the internal environment of the firm to develop 
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valuable resources. Oliver (1997) has successfully argued that it is the 
external environment of the firm (barriers to entry, substitution of resources by 
new technology, legal system, etc.) that dictates which internal resources 
have to be developed to survive. It is also the external environment that 
determines the value of resources that can be sources of competitive 
advantage. This aspect of how the market works in practice is not reflected by 
RBV. For this reason, RBV is limited on its own as an explanatory framework 
for CPA engagement. 
 
In summary, from an institutional perspective, companies undertake CPAs to 
mitigate threats to their legitimacy by socio-political institutions, and to mimic 
their rivals. From a RBV perspective, companies are politically active in order 
to gain competitive advantage and maintain or improve their revenues. From 
the viewpoint of RDT, companies attempt to shape their environment by 
reducing uncertainties (e.g. costs of regulations, extension of government 
contract). The three theoretical frameworks share some common 
underpinnings. Both institutional theory and RDT recognise that organisational 
choices and performance are constrained by external pressures, but they 
diverge on the explanation for CPA engagement. Institutional theory proposes 
that companies are passive actors that follow the behaviour of their peers or 
are coerced into CPA. RDT stresses the role of agency and attempts by 
corporate actors to control the regulative, normative and discursive elements 
of their environment. RDT and RBV also share some features. They both 
acknowledge that the types of CPA undertaken by a company are subject to 
corporate resources, and that corporate performance is affected by external 
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pressures. They both view the firm as an active actor that attempts to shape 
its environment; they stress the importance of having valuable resources to 
reduce external risks; and they both consider political access as a critical 
resource. Although RDT and RBV recognise the importance of resources, 
they diverge on their origin. RDT is externally focused while RBV is internally 
orientated. Considering the characteristics of these three theoretical 
frameworks, RDT appears to fall between the institutional theory and RBV. 
Table 4 presents a summary of the theoretical perspectives that explain the 
motives for companies to engage in political activities: 
 
Perspectives Institutional 
Theory 
RDT RBV 
Premise To maintain 
legitimacy and thus 
survive, companies 
adopt practices that 
conform to the 
prevailing norms 
and values about 
what constitutes 
appropriate 
behaviour in their 
external 
environment. 
Companies are 
constrained by their 
dependence on 
resources 
controlled by 
external actors. 
They seek to 
reduce their 
dependence by 
means of political 
activities. 
Public policy is a 
means to acquire 
resources that 
might give to the 
firm a competitive 
advantage, 
depending the 
internal 
capabilities of the 
firm to bundle and 
leverages those 
resources. 
Insight Resources to 
survive are 
acquired outside 
the firm; 
isomorphism is 
likely to be found 
among firms that 
belong to the same 
industry in the 
same country. 
Resources to 
survive are 
acquired outside 
the firm. 
Resources to 
survive and 
compete are 
created within the 
firm. 
Table 4: Explanatory Framework of Why Companies Engage in CPAs 
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Due to the shortcoming of each of these frameworks on their own, scholars 
recommended to integrate them to create a framework that fully grasps the 
political behaviour of the firm in reality (Greening and Gray, 1994; Oliver, 
1997; Lux et al., 2011; Lawton et al., 2013). Medcof’s (2001) recommendation 
to combine RDT and RBV produces a framework (“RDT+RBV”) that not only 
explains the ‘why’ for political activities (and therefore as explained in Section 
2.4.2 the reasons for companies to seek CPP), but also the ‘how’ (i.e. the 
mechanisms and processes). Since institutional settings and context matter in 
corporate decisions and actions, the institutional theory underpins the 
“RDT+RBV” framework. The institutional theory will not be explicitly 
mentioned as I discuss “RDT+RBV”, however the reader should remember 
this crucial information.   
 
2.4.4 Mechanisms of CPP (Outcomes of CPA) 
The “RDT + RBV” framework proposes that corporate efforts to influence 
policy-making are motivated by the desires to control external uncertainties, 
and create an environment favourable to revenue-seeking opportunities. 
According to Medcof (2001), the modus operandi of this framework is as 
follows: RBV stipulates that a firm’s economic success is dependent on the 
value placed by external actors on its internal resources that need those 
resources, for instance proprietary technology and technical know-how. If the 
firm’s resources are unique and/or needed, i.e. no distinct alternative exists, 
then from a RDT perspective external actors are dependent on the firm’s 
resources. These actors will exchange their own resources (e.g. money, 
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political access) for the firm’s ones. For instance, as discussed in Section 
2.4.2, within an institutional setting where the ideology of neoliberal capitalism 
prevails, a politician can be structurally dependent on a company that is the 
main employer in her or his constituency. This politician will have an 
inclination towards accommodating local regulations to the company’ requests, 
in order to maintain its presence and prevent unemployment in the local 
community.  
The “exchange” of critical resources between actors that “RDT+RBV” 
proposes as the mode of operation of CPAs, is best captured by the concept 
of the political marketplace. To clarify, at the origin of RDT is Emerson’s 
(1962) writings on the relation between power and dependency, based on a 
social exchange between actors. This foundation of RDT on the notion of 
exchange, has led a number of scholars to claim that the method of 
participation of the firm in the political arena is through economic exchange 
with policy-makers (Shaffer, 1995; Mitchell et al. 1997; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Bonardi et al., 2006). Companies “must give something valued by public 
officials in exchange for getting favourable policies” (Getz, 2002, p. 318). This 
view of the political environment of the firm conceives it as a marketplace 
where policy-buyers (companies, trade unions, civil society groups…) trade 
with policy-suppliers (legislators and regulators).  
The political market concept, which finds its origin in economic science, 
objects to the common view that public policies are designed for the public 
interest (Stigler, 1971). Politicians are viewed self-interested actors who 
exchange policy favours for resources from interest groups that support their 
own political objectives. According to RDT+RBV, the policy-suppliers’ needs 
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determine the types of corporate resources that are valuable in the political 
market. In general the buyers need political favours, and the suppliers need 
three “political goods”, namely (i) information to devise public policies, (ii) 
votes from supporting interest groups to stay in office (coalition building), and 
(iii) financial contributions to fund their election campaign (Hillman and Hitt, 
1999). The political market and political goods traded on it serve as 
mechanisms to obtain public policies that advance the interest of the firm, in 
other words to obtain CPP. The three political goods desired by politicians can 
be provided by the outcomes of the three types of CPA presented in Table 2. 
To clarify, there is a difference between the outcomes and the impacts of an 
activity (Ebrahim and Rangan, 2010). The outcomes of an activity are what 
have been produced by that activity, and the impacts are the observed effects 
and changes that occur as a result of these outcomes. Within the RDT+RBV 
framework, the outcomes of CPAs are the three political goods, and the 
impacts of CPAs are the repercussion on CPP and corporate performance of 
these political goods. These impacts are not the focus of this study, but will be 
discussed to some extent the next section. 
Central to the political market concept is the resource “political access”. 
Policy-sellers have a limited attention span and as a result, policy-buyers 
compete against each other for the limited access to policy-sellers (Hart, 
2004). This signifies that the successful exercise of CPP is a two-step 
process: firstly, the firm must secure (and maintain) access to policy-makers. 
Secondly, the firm must shape the beliefs of policy-makers on the issue at 
hand, to have the firm’s opinion reflected in their public decisions. However 
there is a difference between obtaining a meeting with policy-makers, or 
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having them read your position paper (access), and then having your opinion 
taken into account in their decision. A CPA may provide access but having 
access does not guarantee successful influence on public policies. Therefore 
access is not equal to CPP. It is a sine qua non but insufficient precondition 
for CPP argue power pluralists (Dahl, 1961; Wilson, 1981). As a limited 
resource, access is critical to obtain as unequal political access usually 
translates into unequal CPP between competing firms (Hillman et al., 2004). 
 
To resume the modus operandi of the RDT+RBV framework, a company 
undertakes CPAs to lessen external threats and at the same time, maintain 
and/or improve its revenues. The process by which the company achieves 
these two objectives is by first, developing valuable internal resources for 
government officials. Then CPAs draw on these internal resources to provide 
policy-makers with political goods they need or desire. In exchange, policy-
makers grant the company access, including access to the policy-making 
process. Having acquired this sine qua non resource, the company is then 
able to advance its interests by seeking to increase its revenues (e.g. sales to 
the government), and/or by seeking a reduction in its operating costs (i.e. 
more friendly regulations), although there is no guarantee it will succeed in 
these attempts. Figure 1 conceptualises the link between CPA and CPP: 
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Figure 1: CPA-CPP Model 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the determinants, mechanisms and processes of the CPA-
CPP relationship. CPP is conceptualised as a two-step process (the definition 
of CPP in Section 2.2 emphasises the successful completion of the process). 
For the sake of clarity, Figure 1 represents the three forms of CPP (visible, 
hidden, invisible) as active throughout the process because, as discussed in 
Section 2.4.2, the three intertwine and are difficult to separate. Moreover, they 
can be active prior to the visible participation of the firm in the public policy-
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making process (Hathaway, 2013a). For these reasons, to avoid confusion 
and misunderstanding, the three forms of CPP will not be analysed separately 
but together as shown in Figure 1.   
With regards to the Framework of CPP in Table 3, it follows that there may be 
corporate activities other than political ones that are instruments of CPP. To 
identify those other corporate activities, researchers need to look for the ones 
able to provide political goods needed, or desired, by policy-makers. In the 
CPA literature, we find researchers that have used variants of the RDT+RBV 
framework to explain how political activities contribute to CPP by providing the 
three political goods, namely information, votes and financial contributions 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Bonardi et al., 2006). In a way, these scholars have 
shed light on the research question of this thesis (‘How does CSR contribute 
to CPP?’) from a CPA perspective. My aim in this thesis is to employ 
RDT+RBV to analyse how CSR activities – which are not considered to be 
political activities in the CSR and CPA mainstream literature – may also 
contribute to CPP. Before moving to this central part of the study (Section 2.5), 
following the model in Figure 1, attention must be brought to the effects of the 
outcomes of CPA. I turn next to this point. 
 
2.4.5 Impacts of CPA  
A predominant view is that political campaign donations, and personal gifts, 
influence politicians and therefore public policies (Kemper and Lutterbeck, 
1996; Etzioni, 2014). But this belief is a factoid as empirical evidence is still 
unclear. There is no consensus about the impacts of CPAs on public policies 
(Vogel, 1989, 1996; Lawton et al., 2013), or on the contribution of CPAs to the 
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performance of the firm (Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Rajwani and Liedong, 
2015). It is unlikely that a definitive result to these two impacts of CPA be 
found in the near future due to the different methodologies, and measurement 
variables of CPA and corporate performance available. According to Lux et al. 
(2011), the main causes of methodological errors in CPA research are the 
difficulties to observe CPAs in action and trace their effects. The business-
government relation is sensitive and secretive; many corporate political 
activities take place behind closed doors. The few observable CPAs are 
testimonies before a government body, and the disclosure of CPA 
expenditure in the US (Shaffer, 1995; Lawton et al., 2013). This explains why 
political access and CPA expenditure are usually used as proxies for CPP, 
although neither guarantees a particular impact on the policy-making process 
(e.g. Sims, 2003). It has also been noted that because CPA expenditure 
reporting is a legal requirement in the US, the availability of these secondary 
data make the CPA literature dominated by the US context  (Rasche, 2015). 
The result is that most empirical studies of CPA are based on statistical 
analyses of cross-sectional data from American firms (Skippari, 2005). 
However Barron (2010) and Lux et al. (2011) note that CPAs are contextual. 
The tendency by researchers to examine large datasets from Fortune 500 
companies in CPA studies fails to account for context, and this may contribute 
to the ambiguous empirical evidence in the literature.  
Finally, due to the competitive landscape of the political market (i.e. the 
political advocacy from various policy-buyers to which policy-makers are 
subjected, and their own political preferences), it is difficult for a researcher, 
and even corporate managers, to know with certainty that a firm’s political 
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activity is responsible for a particular policy outcome (Dahan et al., 2013). All 
these factors explain why there is no much knowledge on how CPA affects 
public policies or corporate performance, and why scholars disagree on the 
effects of CPAs. Research on CPA, and by analogy CPP, requires collection 
of primary data and contextualisation to improve current understanding of 
CPA. Nevertheless, researchers will still face the epistemological issues of 
data selection and interpretation: how to study a discreet activity where the 
honesty of participants, and thus the validity of data, could always be 
questioned? A solution would be doing a form of ethnographic research where 
the researcher would have the trust of participants. The trust would encourage 
participants to engage in “truthful conversations” with the researcher. This 
study will make an attempt to implement this solution.  
 
From this review of the literature, it emerges that the provision of political 
goods is the mechanism by which a corporate activity can become a medium 
of political power. CPAs provide three types of political goods to policy-
makers in exchange of political access; the final effects on public policies and 
corporate performance are unknown. In other words, it is unclear if CPAs 
contribute to CPP. My proposition is that CSR activities can provide political 
goods, and the next sections of the chapter will develop this proposition. The 
parallels between the CSR and CPA literature will be examined by reviewing 
the determinants, outcomes and impacts of CSR activities from a political 
perspective. 
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2.5 The Political Dimension of CSR 
 
2.5.1 Defining CSR 
Questions raised in the debate on CSR such as 'what is the role of business 
in society?' (Handy, 2002), 'what does a company owe to society?' (Carroll, 
1999), or still 'how should a company use its power?' (Weiner, 1964; 
Bernstein, 2000; Coy, 2003; Bendell and Bendell, 2007) are all related to 
ethics and civic duty. They can be traced back to political philosophers like 
Plato who wrote on virtue, moral principles, and the common good (Vogel, 
1991; Solomon, 1992; Smith, 1999b). History teaches us that the perception 
of business and its responsibilities have continually evolved with social norms 
and values. One recurring issue encountered in the field has been the 
difficulty to operationalise the concept, due to the lack of an agreed definition. 
Already over 40 years ago, Votaw (1972) warned that CSR was a concept 
open to conflicting definitions because each of us views business’ 
responsibilities – and thus defines CSR – according to his or her cultural 
background, field of expertise, and interests. His acute observation is still valid 
today. Over 40 definitions have been found in the literature, which range from 
highly theoretical ones by academics to practical ones by trade associations, 
inter-governmental and business organisations (Kakabadse et al., 2005; 
Dahlsrud, 2008). Nevertheless, two features of CSR are commonly found: 
firstly, CSR is seen as a self-regulated form of corporate governance. It is 
understood to be a construct with a voluntary and non-binding connotation 
(Shamir, 2005; Ungericht and Hirt, 2010). Being self-regulated implies that 
CSR is a regulation-dependent construct; it is contingent upon government 
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policies that set the threshold of responsibility for all businesses (Litowitz, 
2005). Secondly, CSR activities are for the benefits of all the firm’ 
stakeholders, including shareholders. This implies that CSR is multi-
dimensional. In his famous pyramid of CSR, Carroll (1991) depicted CSR as 
the sum of four dimensions: economic responsibility (wealth creation) as the 
foundation, followed by the legal, ethical and philanthropic/discretionary 
responsibilities. Building on these features and Carroll’s (1991) description, 
CSR is defined in this study as a firm's efforts to further societal goals and its 
own by managing market and non-market issues.  
Some implications of the definition are the difficulties associated with the 
multi-dimensional nature, and the regulation-dependent aspect of CSR. We 
cannot have a general taxonomy of CSR activities because legal 
requirements vary considerably between countries and industries. In addition, 
CSR is a dynamic construct because social norms and laws change across 
time and space. Distinguishing the activities that are legally mandatory and 
discretionary would require contextualisation as what might count as a social 
responsibility today, might not be in the future (Votaw, 1972; Griffin, 2000). A 
solution would be to cluster CSR activities into the economic, environmental, 
social and governance dimensions of the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) 
reporting framework, a popular international standard used by businesses to 
report on their CSR performance. Olsen and Gitsham (2005) made an attempt 
in that direction, but by their own admission their CSR catalogue is biased 
toward the social dimension. Given that it is an impossible task to review all 
existing CSR activities, some researchers recommend restricting CSR 
research to a single industry in a single country (Wokutch and Spencer, 1987; 
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Griffin and Mahon, 1997). Companies that belong to the same industry in the 
same country evolve in the same environment and face the same issues. We 
should therefore expect isomorphism in their CSR practices as institutional 
theorists posit (e.g. Campbell, 2007).  Only then a taxonomy of CSR activities 
can be established for that specific industry. This recommendation will be 
followed in this thesis. The taxonomy of CSR in the industry selected is 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
The implications of the CSR definition inform my approach to the study of the 
subject. In what follows, I review the main strands of research in the CSR 
literature to present an overview of the field, and to position the study. 
 
2.5.2 CSR Perspectives 
Windsor (2006) identified three strands of research on CSR, namely 
economic, ethical and political. The “Economic CSR” proponents associate 
with the shareholder primacy argument as they claim that the firm is a fictional 
economic actor only, an instrument of wealth creation for shareholders . Any 
social goal pursued should be acceptable only if it maximises shareholder 
value, and if it is pursued without moral considerations (Jensen, 2002). A 
recent development in this research stream is the emphasis on the 
instrumentalisation of CSR, as seen in the prevalence of research on the 
“business case for CSR” (Vallentin and Murillo, 2012). A “business case” is a 
pitch for investment in a project or initiative that offers value to the investor. 
Thus the business case for CSR is the belief that CSR activities and the 
creation of shareholder value are not incompatible. Companies can do well 
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financially by attending to the needs of society at the same time (Porter and 
Kramer, 2006). This is in line with the notion of “enlightened shareholder 
value” promoted by UK corporate law. Research on the “business case for 
CSR” – which consists in empirically testing if a positive correlation exists 
between CSR activities and corporate financial performance – has been 
called the “holy grail of CSR” (Devinney, 2009). The results of the research 
have been so are far inconclusive (Vogel, 2005). 
The second perspective in CSR research is “Ethical CSR”, which draws on a 
range of ethical theories, including the principle of Kantian ethics to not violate 
the legitimate rights of others. Ethical CSR theorists view the firm as a social 
actor and trustee of communities who is accountable to the variety of actors 
that have a stake in its activities (e.g. shareholders, employees, clients, 
suppliers, government agencies, the environment). They therefore advocate 
corporate altruism and self-restraint (Evan and Freeman, 1988; Freeman, 
2002).  
The last strand is “Political CSR”, where firm is seen as a political actor 
(Néron, 2010). For Political CSR theorists (Matten and Crane, 2005; Scherer 
and Palazzo, 2011), Political CSR is the movement of the firm into the political 
sphere in order to respond to environmental and social challenges through the 
provision of global regulations and public goods. CSR activities provide public 
goods that substitute to government interventions by correcting market 
failures. This articulation of CSR activities as political acts open possibilities to 
bridge the fields of CSR and CPA. Political CSR draws on the political theory 
of citizenship, and conceives of the firm as a legal citizen with the same rights 
and responsibilities towards the community as any other member. For this 
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reason Political CSR is also called “Extended view of Corporate Citizenship” 
(Matten and Crane, 2005). This perspective is consistent with the legal person 
view of the firm adopted for this study. Corporate citizens are legal citizens 
with the right to carry out revenue-making activities in exchange for fulfilling 
certain social and political obligations (Davis, 1973; Donaldson and Dunfee, 
1994). Abiding by this “social contract” ensures access to the rights 
associated with citizenship, including participation in the public policy-making 
process. However the non-fulfilment of obligations creates conflicts and 
subsequently, the company might lose its legitimacy, power, revenues and 
eventually its existence as key stakeholders cancels the social contract. A 
recent example is the 2011 phone hacking scandal in the UK. It resulted in the 
closure of the 168-year-old News of the World tabloid due to a fall in 
legitimacy and revenues (Kellner, 2012). 
 
Given their divergent views on the role of the firm (economic actor, social 
actor, political actor), it is not surprising that these three perspectives also 
develop different propositions regarding what may constitute a legitimate 
exercise of CPP. Economic CSR views the exercise of corporate power within 
the respect of existing laws only. Any other considerations would be a misuse 
of it. For Ethical CSR, the use of power is an altruistic obligation to alleviate 
issues that affect society, starting with the ones that result from corporate 
activities. Finally Political CSR considers the exercise of power only within the 
boundaries of citizenship rights and responsibilities. Considering the aim of 
this thesis, the study of CSR will be located in the corpus of Political CSR. To 
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avoid confusions, the term “Extended Corporate Citizenship” will be used to 
refer to. 
 
2.5.3 Extended Corporate Citizenship   
The term “corporate citizenship” was originally coined by US practitioners in 
the 1980s, who view it in a more positive light than CSR (Matten et al., 2003). 
The term gained in popularity from 2002 onwards, when over 40 CEOs of the 
largest multinational companies endorsed the report Global Corporate 
Citizenship: The Leadership Challenge for CEOs and Boards at the World 
Economic Forum (Matten and Crane, 2005). These practitioners defined 
corporate citizenship as “the contribution a company makes in society through 
its core business activities, its social investment and philanthropy 
programmes, and its engagement in public policy.” (World Economic Forum, 
2003, p.17). The document signalled an institutionalisation of the term 
corporate citizenship, and the report was subsequently promoted by inter-
governmental organisations like the United Nations. But given the lack of 
consensus on a definition of CSR and its content, Matten and Crane (2005) 
showed that corporate citizenship has often been used as a synonym for CSR 
itself, or for corporate philanthropy, the fourth dimension in Carroll’s (1991) 
pyramid of CSR. They developed an “Extended view of Corporate Citizenship” 
(ECC), which has come to be classified as a normative political theory of CSR 
(Garriga and Melé, 2004). The ECC theory draws on traditional liberal values 
and the Aristotelian principles that individuals/people are natural citizens of a 
society with both duties (responsibilities) and rights (privileges). Consequently, 
ECC theorists such as Matten and Crane (2005) and Moon et al. (2006) argue 
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that the company is an artificial but legal citizen, whose primary responsibility 
is to guarantee the provision of natural citizens’ rights when governments fail 
to do so. The firm is a political actor with the duty to enable people to exercise 
their political rights to vote, the duty to provide social rights such as education 
and healthcare, or still the protection of civil rights like freedom of speech.  
 
ECC is a normative theory built on the assumption that globalisation has 
undermined the capacity of governments to regulate their national economy, 
the global economy, and to provide public goods. Governments would be 
today less economically and politically powerful than multinational companies, 
and could no longer pursue public policies that diverge from business’ interest 
(Newell, 2000; Blowfield, 2005; Vogel, 2009). For these reasons, ECC 
stipulates the existence of a social contract between corporate citizens and 
society. Companies ought to accept their political responsibility to tackle the 
negative externalities of their activities such as human rights degradation, 
environmental damages, and the discordant legal environment of the global 
economy (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Crane et al., 2008; Detomasi, 2008). If 
companies refuse to leverage their political power when they have the 
capacity to do so, they will lose their legitimacy on which their existence 
depend (Davis, 1973). The moral philosophy of ECC is “give something back 
when you can” (Wood and Logsdon, 2001).  
As a political actor, ECC presents the firm a citizen with responsibilities in the 
economic, legal, social and political life of the community.  To some extent, 
the responsibilities in those four dimensions overlap those described by 
Carroll (1991). For Hamilton and Hoch (1997) and Bendell and Kearins (2005), 
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political responsibility is a dimension of the pyramid of CSR because the 
undertaking of political activities for the public interest is a political obligation 
for the firm. According to these scholars, CPA is a legitimate socially 
responsible activity. As per the moral philosophy of ECC, the firm must 
participate to policy-making, help politicians design the right policies for the 
public, and contribute to the implementation of public policies when they can. 
Figure 2 represents an adaptation of the pyramid of CSR from an ECC 
perspective. The “political responsibilities” dimension comes after “ethical 
responsibilities”, since the acknowledgement and orientation of the former, 
depend on how the firm reconciles its own ethics with the norms and values of 
the community where it operates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Extended Pyramid of CSR (adapted from Carroll, 1991) 
 
  
Be a good 
corporate citizen 
Be ethical 
Obey the law 
Be profitable 
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ECC proponents view the company as the political solution to societal ills and 
stress the importance to promote corporate voluntarism and self-interest as 
incentives for CSR engagement (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). In that sense, 
the proponents of this political theory of CSR recommend light government 
regulations and more self-regulated CSR initiatives such as the UN Global 
Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative and the Fairtrade certification 
scheme. This stance on regulations has led to a number of criticisms of ECC, 
the main one being the lack of corporate accountability it promotes (van 
Oosterhout, 2008; Whelan, 2012). After the scandals of the last decade (e.g. 
Enron, Lehman Brothers), many believe that if corporate citizens are allowed 
to self- or co-regulate their own rules of conduct, they will endanger society 
(Barley, 2007; Banerjee, 2007). This claim is given credence by Bakan’s 
(2005) depiction of the firm as a person, but a psychopath without virtues and 
ethics who would self-destruct if left unregulated.  
 
Overall, the ECC theory holds two premises that provide a robust conceptual 
basis to comprehend the political character of CSR, and its association with 
CPP. The first premise is that the company is by nature a political actor 
(Néron, 2010). One argument that supports this premise concerns the day-to-
day decisions a company takes in a private capacity to manage its markets 
and non-market activities. These decisions have wide social and political 
consequences as in the short and long terms, they affect the structures of 
society by changing work pattern, industries’ structures, resources allocation, 
and social relations between natural citizens (Farnsworth and Holden, 2006; 
Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). A second argument is the firm’s structural power, 
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i.e. the second mechanism of hidden CPP. The fear of capital flight constrains 
government officials to consult business before enacting public policies 
(Lindblom, 1977). A third and final argument holds to the premises of 
democracy: companies have the political right and duty to participate in policy-
making as corporate citizens or an interest group affected by public policies. 
Business participation helps balance the opinions of interest groups and 
ensure good policies for all citizens (Dahl, 1961; Moon et al., 2006). Given 
these three reasons, the firm can be seen as a private political actor at all 
levels, whether locally, regionally, nationally or internationally.  
 
The second premise of ECC is that CSR activities are a form of political 
activities (Matten and Crane, 2005; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2011). CSR 
activities blur the boundaries between the economic, political and civil spheres 
of society by erasing the line between private business activities and public 
governmental services (Banerjee, 2007; Makinen and Kourula, 2012). The 
provision of global regulations or standards (e.g. the UN Global Compact), 
and the provision of public goods (e.g. education and healthcare in developing 
countries; sponsorship of public art), are two political activities traditionally 
associated with the state. Yet their design and delivery are increasingly 
arranged by private companies through CSR initiatives. In consequence, CSR 
activities contribute to the politicisation of the firm in society and reinforce the 
position of the firm as a political actor. This theoretical argument is supported 
by recent evidence of lobbyists who admit using CSR activities “to influence 
political decision making and the stakeholders’ actions and reactions relevant 
to a company” (Köppl, 2012, p.178). While for practitioners CPA and CSR 
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activities are connected, the paucity of academic studies on this connection 
seems to stem from the fact that it runs counter to the prevalent discourse on 
these two subjects: CSR activities are viewed in a positive light, while CPAs 
are usually associated with negative corporate attributes (e.g. contribution to 
political ‘sleaze’) (Richter, 2011). Because of this assumption, scholars 
assume that CSR and CPA have no relations. Hillman et al. (2004) 
denounced this gap between reality and academic research, and invited 
scholars to develop more realistic frameworks. ECC attempts to fill this gap as 
it claims that CSR activities are a form of political activities. 
 
This review of ECC has provided a better knowledge of CSR and shed lights 
on its affiliation with CPA. Following my proposition that the model in Figure 1 
can be applied to CSR, I review in the next sections the determinants, 
outcomes and impact of CSR from a political perspective.  
 
2.5.4 Determinants of CSR  
Two main theoretical perspectives, institutional theory and RBV, have been 
employed in the investigation of the causes of CSR engagement. Institutional 
theory has been primarily used to describe the institutional conditions that 
forced companies to act in socially responsible ways (Moon, 2004; Campbell, 
2006; Bondy, 2008), and to explain the difference in CSR practices found 
between industries and between countries. For instance Midttun et al. (2006), 
Matten and Moon (2008) and Gjølberg (2009, 2011) analysed CSR through 
the lens of political economy. They share the same conclusion that the 
discourse on CSR is more prominent in countries with a neoliberal economy 
 69 
where the welfare state is weak, such as the U.S. and the UK. What 
constitutes corporate citizenship reflects the areas in which regulations and 
the provision of public goods by national governments have been historically 
limited due to economic and cultural factors. In the U.S., CSR tends to take 
the form of philanthropic donations to charities, whereas in Europe it is more 
directed towards labour and environmental standards (Maignan and Ralston, 
2002).  These studies suggest that CSR activities are essentially a response 
to institutional pressures, and that variations in CSR practices observed 
across countries are due to differences in national culture, political ideologies 
and other elements of the institutional settings that are influenced by socio-
political institutions. Their conclusions are supported by historical surveys of 
CSR, which find that changes in corporate practices have often been the 
result of religious, social or political pressures, against the lack of provision of 
what is expected to be a public good (Eberstadt, 1973; Vogel, 1991; 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2005; Shamir, 2005; Steets and Weihe, 2006; 
Carroll et al., 2012). A recent survey of the literature on the empirical 
determinants of CSR by Aguinis and Glavas (2012) concludes that the need 
for legitimacy has always been the foremost predictor of CSR engagement. 
Moral righteousness, and the desire to improve corporate performance, are 
secondary drivers.  
There is evidence between pressures from governmental institutions 
(regulatory threats) and CSR provision (Moon, 2004). There is also evidence 
in the reverse direction as some studies found CSR activities, particularly 
corporate philanthropy, able to pre-empt or lessen regulatory threats (Sims, 
2003; Fooks et al., 2011). They forestall mandatory regulations that might 
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have increased operating costs. This relationship between regulatory threats 
and CSR activities in the two directions finds some explanation in the model 
of Maxwell et al. (2000), a variant of the RDT+RBV framework. Their model 
proposes the existence of a “tit for tat” game between business and 
government. In exchange for CSR activities, companies are rewarded with 
more regulatory leniency and less monitoring. Companies play the game if 
undertaking CSR activities is more profitable than the costs of CPAs to 
attempt to influence the political process (with no guarantee of success), plus 
the estimated costs of the mandatory regulation. The “tit for tat” game is also 
found in Kinderman’s (2012) historical analysis of CSR in the UK. He found 
that “CSR deals” were negotiated between the Government and business. In 
exchange for more “voluntary” CSR programmes, companies were awarded 
less stringent public policies. Neiheisel’s (1994) findings also support the idea 
of a political market posited by Maxwell et al.’s (2000) model. In one of the 
first empirical studies of the political determinants of corporate philanthropy, 
Neiheisel (1994) noted that when strategic philanthropy delivered goods and 
services that met politicians’ expectations, it had the effect to appease 
politicians’ hostility and curb their demands on the business community. In 
exchange for their philanthropic activities, politicians rewarded companies 
with less mandatory regulations or with favourable regulations.  
 
Concerning the RBV approach to the study of CSR determinants, although 
empirical evidence points to external pressures as determinants of CSR 
engagement, Aguinis and Glavas (2012) note a number of organisational 
characteristics that also act as determinants. One is corporate size, which 
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overlaps external determinants because the larger and more visible a 
company, the more scrutiny and external pressures it receives. Stakeholders 
come to believe that the firm has the slack resources to engage in CSR 
(Buchholtz et al., 1999; Seifert et al., 2004). It is been noted that large 
companies, to mitigate risks of conflicts and reputational damage, are more 
pro-active in CSR than smaller enterprises that are less visible in the market 
(Kakabadse et al., 2005; King and McDonnel, 2012).  
A second organisational characteristic is the culture of the firm. Its history and 
values influence employees’ decisions, who are aware of the firm’s ethics and 
what practices are acceptable or not (Barney, 1986; Marcus and Anderson, 
2006). The culture of a company is influenced by its owners. Long-term 
shareholders, such as some institutional investors and senior management, 
tend to make a long-term commitment in the performance of a company. They 
are therefore more attentive to stakeholders’ concerns. Family firms in 
particular place great importance on maintaining a positive reputation with all 
stakeholders. For this reason, they usually have a higher CSR performance 
than non-family firms (Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Berrone et al., 2010).  
The third and final organisational characteristic is the belief by the firm in the 
business case for CSR (Burchi and Tarabella, 2013). The company believes 
that CSR can be a source of competitive advantage because it improves 
corporate reputation and legitimacy (e.g. risk reduction of lawsuits), and 
reduce costs (e.g. waste reduction, employee car-sharing) (Bansal and Roth, 
2000; Kurucz et al., 2008). Yet despite the popularity of the business case, 
the arguments in its favour (reputation, cost reduction, legitimacy) do not fully 
withstand scrutiny. Firstly, many CSR activities are visible and imitable. When 
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companies operating in the same industry gradually engage in CSR due to 
regulative and mimetic constraints, any competitive advantage that a firm may 
have had initially gradually disappear, as competition reduces profits and 
other slack resources to invest in CSR (Chymis, 2007). The extra investment 
and payback period required to differentiate further from rivals through CSR is 
such that most firms are unwilling to do the investment (Banerjee, 2007). As 
Vogel (2009) found out: 
“CSR has rarely proven to be a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage: it is relatively easy for any firm to identify its business 
mission or brand with a CSR-linked cause or issue or to subscribe to a 
civil regulation. This means that as soon as one firm does so, its 
competitors are likely to immediately do so as well. The result is a kind 
of CSR “arms-race” (p.26).  
 
The second argument that undermines the business case rationale is that the 
claim that the market punishes companies that are socially irresponsible, 
pollute, or are non-ethical, is empirically elusive (Vogel, 2005). Evidence fails 
to demonstrate the existence of a market for virtue. All companies would be 
seen to act with more concern for the environment if this was the case. 
Research shows that investors and consumers like the idea of CSR, but are 
unwilling to pay for it (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004; Devinney et al., 2010). 
The last business case’s argument, legitimacy, is driven by external pressures. 
An external pressure is not an organisational factor. In summary, the current 
arguments in support of the business case that are all based on economic 
grounds are weak. Rather than justify the undertaking of CSR with economic 
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arguments that presume a direct relation between CSR and corporate 
performance, McWilliams et al. (2006) and Zhao (2012) recommend using 
arguments with political grounding that presume an indirect relation. 
According to these scholars, CSR activities are more effective to obtain a 
competitive advantage when instrumentalised for political purposes. Like 
CPAs, CSR activities could help companies obtain government regulations 
that advance their interests by (i) obtaining a competitive advantage such as 
trade barriers for protectionism against foreign products (Baron, 1995; Dahan, 
2005), and/or (ii) removing a rival’s competitive advantage (McWilliams et al., 
2002). Indeed, CSR scholars have identified two types of companies that 
build their business cases with these two political arguments by seeking 
stricter CSR-related regulations. The first type of company is the one that 
engaged in CSR activities because it had been coerced to do so by external 
pressures (Bendell and Kearins, 2005). For instance, companies with high 
profile brands like Nike were targeted by activists and realised that as long as 
some CSR activities remained voluntary (e.g. inspection of suppliers in 
developing countries), they might lose out to competitors that were not subject 
to activists’ pressure. To eliminate their competitive disadvantage and level 
the playing field, these companies advocated certain mandatory regulations 
for their whole industry (Albareda et al., 2008; Vogel, 2009).  
The second type of company that seeks stricter social or environmental 
regulations, is the one that believes to be already above any foreseeable 
future regulations (Gjølberg, 2011). For this company, levelling the playing 
field would raise rivals’ costs that are laggards in CSR, while giving it an early 
mover advantage. For instance, the British Factory Act of 1833 that restricted 
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child labour was supported and lobbied for by steam-mill companies. Water-
mill companies opposed the policy. It was not that steam-mill operators were 
more socially responsible, but the policy gave them a competitive advantage 
due to their technology requiring less man-hours than water-mill companies 
did (Marvel, 1977). After the law was enacted, steam-mill companies faced 
less competition due to the regulatory barriers they had helped create. 
 
In summary, the CSR literature finds instrumental motives to be the 
fundamental drivers of engagement in CSR activities, either to reduce 
external pressures (e.g. legitimacy threats) or to improve financial 
performance. Organisational characteristics, i.e. corporate size, culture, 
ownership structure, and the revenue-seeking nature of the firm) also play a 
role. A variant of the political market found in the CPA literature is also found 
in the CSR literature. The conclusions of this review of the CSR determinants 
of the firm are similar to the ones concerning the determinants of CPA in 
Section 2.4.3. Whether the firm undertake CPAs or CSR activities, its 
objective is to obtain an external environment that is favourable to its revenue-
making operations. To succeed, the firm negotiate with policy-makers and 
engages in a type of trade with them.  
 
Following the model in Figure 1, I discuss next the political outcomes of CSR. 
As explained in Section 2.4.4, these correspond to the political goods of CSR, 
in other words they are the CSR-based mechanisms of CPP. 
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2.5.5 Outcomes of CSR 
Rare are the empirical studies on the relation between CSR and CPP. The 
few existing studies (Neiheisel, 1994; Sims, 2003; Fooks et al., 2011; Richter, 
2011; Wang and Qian, 2011; Werner, 2014) used charitable giving and 
political access as proxies of CSR and CPP respectively. They found a 
relation between corporate philanthropy and political access; however 
attempts to describe the mechanisms of this relation have to be found in 
conceptual studies. Theoretical contributions are from Rehbein and Schuler 
(2013) and Hond et al. (2014), who described how some political outcomes of 
CSR activities could be substitutes, or complements, to the outcomes of CPA 
on the political marketplace. With regards to the model in Figure 1, the 
political outcomes of CSR have to be considered to be political goods valued 
by policy-buyers. These political outcomes/goods from CSR activities include 
public image, technical expertise, social capital, and indebtedness. They are 
discussed in turn. 
 
 
1. Public Image:  
The public image of the firm, which represents its legitimacy, is a hybrid 
political good and meta-resource, as it ensures the successful deployment of 
the other political goods (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). A positive public image 
signals trust and credibility; it acts like a badge of legitimacy to stakeholders 
(Hadani and Coombes, 2012). Without legitimacy, there cannot be political 
access. Politicians, for their own public image, like being associated with high 
profile actors (e.g. artist musicians, leading businesses), and causes of 
interests to their constituents (e.g. cancer research, climate change). For this 
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reason, companies appreciated by the public are deemed less risky by 
politicians to collaborate with (Lindblom, 1977; Dahan, 2005; Richter, 2011). 
Thus a positive public image is a necessity for politically active companies.  
A CSR activity found to improve the public image of the firm is the practice of 
self-regulation (Sims, 2003; Lyon and Maxwell, 2008). Self-regulation is 
defined as: 
 The voluntary adoption of guidelines, codes of conduct and standards 
set by companies themselves or a third party, which correspond, or are 
above and beyond the law’s requirements, and to which companies 
pledge to abide by (Tyrrell, 2006, p.44).  
 
Regulators are aware that companies that publicise their CSR engagement 
and win awards for their social activities (e.g. “best company to work for”; 
“sustainable company of the year”, etc.), may find themselves victims of self-
entrapment (Risse, 1999). A public engagement raises the expectations of 
stakeholders, and the company has no choice to self-regulate its conduct to 
maintain its public image. If it does not, it loses its credibility and legitimacy. 
To summarise, having a public image of good corporate citizen is a double-
edged sword. The image gives a goodwill that facilitates the participation of 
the firm in policy-making, helps persuade policy-makers to support the 
arguments of the firm on a public issue, and makes the firm subject to less 
scrutiny by regulatory agencies (Lyon and Maxwell, 2008). However it makes 
the company also more accountable. Any failure to uphold the standards the 
firm publicly pledged to respect threatens its existence (e.g. the 2011 phone 
hacking scandal by News of the World).    
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2. Technical Expertise:  
 Lindblom (1977) called technical expertise the “privileged position of 
business” (p.172). In the course of their activities, companies collect 
information and develop proprietary knowledge that is critical for policy-
makers to access in order to design public policies. As a result, when a 
government needs information and advice on a subject related to the 
economy, it contacts business first among all interest groups. Business’ 
technical expertise is expected to be at the forefront of all. Companies act like 
a service agency to policy-makers: they bear the cost of collecting, analysing 
and disseminating political intelligence (Werner, 2014). In exchange for the 
provision of this service, policy-makers grant companies an easier access to 
the political process.  
Strong (2010) studied the role of the business community in the making of UK 
climate policy between 1997 and 2009. She found that information needed by 
government officials facilitated access to, and gave influence on the policy-
making process. The privileged position of business because of its technical 
expertise results in asymmetric information in policy-making: government 
officials find it difficult to verify or challenge the claims put forward by 
companies that are leaders in their field. In addition to capital flight, the 
dependence of policy-makers on business’ technical expertise contribute to 
the structural power of the firm (hidden CPP). According to Rehbein and 
Schuler (2013), expertise on CSR issues reinforces the privileged position of 
a company. They suggest that a company that undertakes CSR activities in a 
community, for instance through employee volunteering programmes, not only 
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gains a positive public image with local constituents, but also collects novel 
information and develops expertise over CSR issues in the community. These 
attributes make the firm an attractive partner for local politicians to consult and 
work with, starting with the granting of more and easier access to policy-
makers. 
  
A particular use of technical expertise in policy-making connected to CSR, is 
the combination of technical expertise and lobbying for technical 
standardisation, a practice that Frankel and Højbjerg (2012) call "technical 
activity" (i.e. technical plus political activity). Unlike more familiar forms of 
CPAs, technical activity aims at developing norms and technical standards for 
goods and services within an industry in advance of their demands by policy-
makers, with the hope these standards will be used as references in future 
government policies. The references could make these technical standards 
legally binding, or recommend them as one way among others to comply with 
the requirements of the policies. Technical activity has some similarities with 
the discursive instrument “sound science” reviewed earlier. Since legality is 
often commensurate with legitimacy (Litowitz, 2005), once a technical 
standard has been legally accepted as a reference, it becomes part of 
institutional norms of society expected to be met or exceeded by corporate 
and natural citizens. Since it is the corporate citizen that has set the norm, 
threats to its legitimacy are mitigated.  
Technical activity is a CSR activity because technical standards can originate 
from CSR activities, such as the creation and adoption of voluntary standards 
by an industry. For instance, the Forest Stewardship Council is a global forest 
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certification system, created and managed by civil groups and timber 
companies since 1993. In 2010 the EU Commission adopted a policy to 
prevent sales of illegal timber products on the European market. The policy 
referred to the use of the Forest Stewardship Council’s certifications as a way 
to guarantee the legality of a timber product. 
 
Frankel and Højbjerg (2012) argue that most academics and government 
officials disregard, or assign lesser weight to the practice of technical activity 
than other CPAs. If a company's representative goes to the European 
Commission to present the company's position on a political issue, the firm is 
seen to engage in CPA and controversy could ensue. However if the same 
representative goes to the European Committee for Standardization – an 
agency responsible to recommend European technical standards to the 
European Commission – and negotiate norms for the firm's products, the firm 
engages in technical activity. Yet it is more likely that this latter effort by the 
firm to set standards, and therefore control its external environment by setting 
the institutional norms of what constitute legitimacy, will go unnoticed. 
Technical activity can hide a corporate political agenda to frame debates on 
future policies, and the results may not always be beneficial to the public. For 
instance, in the UK 25 percent of purchased food is discarded at home. It 
encourages over-consumption and pollution, which are CSR issues. A driver 
of food wastage is date labelling; consumers misunderstand expiration date 
labels (‘sell by’, ‘use by’, ‘display until’, and ‘best before’ dates) (WRAP, 2012). 
New norms are needed but it may affect sales, so manufacturers and retailers 
disagree on the technical standards to adopt. Each party has a vested 
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financial interest to maintain the current norms, and prefer to reject the 
responsibility for this externality on the other party, the British government, 
and the lack of education of consumers (Newsome et al., 2014).  
Taken together, technical expertise and a structural position in society should 
give companies the ability to exercise the three forms of CPP at the same 
time.  
 
3. Social Capital: 
Social capital is the ability of an actor to secure benefits from his or her social 
relationships (Bourdieu, 1985; Barney, 1991). There are two forms of social 
capital that companies develop over time in the political arena: political ties 
and political reputation. The first one, political ties, comes from the first 
mechanism of hidden CPP (i.e. privileged relationship between top corporate 
managers and policy-makers), or from the use of the revolving door. A CSR 
related activity that makes use of the revolving door, and builds political ties, 
is the participation in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) programmes, such as 
Task Forces and Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation 
(Quangos). PPP brings together members from the public and private sectors 
and as a result, political ties develop between these actors.  
Both PPP and the revolving door are instruments of visible and hidden forms 
of CPP. The public may notice that former government officials appointed by a 
company, and corporate managers sit on the boards of Quangos, hospitals 
and schools. But the public remains unaware of how these individuals use 
their knowledge of regulatory procedures, and their personal contacts in 
government departments, to set the agenda of meetings and frame debates in 
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a fashion that advance the interest of their employer (Farnsworth and Holden, 
2006). One example given by Levy and Egan (2000) will illustrate this point. In 
1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 
Rio de Janeiro, the CEO of the Canadian electricity company Ontario Hydro 
was appointed Secretary-General of the conference. In turn, he invited the 
industrialist Stephan Schmidheiny to be his principal adviser. Schmidheiny 
founded the Business Council for Sustainable Development, an NGO group 
made of 48 of the world's largest companies to represent the voice of 
business at the conference. The outcome of the conference, the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change adopted by governments as a policy 
instrument, was legally non-binding, with no enforcement mechanisms and no 
concrete commitments by companies to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions. Most civil society groups and academics criticised the conference 
board for being structurally biased in favour of business (Levy and Egan, 
2000). 
 
According to Patricia Hewitt, former Secretary of State for Health in the Tony 
Blair government, there are three lobbying practices that can be disguised as 
CSR activities to build political ties (Groves and Newling, 2010): 
1. Offer politicians hospitality by inviting them to corporate events; 
2. Ask a third party (e.g. NGOs, government agencies, charities, think-
tanks, universities) to organise an event, sponsor the event and have a 
company representative sit next to the policy-maker; 
3. Identify a link between the company’s activities and the policy-maker's 
constituency, and request a private meeting.   
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Community relations as part of a CSR programme provide opportunities for 
these three activities. For instance, some companies sponsor museums and 
art galleries just for the opportunity to meet policy-makers (Moir, 2004). A final 
method to build political ties by means of CSR activities, is for a company to 
be a member of trade associations, NGOs and charitable organisations. 
Skippari (2005) noted that these memberships confer to corporate managers 
a social status, which contributes to the social capital of their employer. The 
memberships also give a number of opportunities to meet government 
officials and build personal ties with them.  
 
On the second form of social capital, political reputation, Attarça (1999) 
insisted on distinguishing it from public image. Whereas public image is best 
associated with the reputation of the firm with all stakeholders, political 
reputation corresponds to the credibility of the firm with government officials 
only. Political reputation results from the accumulation of political successes 
in policy-making, or a history of providing reliable and essential information to 
policy-makers, leading to the acquisition of an informal political status of 
“trusted expert” among government officials (Ellis, 2008). Political reputation is 
a medium of power difficult to notice because it is active outside and within 
the political arena, before, during and after the policy-making process. 
Mattingly (2006) claims that companies that have accumulated sufficient 
political reputation, are more likely to shape successfully public policies. And 
even if policy-makers may have decided upon a policy apparently hostile to a 
firm, compromises and amendments may have been reached behind closed 
doors. By concentrating on creating exemptions and legal loopholes rather 
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than opposing the entire policy, the company still gains in political reputation 
(Polk and Schmutzler, 2003). In a way, political reputation feeds upon itself. 
 
In their theoretical analysis of CSR activities as alternatives to CPAs, Hond et 
al. (2014) argue that “traditional” CPAs are more expensive and less reliable 
than the leverage of social capital built on trust. They therefore suggest that 
political ties can reduce the costs of politically active companies to access and 
convince policy-makers. This claim is supported by empirical evidence from 
Hillman (2005) and Faccio et al. (2006), who found that companies with 
political ties receive preferential treatments for government contracts, access 
to capital and more tax benefits. According to these studies, social capital 
affects positively political access and corporate financial performance. One 
interpretation is that political ties give the firm more technical expertise in 
regulatory procedures, and more political reputation. These two elements 
facilitate access to policy-makers, and give credence to the information 
provided to policy-makers in lobbying situations.  
 
The final political outcome of CSR is indebtedness. It ties in with social capital, 
but for the sake of clarity the two outcomes are kept apart. 
 
4. Indebtedness:  
 According to Sánchez (2000), indebtedness is a subtle and insidious political 
outcome of CSR that has gone unnoticed in the literature. When a firm does a 
CSR activity by which they provide a tangible benefit to the recipient, in our 
context a politician, there is a psychological dependence by the policy-maker 
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to repay the debt she or he feels owing to the firm. This dependence finds 
explanations in the theory of influence by the social psychologist Robert 
Cialdini (2007). He demonstrated that reciprocity is a key principle of power 
and influence in social relations across civilisations. When we receive a gift, 
we feel indebted to the donor and want to cancel that debt by being more kind 
and receptive to the requests of the donor. CSR activities such as 
philanthropic donations, trigger a psychological impulse on the part of 
recipients to repay the favour to the company. Indebtedness is therefore a 
medium of invisible power. 
Indebtedness is more likely to be created when a company gives non-
monetary philanthropic contributions, or indirect financial contributions, to a 
policy-maker (Bonardi and Urbiztondo, 2013). Sims (2003) gives the 
examples of funding an organisation close to the politician’s heart, employing 
a member of his or her family, and providing public goods and services that 
support government policies, or help to solve community problems for which 
the politician is accountable for to voters. All these CSR activities provide a 
platform for dialogue with politicians who benefit from them, and for 
developing social capital. More importantly, they create a sense of 
indebtedness to the politicians. They feel morally obliged to reciprocate this 
kindness, starting by giving easier political access to the firm (Sánchez, 2000; 
Fooks and Gilmore, 2013). Hillman et al. (2004) made a similar observation 
following their review of CPAs in the US. They remarked that the “[company] 
with a history of sponsoring community projects most likely realizes easier 
access to and better hearing from local politicians” (p.16).  
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Wikileaks (2011) gave evidence that indebtedness could provide a means to 
exercise invisible CPP. Prior to the 2007 presidential election in Argentina, the 
government negotiated with local banks the issues of small enterprises and 
mortgage loans at very low interest rates, which were unprofitable to the 
banks. The objective was to use the publicity in the media to boost the 
electoral chances of the presidential candidate Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner, who was at the time the Fist Lady. The banks accepted to issue 
loans at a loss because they knew it was temporary, that the government had 
no intention to verify if the loans were really issued, and that their gesture 
would create indebtedness. The banks expected de Kirchner, when elected, 
to return the favour. While this creation of false consciousness among voters 
contributed to the election of de Kirchner, the banks promoted a public image 
of being responsible corporate citizens, concerned with providing affordable 
loans to those in need (Bonardi and Urbiztondo, 2013). 
 
Table 5 summarises the four political outcomes of CSR, i.e. the political goods 
of CSR, and the CSR activities noted in the literature that create them. We will 
note that scholars have mainly used corporate philanthropy as a proxy for 
CSR, particularly charitable giving, because the expenditure is measurable 
and thus useful for quantitative studies (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Brammer and 
Millington, 2008). Charitable giving is cash and non-cash donations to 
charities such as gifts-in-kind and employee volunteering time). 
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Political 
Outcomes 
(Political Goods) 
Role CSR Activities 
Public Image  Give the firm legitimacy 
and trustworthiness 
Philanthropy (community 
programmes, event 
sponsorships, charitable 
giving…); self-regulation 
practices that meet 
stakeholders’ expectations; 
abide by the law; CSR 
reporting; contribution to 
environmental sustainability 
(pollution emissions and 
waste monitoring)  
Technical 
Expertise 
Make the firm an 
attractive source of 
information for policy-
makers 
Free advisory service (i.e. 
philanthropy); technical 
activity 
Social capital  Facilitate access to 
policy-makers, give 
credence to the firm’s 
reputation 
Philanthropy; participation in 
PPP; revolving door, 
membership of NGOs, trade 
associations and charities 
Indebtedness The support of 
government projects and 
politician’s causes 
creates indebtedness 
that gives political 
leverage 
Philanthropy; indirect 
financial contributions 
 
Table 5: Political Outcomes of CSR 
 
From this discussion of the political outcomes of CSR, we can draw the 
conclusion that CSR activities are instruments of CPP, like CPAs. Accordingly 
Table 6 presents an update of the CPP Framework: 
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Forms of CPP Visible Hidden Invisible 
Characteristics Agency Structural Discursive 
Mechanisms Visible actions that 
shape the policy-
making process 
and policy 
outcomes 
Certain actors and 
issues are 
excluded from 
public debates 
and decision 
making  
Socialisation and 
control of 
information 
Instruments 
(CPAs) 
Financial and 
Informational types 
of CPA; 
constituency 
building; coalition 
building 
Front groups and 
third party 
sponsorship 
(Astroturfing); 
political ties; 
revolving door; 
capital flight 
threats 
Dominant 
neoliberal 
ideology 
(economic 
growth, free 
market, 
consumer 
choice); sound 
science; 
advertising 
Instruments 
(CSR 
Activities) 
Philanthropy 
(event 
sponsorships; 
community 
programmes; 
employee 
volunteering); 
PPP; revolving 
door; self-
regulation 
PPP; revolving 
door; technical 
activity 
Technical 
activity; indirect 
financial 
contributions; 
advertising 
 
Table 6: CPP Framework with CSR 
 
2.5.6 Impacts of CSR 
Other than the determinants of CSR activities, the body of empirical studies in 
the literature has largely focused on the impact of CSR on corporate 
performance. The literature indicates that CSR activities contribute to 
corporate legitimacy by improving customer trust and loyalty, attracting 
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qualified employees to join the company, and by helping to negotiate better 
terms with suppliers (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Rowley and Berman, 
2000; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). It has also 
been reported that CSR activities help companies reduce their waste and 
therefore costs (Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998). Although these different 
impacts may contribute to the economic success of the firm, empirical 
research of the relationship between CSR and Corporate Financial 
Performance (“CFP”) remains inconclusive to date. The link has been found in 
the direction CFP-CSR, i.e. an increase or decrease of the financial 
performance correlates with an increase or decrease of the social and 
environmental performance of the firm (McGuire et al., 1988; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Orlitzky et al., 2003). In contrast, research in the reverse 
direction CSR-CFP remains unsettled. Despite approximately 170 studies that 
have been conducted in the last four decades, it is still unclear if CSR is 
positively correlated to CFP. Results are mixed, ranging from positive to 
neutral to negative (Vogel, 2005; Margolis et al. 2007; Orlitzky et al., 2011; 
Burchi and Tarabella, 2013). Similar to CPA research (Section 2.4.5), it is 
usually the methodology and sampling errors that have been criticised for the 
contradictory findings between CSR studies. Researchers have tended to 
lump together data from companies that belong to different industries, and 
which confront different contexts, CSR issues and stakeholders (Wokutch and 
Spencer, 1987; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Waddock and Grave, 1997; Roman 
et al., 1999). But CSR is a dynamic and contextual phenomenon, “the issues 
change and they differ for different industries” (Carroll, 1979, p.501).  
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This review of the impacts of CSR completes the review of the literature. The 
next section will summarise the literature, highlight the gaps, and a conceptual 
model will capture the relationship between CSR and CPP. 
 
2.6 Literature Summary 
In the same manner that power and responsibility are intertwined and are not 
easily dissociated, CSR and CPP form a pair. The firm as a legal person and 
citizen has political responsibilities similar to natural citizens, but those of the 
firm are considered to be greater because of its greater influence and power. 
Yet despite a growing interest in the concept of Extended Corporate 
Citizenship, the political dimension of CSR is still empirically under-studied. 
This political theory of CSR claims that the firm is a political actor and CSR 
activities are a type of CPAs. Rare are the studies that conceptualise CSR 
activities as political activities. Yet the review of the body of work on CSR and 
CPA reveals some overlaps between the two fields. One overlap concerns the 
determinants. CSR activities and CPAs are first and foremost motivated by 
instrumental motives, whether external threats to corporate legitimacy, 
particularly regulatory threats, or the desire to improve financial performance 
through public policies or sales of goods and services to the government. 
Another overlap is the mechanisms by which CPAs and CSR activities are 
able to contribute to the political power of the firm. The theoretical framework 
adopted, RDT+RBV underpinned by the institutional theory, is built on the 
proposition found in CPA studies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), and CSR studies 
(Maxwell, 2000), that the political environment of the firm is akin to a political 
marketplace. The firm exchanges political goods against political favours with 
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policy-makers. CPAs produce three types of political goods; CSR activities 
produce four types. Although different, each political good fulfils the same 
function of acting as a means to give the firm political access. CPA-based 
mechanisms and CSR-based mechanisms are both underpinned by the 
RDT+RBV framework. 
A third overlap concerns the ambiguous impacts of both CPAs and CSR 
activities. It is unclear if and how CPAs and CSR activities do or do not shape 
public policies (or contribute to corporate performance). Researchers blame 
methodological errors and a gap in knowledge on the processes and 
mechanisms (moderators and mediators) for this shortcoming (Waddock and 
Grave, 1997; Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). One limitation is the use of 
observable charitable donations as the proxy for CSR. A reason might be that 
these activities can be easily quantified and help research the “business case”. 
However corporate giving is not representative of the whole CSR 
phenomenon (Carroll, 1991).  
Another weakness stems from the difficulty to observe and trace the effects of 
CSR and CPA in policy-making. Because of this, many studies use political 
access and CPA expenditure as proxies for CPP (Sims, 2003; Fooks et al., 
2011; Richter, 2011). Level of access, and visible policy outcomes on a case-
by-case basis, are the only means to assess the three forms of CPP. 
The last shortcoming is the failure to systematically contextualise CSR and 
CPA research. Many studies are quantitative and use data from various 
sources (Lux et al., 2011). They do not capture the temporal and geographical 
aspects of CSR and CPAs, when in practice these nonmarket activities are 
constrained by the external environment of the firm. Determinants are 
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contextual and so are CPAs and CSR activities (Getz, 1997; Skippari, 2005; 
Fuchs and Lederer, 2007). Process-oriented case studies are best to analyse 
the link between CSR and CPP because a process approach retains the 
relational aspect of power and allows for the exploration between “cause,” 
“capacity,” and “effects” in a defined environment (Berenskoetter, 2007). 
Unfortunately data are difficult to collect as companies are secretive about 
their CPAs, and the literature suffers from a lack of case studies at the firm 
level (Shaffer, 1995). Fooks et al.’s study (2011, 2013) for instance, the only 
in-depth case study on the CSR-CPP relationship to my knowledge, was 
feasible only because the case-company investigated had released internal 
documents to the American courts. It is survey-based studies at the industry 
level that prevail in CPA scholarship (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). But these 
studies are criticised for being US-centric, and theories and empirical findings 
may not be applicable to all contexts (Barron, 2010; Rasche, 2015). Given 
that the characteristics of CSR activities and CPAs are expected to differ 
across nations and industries, there is a need for more in-depth case studies, 
process-oriented and contextualised to a single industry within a single 
country. 
 
Given the aforementioned gaps in knowledge, this thesis will analyse the 
CSR-based mechanisms of CPP and their impacts. To achieve this purpose, 
the study seeks answer to the research question: “How does CSR contribute 
to CPP?” Research will be restricted to a single industry in the UK. Following 
the definition of CSR employed by this thesis, all the CSR activities 
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undertaken in that industry will be investigated, not solely visible charitable 
donations like previous research did.  
The next section presents the conceptual model. 
 
2.7 Conceptual Model 
The preliminary conceptual model that illustrates the relationship between 
CSR and CPP is based on the findings from the literature review and 
theoretical perspectives adopted. The model conceptualises the political 
environment of the firm as a marketplace. The exercise of CPP is based on 
an exchange of political goods between the firm and policy-makers, 
underpinned by the institutional settings (e.g. local laws and culture) and the 
context in which the trade occurs. Political goods are produced by corporate 
activities (i.e. they are the outcomes of those activities), and they are the 
mechanisms by which these corporate activities contribute to CPP. 
Two types of corporate activities were identified in the literature as leading to 
the production of political goods. One type is the traditional CPAs, which 
typically produce three political goods, information, votes and financial 
contributions. The second type is CSR activities, which produce four political 
goods, namely public image, technical expertise, social capital, and 
indebtedness. With these later four political goods, companies are able to use 
CSR activities as substitute to CPAs on the political marketplace. The process 
is as follow: the firm seeks CPP to maintain and/or improve its revenues, or 
external pressures motivate the firm to seek CPP to mitigate external threats 
to its legitimacy. To access policy-makers, the firm can use either CPAs or 
CSR activities. Having gained political access, the firm leverages its 
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organisational resources to obtain a government contract or a public policy 
that advances its interests. 
 
Figure 3 presents the preliminary conceptual model of the CSR-CPP 
relationship. Variants of the left part of the model (CPA-CPP) have already 
been studied in the literature (e.g. Neiheisel, 1994; Sims, 2003; Fooks and 
Gilmore, 2013). The right part of the model with dashed arrows (CSR-CPP) is 
the gap in knowledge investigated by this research. CSR activities and CPAs 
are viewed as instruments of CPP, and the model illustrates the parallel 
between these two activities generally treated separately in the literature. 
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Figure 3: Conceptual Model of CSR-CPP 
 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented a critical review of the different fields of study; it 
has identified gaps that the thesis will seek to address by investigating 
answers to one main research question. A conceptual framework built from 
the literature and the theoretical fields underpin the research. In the next 
chapter the methodology guiding this study, and the research methods 
employed, are presented. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
 
This chapter outlines the approach taken to design and conduct the research. 
The philosophical approach to the study is presented, followed by the 
methods and research design. The chapter concludes with the strategies 
used to collect and analyse the data. 
 
3.1 Research Paradigm 
The term “research methodology” refers to the strategic approach adopted by 
the researcher to carry out the study and discover knowledge (i.e. answers to 
the research question). The methodology is guided by the philosophical 
assumptions, also called research paradigm, of the researcher. The paradigm 
represents the framework of beliefs and values that underpins the research 
methodology, from the way the researcher sees the world to the selection of 
methods to gather and analyse data (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). According to 
Guba (1990), paradigms are characterised by their ontology (what is the 
nature of reality?) and epistemology (how do you know what you know?). 
There are two main opposing ontologies in science (Bryman and Bell, 2007; 
Saunders et al., 2009). Objectivism as an ontological position considers that 
phenomena and their meanings are independent and separated from social 
actors. In contrast, subjectivism considers that phenomena and their 
meanings are constructed by the interactions of social actors.   
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There are also two main epistemological positions that oppose each other in 
science, namely positivism that is closely related to objectivism, and 
constructivism related to subjectivism. Constructivism is often identified with 
‘interpretivism’, although Schwandt (2000) argues there is a minor difference 
between the two. Positivism holds that reality is objective and independent of 
actors. Only the positive affirmation of theories through authentic scientific 
methods provides true knowledge of the world. Therefore researchers must 
focus on facts and avoid a personal judgment of data. General laws and 
theories can be discovered following a large number of observations and 
measurements using quantitative methods of data collection and analysis to 
ensure objectivity. Since research assumptions can be formed prior to the 
data collection, positivism is mainly deductive in approach. It usually attempts 
to test theories and hypotheses through their application to the specific 
contexts (Crowther and Lancaster, 2009).  
While positivism is suitable for research in natural sciences where scientists 
look for universal laws (e.g. mathematics and physics), in social science it is 
difficult to use this research paradigm because researchers need to interact 
with the people who cause the social phenomena studied (Fleetwood and 
Ackroyd, 2003). In contrast to natural phenomena, the understanding of social 
phenomena is only possible through the eyes of social actors. Because each 
person tends to have his or her own interpretation of an event, for social 
scientists reality is not easily predictable and assumptions may be made at 
the outset of the research. For this reason, constructivism/interpretivism has 
been developed in response to the limitations of positivism. Constructivists 
consider that reality is subjective and socially constructed by actors; 
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knowledge can only be found through their eyes (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008). Because reality is individually constructed, constructivists recognise 
that general truth is difficult to conceive. Rather than seeking generalisation to 
an entire population as positivists do, constructivists tend to adopt qualitative 
methods to inductively understand why a phenomenon exists in context-
specific settings. Theories are not determined prior to the data collection but 
are constructed during the study (Creswell, 2003; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008). 
 
The debate between the proponents of these two opposing epistemologies, 
and the need to find a common ground, has led to the emergence of new 
paradigms. Two that have gained attention in recent years in business studies 
are pragmatism and critical realism (Mingers, 2004). Pragmatism is simply the 
commitment to no research paradigm. Pragmatic researchers focus on what 
works in practice and use any methodology and methods they judge best to 
answer the research problem and research questions they face (Creswell, 
2003). Inductive and deductive strategies, qualitative and quantitative data, all 
can be mixed at different stages of the research process depending the 
researcher’s needs (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2007). 
Critical realism positions itself between positivism and constructivism. It is 
similar to positivism in that it conceives of external reality independent of 
human consciousness (i.e. objects exist independently of the human mind). 
But contrary to positivism, critical realism makes a distinction between natural 
phenomena (e.g. lightning strikes) and social phenomena (e.g. fashion trends, 
bureaucracy). The latter cannot be understood independently of the social 
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actors and social structures involved in their creation. Thus critical realism 
takes into account the link between social structures and their causal power 
on actors, like the resource dependence theory does (Blaikie, 2003; Bryman, 
2008; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008; Saunders et al, 2009). Nevertheless 
critical realism opposes constructivism on the basis that it does not consider 
that the emotions experienced by an individual can distort reality and render a 
wrong image of the real world to the individual. In addition, for critical realists 
the social world includes institutions and cultures (national, organisational), 
which exist independently of an individual’s thinking (Bergin et al., 2008; 
Saunders et al., 2009). Another distinction from positivism and constructivism 
is that critical realists believe reality can exist on multiple levels: the empirical 
domain that consists of events that can be observed and experienced (e.g. a 
company publishes a CSR report); the actual domain that consists of events 
observable or not (e.g. the tangible and intangible benefits of publishing a 
CSR report, which can only be known by interviewing the company’s 
stakeholders); and the real domain that consists of the structures, 
mechanisms and processes that produce these events (e.g. a conceptual 
model to understand why a company produces a CSR report, how it does, 
and the tangible and intangible benefits to be expected) (Blaikie, 2003). In 
other words, a feature of reality is that there is a gap between what we 
experience and understand (empirical domain), what really happens (actual 
domain), and the mechanisms that make things happen (real domain).  
Thus whilst positivists look for explanations that fit one stable and universal 
reality, constructivists focus on the meaning that actions have for actors and 
offer their results as one interpretation of the social phenomena studied. In 
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contrast to both, critical realists look for causal relationships (the mechanisms), 
but consider that the important ones cannot be observed and have to be 
established indirectly, by being inferred from the researcher's theory and 
observable relationships (Danermark et al., 2002; Marsh and Smith, 2001; 
Bergin et al. 2008). Table 7 summarises the four common research 
paradigms in management research. 
 
 Positivism Constructivism/ 
Interpretivism 
Pragmatism Critical Realism 
Ontology: the 
researcher’s 
view of the 
nature of reality 
External, 
objective and 
independent of 
social actors 
Socially 
constructed, 
subjective, may 
change. 
View chosen to 
best enable 
answering of 
research 
questions. 
External, 
objective and 
independent of 
human beliefs, 
but is interpreted 
through 
sensations and 
mores.  
Epistemology: 
the researcher’s 
view of what 
constitutes 
acceptable 
knowledge 
Only observable 
phenomena can 
provide valuable 
data. Findings 
are true and can 
be generalised. 
Knowledge 
derives from 
subjective 
meanings. 
Researcher is a 
participant. 
Findings are 
approximate 
truth as reality is 
never fully 
apprehended. 
Either or both 
observable 
phenomena and 
subjective 
meanings can 
provide 
acceptable 
knowledge. 
Observable 
phenomena 
provide credible 
data; findings 
probably true if 
triangulated from 
many sources. 
Methodology: 
how the 
researcher 
examines reality 
Large samples; 
mostly 
quantitative data 
to test theories 
(surveys, 
experiments, 
etc.). 
Small samples; 
mainly qualitative 
data but can be 
quantitative 
(interviews, 
participant 
observations, 
case studies, 
etc.) 
Focus on a 
practical 
approach to 
gather and 
interpret data. 
Mono, mixed or 
multi-method 
depending 
research 
questions; 
quantitative 
and/or qualitative 
data 
Methods and 
sample size 
depends of 
research 
questions; 
quantitative 
and/or qualitative 
data. 
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Table 7: Research Paradigms (adapted from Saunders et al., 2009) 
 
3.1.1 Rationale for the Research Paradigm Adopted 
 
Personal Beliefs: 
The literature review influenced my view of the world. At the end of it I 
regarded CSR to be a dynamic socio-political phenomenon. The environment 
of the firm is not static but constantly changing and so, both CSR and CPP 
are like on-going processes that constantly monitor and adapt to external 
pressures. Both concepts are contextual. The meaning and content of CSR 
change over time, in parallel with a society’s values and the expectations of its 
citizens. CSR and corporate legitimacy are built on a constructivist 
epistemology because they are dependent on the belief of the firm’s 
stakeholders (Suchman 1995; Kurucz et al., 2008). For these reasons, I 
adopted the constructivism’s assumptions that (i) reality and knowledge are 
known through experiences in a given context; (ii) language is not a 
transparent medium of communication; and (iii) social rules and codes shape 
an actor’s knowledge (Foucault, 1980; Burr, 1995). I also followed Marsh and 
Smith (2001) and Marsh and Furlong’s (2002) recommendation to use 
multiple research philosophies. According to them, although the causal 
mechanisms of a process and its outcomes can be revealed and explained 
from empirical data, they can only be understood through recognition of their 
social construction. Business managers are individuals with a free will but 
influenced by their environment and emotions. They are constantly making 
strategic choices among multiple goals to satisfy multiple stakeholders, so the 
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understanding of their apparent rational choices is best developed through the 
analysis of managers’ own stories (Kaplan, 1993). But their stories only 
provide a small window on the phenomenon. Only by uncovering the 
underlying mechanisms, which managers may not be aware of, can we have 
an in-depth explanation and understanding of the whole phenomenon. The 
critical realism stance is congruent with a ‘Foucauldian’ view of the world, 
where knowledge and power create each other (Joseph, 2004; Al-Amoudi, 
2007). Indeed, with critical realism claiming there are multiple interpretations 
of reality because it is socially created, some scholars argue that 
constructivism is compatible with a realist worldview and social scientists can 
be critical realists and social constructivists at the same time (Messick, 1989; 
Krausz, 2000; Cupchik, 2001; Marsh and Furlong, 2002; Barkin, 2003; Al-
Amoudi and Willmott, 2011; Elder-Vass, 2012). The resulting hybrid paradigm 
is ‘constructivist-realism’: social sciences deal with phenomena that are 
recognised to be real, but their descriptions and explanations are constructed 
by scientists, hence the term ‘constructivist-realism’ (Krausz, 2000; Cupchik, 
2001). Constructivist-realism suits research where participants are not 
expected to have, nor willing to provide, all the answers or truthful accounts to 
the phenomenon investigated. The unknown is to be uncovered, and the 
mechanisms of reality constructed by the researcher: how companies design 
and manage their CSR activities can be partially observed through their 
annual reports and CSR reports, but how they design and manage their 
political activities cannot because they are secretive on this subject (Lawton et 
al., 2013).  
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Although constructivist-realism is the main underpinning paradigm of this 
research for the theoretical reasons and personal beliefs mentioned above, 
pragmatism also guided me to this choice due to the nature of data sought. 
  
The Nature of Data: 
The main practical challenge faced by all researchers on CPAs in the UK is 
the lack of information on these activities and their impacts (Harris, 1999). 
Companies do not report on their CPA expenditure, and information on the 
processes and tactics used by businesses concerning their political affairs is 
scarce. To study CPA or CPP in the UK, researchers must interview business 
executives and government officials who have knowledge of them. But access 
to those individuals is more challenging than for studies on other subjects, as 
they are reluctant to discuss what it is considered to be commercial and 
sensitive information. Hence the size of samples in those studies is usually 
not large enough to conduct quantitative data analyses, nor is random 
sampling effective to collect high quality data. All of these make the adoption 
of the positivism paradigm difficult in this field of research in the UK (Collis 
and Hussey, 2009). Furthermore, when managers do accept to talk about 
their political or CSR activities, they often suffer from a social desirability bias 
(Bondy, 2008). They explain the reasons for their decisions and the outcomes 
from their own perspective but, as they fear criticism on the possibly 
controversial nature of their actions, their frankness and the full details of their 
disclosures may be questionable (Shaffer, 1995; Banerjee, 2002). For this 
reason, collecting objective data on these two subjects is difficult. 
Researchers must carefully interpret the data gathered by taking into account 
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the socio-economic and political contexts in which events occurred. This 
makes constructivist-realism suitable as context is central to this hybrid 
paradigm. 
  
Research Strategy and the Role of Theory: 
Another motive to locate the research within a constructivist-realism 
orientation was the research strategy. Given the lack of empirical research on 
the political dimension of CSR in the UK, this study sought the understanding 
of a phenomenon rather than the verification or falsification of theories on a 
phenomenon. Positivism, with its use of pure deductive thinking, was not 
appropriate because it does not contribute to the construction of new theory, 
but rather confirms or invalidates previous ones. Interpretivism was not 
suitable because the literature review informed the research and therefore, a 
pure inductive reasoning was not possible. The alternative was to adopt a 
retroductive research strategy. 
Retroduction is based on realism. It is a mode of analysis for findings answers 
that explain what conditions in reality have, may have, or could have led to the 
phenomenon (Olsen and Morgan, 2005). It starts in the domain of the actual 
by observation of the phenomenon, and then seeks to uncover the 
mechanisms responsible for it by building a preliminary conceptual model. As 
the mechanisms represented by the model are in the “real” domain, and 
usually not directly observable initially, their nature and functions have first to 
be imagined before evidence can be sought and the model verified (Blaikie, 
2003). The objective is to explain the phenomenon and not predict it. 
Retroduction requires the cyclical move back and forth between the literature, 
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the conceptual model and the emerging empirical data to uncover the real 
mechanisms (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Davis and Marquis, 2005). Ragin’s 
(1994) model of social research, shown in Figure 4, describes the retroduction 
process: 
 
 
Figure 4: A Model of Social Research (Ragin, 1994, p. 57) 
 
The “analytic frames” (conceptual frameworks and models) are deduced from 
general observations, personal experiences, ideas and theories from the 
literature; “images” of reality are inductively constructed from the evidence 
collected in the field. To represent “social life” as realistically as possible, the 
analytic frames guide data collection and are constantly compared and 
combined with images in a process called retroduction. This combination of 
deductive and inductive thinking tends to provide better research findings 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Langley, 1999; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). 
Indeed, it is been claimed that no study begins without any prior knowledge of 
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either the field or a prior theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1997; Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2000), and trying to use a purely deductive or inductive strategy 
is “unnecessary stultifying” (Langley, 1999, p.694). The literature review 
helped me in understanding the present state of knowledge on CPP and CSR, 
and in identifying research gaps to direct my research. This culminated in the 
initial conceptual model in Figure 3, which guided the data collection and 
analysis. For instance, it gave a prior view of the general constructs for the 
development of interview questions and a priori codes (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Miles and Huberman, 1994). Considering that at the beginning of the data 
collection the model was hypothetical, it was expected that its robustness 
would improve as it would be revisited as data emerged. Hence the case 
studies in this research did not formally test the conceptual model. This fits to 
the retroductive strategy adopted. 
 
3.2 Research Design and Methods 
Given the aforementioned reasons for my philosophical position, a qualitative 
research approach was adopted. A case study design was considered the 
most suitable methodology to apply, as it allows the investigation of the 
phenomenon within its real life context. The inter-dependency between a 
phenomenon and context is best captured through a case study (Yin, 2003). 
In addition, the nature of data sought makes the case study methodology well 
suited to find answers to the research question of this thesis. Different types 
of case studies can be conducted depending on the purpose of the research 
(Robson, 2002; Yin, 2003): 
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1. Exploratory: used to explore those situations in which little is known of 
the phenomenon observed, and its effects are unclear. The researcher 
tries to find out what is happening, seeks new insights and generates 
ideas and hypotheses for new researches. 
2. Descriptive: used to portray a phenomenon and the real life context in 
which it occurred. This type of case requires the researcher to have 
extensive previous knowledge of contextual conditions. 
3. Explanatory: used when seeking an explanation of a situation, but not 
necessarily in the form of a causal relationship. 
  
This study is exploratory in nature, as its aims to explore the relationship 
between CSR and CPP within the UK context. Exploring is the first step to 
reach an understanding of a phenomenon: to explore is an attempt to develop 
an initial rough description of the phenomenon; to understand is to establish 
reasons for particular acts or the occurrence of an event, these reasons being 
derived from the ones given by social actors (Blaikie, 2003).   
Altogether, the reasons for adopting an exploratory case study methodology 
for this study are summarised as follows (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Yin, 2003; 
Ghauri, 2004):  
1. It is flexible and suits a retroductive constructivist-realism position 
as it collects participants’ perceptions of unobservable events for 
the researcher, which fall into the actual domain of realism. 
2. It focuses on relationships and processes between variables. This 
provides insight on how variables affect one another, revealing the 
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mechanisms and structures in the real domain that create the 
phenomenon.  
3. It allows early insight into a phenomenon not yet understood. 
Theories, conceptual models, hypotheses and propositions can be 
developed, tested and/or refined. 
4. The phenomenon can be studied within the real life context in which 
it occurs, using multiple sources of evidence and a variety of 
methods for data collection. 
 
The main disadvantage of the case study methodology, regardless of the 
research paradigm adopted, is that the data collection and analysis rely on the 
researcher’s interpretation of empirical data. There is always a risk that the 
researcher’s own beliefs, values and prior assumptions limit the validity of the 
findings. Studies on corporate power particularly, have been accused to be 
biased because power as a concept is ambiguous (Luger, 2000). For instance, 
more relevance could be given to a datum, leading to the misunderstanding of 
all the empirical data (Jaikumar and Bohn, 1986; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986). Another risk of bias is the case selection. The researcher might choose 
a case because of its convenience, but if the case is far from being typical, the 
research will be very difficult to replicate (Denscombe, 2007). This is why 
external validity is difficult to attain with a single case study. For these reasons, 
a multiple case study approach was adopted for the research. With multiple 
case studies, the investigation of the phenomenon takes place in diverse 
settings across the cases, and the cross-case analysis makes the research 
findings more robust and reliable (Yin, 2003). If the majority of cases have 
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similar results, there is substantial support for the theory that explains the 
phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
3.2.1 Process-Based Research 
This study sought an understanding of the processes and mechanisms that 
brought together CSR and CPP. CPP was conceptualised as a process. The 
phenomena had to be observed dynamically, that is “in terms of movement, 
activity, events, change and temporal evolution” (Langley, 2007, p.1). A 
process analysis links outcomes to causes and processes by showing the 
reciprocal mechanisms between corporate actions and social structures 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997). It is an effective methodology to understand how 
changes come about within and outside the firm over time, and thus how CSR 
activities affect CPP. For these reasons, Pettigrew’s (1997) process research 
model was adopted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  A Process Study (adapted from Pettigrew, 1997) 
Draw research questions and 
conceptual framework from 
literature review 
Preliminary data 
collection (pilot) 
Early pattern 
recognition 
Revise research 
questions and/or 
conceptual framework 
Data collection 
Additional pattern 
recognitions across-case 
studies 
Theorising 
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A process can be defined as a series of non-linear events unfolding over time 
in context. An event is a temporally specific outcome of acts performed by 
human actors or nature (e.g. earthquakes) perceived to be critical (Pettigrew, 
1997; Elo et al., 2010). The case studies had to be retrospective, conducted in 
the form of time series analysis of CSR activities and CPAs for a better 
tracking of causes and effects in their context. I followed Barley and Tolbert’s 
(1997) recommendations for empirical studies that use a process-based 
framework: 
(1) Choose a social structure or institution at risk of change. This 
represents the unit of analysis for the single case study. 
(2) Use various sources of data, chart the flows of actions by key actors 
within and outside the unit of analysis by bracketing the actions and 
institutional realms in different time periods. 
(3) Search for evidence of changes in behavioural patterns by the unit of 
analysis and its external environment. Since it is not possible to 
observe instantaneous changes, the only way to observe if any 
changes occur is by comparing the actions uncovered at time T0 to 
those at a later time (T1, T2, etc.) in the bracket period. 
 
The units of analysis were the case study companies. The observation of 
noticeable sequential episodes of changes took place across the social 
structures represented by government institutions (e.g. changes in public 
policies, ideologies and policy-makers’ expectations), and the actions of the 
companies (e.g. changes in everyday practises through the adoption of major 
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new policies related to CSR and CPA, change in human resources to fulfil 
these new priorities, etc.). Hence the analysis focused on: 
1. The motives for case companies to undertake CSR activities and CPAs. 
This information helped evaluate the evolution of corporate activities, 
and causes for changes.  
2. The starting point of the processes, called here the Key Event (T0). 
Unique to each case company, the Key Event corresponds to the point 
in time when a company took the decision to proactive engage in CSR 
activities. 
3. The Critical Events (T1, T2, etc.) within and outside the case company. 
These were events that had major impacts on the firm’s political and 
CSR activities after the Key Event. The identifications of these events 
are discussed in the next section. 
 
The temporal bracket selected to capture data, including Key Events and 
Critical Events, was the period 1980-2010. This 30-year period was chosen 
because it was found to be the period during which CSR raised to prominence 
and became institutionalised in the UK. This long-term view helped in 
identifying CPP mechanisms that worked prior to and outside the policy-
making process (Hathaway, 2013a), and reconstructing the chronology of 
Critical Events and the evolution of some public policies. 
 
As per Barley and Tolbert’s (1997) recommendations, Figure 6 represents the 
unit of analysis used for case studies: 
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T-1      T0        T1, T2, T3…tn      Tn+1 
 
 
Figure 6: Unit of Analysis 
 
 
Langley (1999) outlined seven common strategies for analysing process data: 
narrative, quantification, alternate template, grounded theory, visual mapping, 
temporal decomposition and synthetic strategies. Each researcher is free to 
use any approach he or she considers effective “to become intimately familiar 
with each case as a stand-alone entity [and] allows the unique patterns of 
each case to emerge” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.540). For Pettigrew (1997), what is 
important when doing a process analysis is to contextualise the process first, 
and then gather the data related to: 
• when the process begins and ends;  
• the key sequence of actions;  
• the moments when influential ideas or individuals emerge;  
• the key transitions point and the remarkable individuals involved; and  
• the indicators of changes at the end of the process.  
 
Corporate  
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Political 
Activities 
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The researcher finally analyses the event chronologically and writes the case 
study by quoting interviews and/or secondary data. I combined Pettigrew’s 
(1997) approach with Elo et al.’s (2010) method for event-based qualitative 
process analysis. The method conceives of processes as several mini Critical 
Events that are retrospectively analysed for understanding an entire process, 
and ultimately the phenomenon in its entirety. The finding and sense making 
of Critical Events take place at three levels: macro level (events that occur in 
the world, outside the UK, and may affect the case company indirectly), meso 
level (events that occur within the UK and the British construction industry and 
may affect the case company directly or indirectly) and mini level (events that 
occur within and outside the case company and affect it directly). 
 
 
Figure 7: Tracing Events (adapted from Elo et al., 2010) 
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“E1” indicates events identified from secondary sources that were Critical 
Events in the macro and meso-level environment, such as the Falklands War 
in 1982 or the privatisation programme of the 1980s, and that had an 
observable impact on business-government relations. For instance case 
companies were awarded procurement contracts during these Critical Events. 
But E1 had to be discarded during the analysis because I did not have access 
to the relevant people who could confirm or refute their effects on the case 
company, or the participant(s) knew but declined to comment.  
Interestingly, because the case companies belonged to the same industry, 
they shared many Critical Events at the macro and meso levels. It facilitated 
the identification of their homogeneous and heterogeneous practices, and the 
institutional changes in their political environment. For instance: 
 
Macro level:  
o The United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (“Earth Summit”) in 1992, where an international 
action plan for sustainable development (Agenda 21) was 
agreed and was integrated later into British government policies . 
o European Union legislations, such as the 1993 European 
Working Time Directive and the 1999 EU Landfill Directive). 
Meso level: 
o Oppositions to road buildings on environmental grounds during 
the 1990s, which affected the entire construction industry. 
o Responses by their common trade associations to governmental 
consultations, and the subsequent public policy amendments. 
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To identify the Key Event and Critical Events for each case company, I first 
collected and reviewed documentary data (see list of documents and sources 
in Table 8) in order to get familiar with the case companies, determine a priori 
the Key Event and Critical Events, and establish a chronology of the different 
types of CSR and CPAs undertaken by the companies over time. Following 
the review of the documents, I sought to interview informants who had 
knowledge of the industry and the case companies. They confirmed, rejected 
and provided new data on what they considered to be the Key Event, Critical 
Events, the responses by case companies to these major events, and the 
impacts. These primary data were then triangulated with documentary 
evidence. This approach allowed me to identify the major events for each 
case company, and reconstruct the sequential events that brought closer CSR 
activities and CPP. 
 
3.2.2 Case Selection  
In qualitative case study research, cases are usually chosen selectively as 
they determine the understanding of the phenomenon. According to Yin 
(2003), each case is similar to an experiment and each should be selected so 
that it either produces similar results (“literal replication”) or contrasting results 
(“theoretical replication”) to others. Given the objective of this study to explore 
and understand a phenomenon that we know little about, literal replication 
was sought. Theoretical rather than statistical sampling was used to select the 
cases. Unlike statistical sampling where the cases and the population are 
randomly selected for objectivity and statistical reasons, in theoretical 
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sampling the researcher selects (i) sample cases likely to have similar results 
and, (ii) sample of participants within each case which will provide insights 
into the area of study. Case companies were selected according to the 
following criteria based on documentary data: 
 
1. Industry: One conclusion reached after the critical review of the 
literature was the importance to contextualise research on CSR to a 
single industry. I chose the British construction industry for four 
reasons. Firstly, I had worked in the industry. I could use my 
existing networks to get access to key informants, and collect 
sensitive data of high quality. Secondly, the British construction 
industry is as important as the financial industry to the market 
economy of Britain. This industry is the one that builds the 
infrastructure of the country and its economy. It contributes six 
percent of Britain’s GDP, and employs seven percent of the 
workforce (Rhodes, 2013). Thirdly, this industry is heavily regulated, 
and it is been demonstrated that a high level of regulation in an 
industry is associated with a high level of CPAs (Schuler et al., 
2002; Hillman et al., 2009). The construction industry has been 
found to have “the greatest propensity to bribe public officials and 
exert undue influence on government policies and regulations” 
(Transparency International UK, 2008). Lastly, the industry suffers 
from a negative image among the British public for its impact on the 
environment, for having the highest accident rate at work for 
workers, for being corrupt, and for being seen as a male domain 
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and the last resort for young people without academic skills (Murray 
and Dainty, 2008; Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
2013; HSE, 2014). This bleak perception of the industry makes it an 
interesting context to study CSR and CPA practices. Yet to date, 
knowledge of these practices in this particular industry is very 
limited (Murray and Dainty, 2008; Brown, 2012). This thesis can 
contribute to fill the gaps in these areas. 
2. Industry Sector: the companies had to be general/main contractors. 
A general contractor in a construction project is the construction 
firm responsible to deliver the project. It bids, designs and builds; it 
has to recruit and manage all sub-contractors in the supply chain.  
3. Active in CSR and CPA: only companies that were overtly active in 
CSR and politically were considered as potential cases. 
4. Credibility: the companies had to exist for over 20 years to ensure a 
long experience in government relations. 
5. Organisational Characteristics: the companies had to have different 
owners or major shareholders, and distinct historical backgrounds 
to ensure a “range of variation in the studied phenomenon to 
determine whether common themes, patterns, and outcomes cut 
across this variation” (Gall et al., 1996, p. 233). 
6. Level of Access: given the sensitivity of the two subjects 
investigated, to collect data of good quality, I had to be able to 
access the individuals with full knowledge of CSR and political 
activities of each company. 
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There are no upper or lower limits to the number of cases that make the 
findings of a study more or less robust (Ghauri, 2004). The sampling of a 
research is only considered adequate when saturation occurs, that is when 
data cover all aspects of the phenomenon and additional data collected 
replicate existing data, hence cease providing new insights (Morse, 1991; 
Andrew et al, 2011). In total three British construction firms were identified as 
case studies (C1, C2 and C3). All three companies were general contractors, 
founded over 30 years ago in the UK, and where they still had their 
headquarters. Details of each company are provided in the ‘company 
background’ section of each case study, and their anonymity is discussed in 
Section 3.3.3. In short, as at 2010 C1 is a public listed multinational company 
with thousands of employees worldwide. The company is specialised in public 
infrastructure (e.g. road building, bridge maintenance, hospitals). C2 is a 
private family-owned firm that operates in the UK only. It has over a thousand 
employees, and does all type of construction work except public infrastructure 
(i.e. C2 works in property development, school building, social housing and 
offices). C3 is a public limited company that operates internationally in all 
projects across the construction spectrum. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
 
3.3.1 Sources of Data 
A benefit of case study research is that multiple sources of data can be used 
and combined for triangulation purposes, such as surveys, observations, 
documentation, archival records, and interviews (Yin, 2003). Each data 
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source provides one picture of the phenomenon. When all the data converge, 
the researcher is better able to understand the whole phenomenon. Given the 
nature of data sought, the methods judged most efficient to collect them were 
documents analysis and semi-structured interviews (an open-ended 
discussion with the researcher). Documentary data were collected from 
various sources (government publications, companies and industry 
publication, newspapers, reports by civil society groups, etc.). Table 8 
presents the documents collected and their usefulness for the research:  
 
Documents Sources Value for Research 
Press releases; CSR 
reports; Annual reports 
and accounts of C1, 
C2 and C3 from 1980 
to 2012 
 
Participants gave me 
the documents; 
Organisation 
websites;  
Libraries; 
Hansard debates 
(House of Commons 
and House of Lords); 
Parliamentary reports 
(written transcripts 
and videos); 
House of Common 
reports. 
 
Company history and major 
events; shareholders and 
directors data; CSR activities 
and CPAs; corporate 
structure; evaluation of the 
firm’s social capital. 
 
Press clippings; 
academic publications; 
publications from: civil 
society actors, trade 
association, UK 
government, United 
Nations, European 
Commission, industry 
related think-tanks, 
policy-makers’ 
speeches, UK 
parliamentary 
enquiries written and 
oral evidences, House 
of Common debates. 
Salient societal issues that 
put pressures on industry; 
tracing of changes in social 
norms, the regulatory 
environment and the 
industry response; 
identification of public-
private partnership projects; 
records of attendance to 
charitable and political 
events organised by case 
companies, policy-makers, 
think-tanks or charities. 
Electoral commission; 
press clippings; think-
tank annual reports; 
MPs and Lords’ 
Register of Interests; 
Lobbying Register. 
Direct and indirect donations 
to individual politicians or 
political parties, revolving 
door, companies’ social 
capital. 
 
Table 8: Documentary Sources 
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The second source of data was semi-structured interviews with key 
participants. These included anecdotal stories, recollection of events and 
personal views of participants. These primary data provided an understanding 
of the complex processes that could not be seen from outside the firms. 
Whilst the semi-structured interview method allowed participants to express 
freely in their own words their view of reality, documentary data helped in 
finding supplementary information, filling gaps and corroborating or refuting 
data from interviews (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998).  
All interviews were preceded by the review of documentary data in order to 
get a background on the case company, establish a chronology of events, and 
identify key stakeholders within and outside the company. This gave a 
contextual background to develop an interview schedule (see Appendix 1). 
The schedule was used as a template to ensure the same structure be 
followed for each interview. But because the case companies had distinct 
characteristics, the interview questions could not be generic. To maintain the 
general structure of the interview guide, questions were grouped under three 
themes derived from the literature, the conceptual model and the researcher’s 
pre-understanding of the case companies’ history: 
1. CSR: determinants of CSR activities, Key Event and types of 
activities (when, why, and how). 
2. CPA: determinants of the political activities of the company and 
types (when, why and how). 
3. Business-Government Relations: how government’s decisions affect 
business activities and companies respond. 
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The semi-structured interview method is flexible, so questions could be added 
or removed from the interview schedule to explore in-depth information that 
emerged during an interview. And with the research being retroductive, data 
collected from previous interviews were used to guide new ones. This use of 
the constant comparison technique added rigour to the study as it allowed the 
analysis of the same events from the perspective of different participants.  
 
3.3.2 Participants 
To find a sample of participant for each case company, I targeted the 
individuals who could have in-depth knowledge of their CSR and political 
activities. I looked for the companies’ internal stakeholders (e.g. CEO, CSR 
Director, etc.), and the external stakeholders who participated in the design 
and implementation of CSR and CPAs, or were targeted by them (i.e. trade 
associations, regulators and clients). Since the three companies belonged to 
the same industry, it was expected that they faced similar environmental, 
social and political issues. Thus they had to have the same stakeholders for 
some Critical Events who if interviewed, could provide information on the 
three case companies at once (e.g. government officials, civil groups).  
In 2009 I concluded two separate pilot interviews with two participants. These 
were senior managers of two construction companies that I knew personally 
(participants #ID5 and #ID6 in Table 9). One interview was conducted face to 
face and the second by telephone. Both were recorded with a digital recorder. 
As per Pettigrew’s (1997) research process model, this preliminary data 
collection was not a pilot case study, but pilots aimed at testing the interview 
schedule. Another objective was to become familiar with the practice of CSR 
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and CPA in the industry. It would ensure that during the main phase of the 
research, I would be better in probing participants.  
After the pilots, I revisited the interview guideline and questions. I then drafted 
a list of people to interview for the main phase of the research. Using my 
personal contacts and information from documentary sources (government 
and companies’ reports, civil groups’ publications, press clippings, etc.), 33 
people were identified. Each one was sent a letter, inviting him/her to 
participate to the PhD research by granting me an interview (see example of a 
letter in Appendix 2). 33 letters were sent; non-respondents were followed up 
by emails and telephone calls. 15 positive responses were received. 
 
To summarise, between 2009-2011, 15 interviews and two pilots were 
conducted with representatives of nine organisations. Seven were face to face 
(at the participants’ office or home), nine were conducted by telephone and 
one by “telephone-email” (the participant agreed to do a telephone interview, 
and then chose to answer to the questions by e-mail). 
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Table 9: List of Participants 
 
3.3.3 Ethics 
Prior inviting the 33 individuals to participle to the study, approval was sought 
from the University of Wolverhampton’s Ethical Committee. Following the 
guidelines of the committee, participants were assured to have their identity 
and responses anonymised, that they would receive a copy of the interview 
transcript, and that the PhD thesis would be withheld from the public domain 
Participant 
ID 
Organisation Participant 
Job Title 
Interview 
Method, Date 
Interview 
Length 
Relevance 
for study 
ID#1 C1 Ex-Director Face-to-face, 30 
October 2009 
87 
minutes 
C1 
ID#2 C2 Director Telephone, 22 
October 2009 
52 
minutes 
C2 
ID#3 & ID#4 C3 Director & 
Manager 
  
 
Face-to-face, 
interviewed 
together, 13 
November 2009 
84 
minutes 
C3 
ID#5 C4 (pilot) Director 
 
Face-to-face, 14 
September 2009 
99 
minutes 
Knowledge 
of industry 
ID#6 C5 (pilot) Director Telephone, 23 
September 2009 
28 
minutes 
Knowledge 
of industry 
ID#7 C3 Director Telephone, 03 
August 2011 
49 
minutes 
C3 
ID#8 C1 Ex-Director Telephone, 06 
July 2011 
62 
minutes 
C1 
ID#9 C2 Non-
Executive 
Director 
Telephone, 27 
June 2011 
42 
minutes 
C2 
ID#10 CSR Consulting 
Agency  
Director Telephone, 04 
August 2011 
54 
minutes 
C1, C2, C3 
ID#11 CSR Consulting 
Agency 
Director Telephone, 05 
August 2011 
28 
minutes 
C1, C2, C3 
ID#12 Central 
Government 
Department 
Senior Civil 
Servant 
Telephone, 27 
July 2011 
56 
minutes 
Knowledge 
of industry 
ID#13 CPA Consulting 
Agency 
Director Telephone, 08 
September 2011 
40 
minutes 
C1, C2, C3 
ID#14 C1 Ex-Director Face-to-face, 24 
July 2011 
80 
minutes 
C1 
ID#15 C1 Ex-Non-
Executive 
Director 
Face-to-face, 22 
July 2011 
96 
minutes 
C1 
ID#16  Trade 
Association 
Director Face-to-face, 24 
August 2011 
39 
minutes 
C1, C2, C3 
ID#17   C1 Ex-Director Telephone-Email, 
19 September 
2011 
N/A C1 
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for two to five years. To respect the confidentiality and anonymity of 
participants, any direct quote used in this thesis has been made non-
attributable. Original job titles have been replaced by generic titles for senior 
management positions (directors), and management positions (managers). 
Details of documentary data, including sources, are not provided to prevent 
identification of these publicly available documents. The names of companies, 
locations or individuals given by participants may have been left identifiable, 
or replaced with pseudonyms or the term “[anonymised]” depending the risk of 
distorting data by too much anonymisation.   
 
Prior to each interview, the permission to record the interview was sought and 
obtained from the participant. Each participant was reminded that he or she 
could decline to answer any particular question. All the interviews were 
recorded with a digital audio recorder; the recording ensured that the data 
were collected and stored in their original form. It also made it easier for me to 
focus on the interview during the conversation. Each interview was 
transcribed into a text document and a copy sent to the participant to verify 
the accuracy of data, and to add additional comments if desired. Interestingly, 
when questions regarding corporate political activities arose during the 
interviews, out of the 15 participants, one asked to talk off the record from 
time to time (the audio recorder was switched off and with consent of the 
participant I wrote down the answers on a notepad). Another participant 
declined to respond to questions on this topic. Considering the changes in 
elocution and body language during that part of the interview, the majority of 
participants were generally careful in their responses. Out of the 12 
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participants who sent comments about their interview transcript, one deleted 
information from the original transcript, probably after considering having 
disclosed controversial or sensitive information. 
 
3.3.4 Data Analysis 
Since this research involves multiple case studies, there are two stages of 
data analysis: (i) within case analysis where each case is treated as a 
comprehensive research unit itself and, (ii) across case analyses where 
findings from each case are compared to unveil patterns, deepen the 
understanding of the phenomenon and answer the research question (Yin, 
2003).  Since the objective of qualitative data analysis is to identify themes 
and patterns embedded in the data, I followed Miles and Huberman’s (1994) 
process of data reduction, data display and conclusions drawing. These three 
activities were ongoing during the data collection. The first step, data 
reduction, involved selecting, simplifying, and abstracting the text from 
interview transcripts by coding the textual data. Coding consisted of putting 
keywords and categories against data (words, phrases, sentences and entire 
paragraphs) that represent a similar concept or topic, in order to facilitate the 
search for patterns. The coding was done in accordance to the retroductive 
logic, that is by mixing a priori coding (i.e. a provisional start list of categories) 
and inductive coding (categories grounded in the data, created while 
examining the transcripts). A priori categories were deduced from the 
characteristics of the phenomenon studied, mostly the constructs represented 
in the conceptual model, in addition to the topics covered in the interview 
questions and my personal experiences of the construction industry (Dey, 
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1993). The two techniques used to induce categories from data included 
(Ryan and Bernard, 2003): 
1. Repetition: recurring topics in the data. 
2. Metaphors, analogies and linguistic connectors:  people often used 
figures of speech to illustrate their thoughts and experience, and their 
analysis revealed topics. Similarly, the analysis of connector keywords 
such as “if”, “because”, “instead of”, “after”, “before”, etc. allowed the 
identification of topics and their connections. 
 
Phrases, sentences and paragraphs of each transcript were first assigned to 
the a priori codes, and any text that did not fit them was assigned to a new 
one (i.e. a new category or sub-category was created that represented the 
concept embedded in that text). The transcripts were then reviewed in light of 
the newly identified codes, and all the categories revised (see excerpt of a 
transcript in Appendix 3). After this revision, the categories were grouped into 
clusters/themes that reflected their commonalities (Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Harry et al., 2005). Finally ‘core categories’ were drawn from the 
clusters. A core category is central as all the other categories in its cluster can 
relate to it. In a multiple case study research, the label used to describe the 
‘core category’ must be sufficiently abstract to be used in each case study 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Appendix 4 presents the codes and categories 
that emerged from the within-case analyses, with the data codes synthesised 
by meaning of their concept to make easier their understanding for the reader. 
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To facilitate the analysis of data, especially the phase of data display where 
data are organised to uncover patterns more easily, different data analysis 
software are available to assist researchers. They range from the simple text-
storage and counting such as TextPack PC software, to those with more 
advanced features such as Decision Explorer, Nvivo, MAXQDA, Atlas.ti, 
HyperResearch, and the free open-source programme Weft QDA. The most 
popular ones used by academics are Nvivo, MAXQDA and Atlas.ti because of 
their features (e.g. direct use of video and audio data source, kappa 
calculation to determine reliability, creation of master lists and family trees, 
text merging, etc.), and availability in academic institutions. Given that the 
sole objective of using a software is to ease the process of qualitative data 
management and analysis, each researcher should use the one that fits his or 
her needs (Bazeley, 2009). After testing the different software, I chose to use 
Weft QDA over the popular ones like other researchers before me (e.g. 
Lestrelin, 2009; Ishikawa et al., 2011; Walters, 2011; Goodwin and 
Gouldthorpe, 2013). I chose this software because it was faster to learn, 
easier to use and its features were sufficient for this study (e.g. import 
document plain text or PDF, multiple categories creation and family-trees, 
retrieval of coded texts, comparison of coded texts within categories).  Figure 
8 shows a screenshot of a coded transcript: 
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Figure 8: Screenshot of a Coded Transcript in Weft QDA 
 
Once the individual analysis of each case was concluded, the cross-case 
analysis began. To ease the comparison of the differences and similarities 
between the cases, the findings of the three case studies were compared 
using a matrix displaying the categories found in each individual case analysis. 
From these comparisons emerged the final findings of the research. Finally, 
the last stage of the research consisted in comparing the emerging concepts 
with the literature, and to address the discrepancies and similarities 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989). This is discussed in Chapter 5. Figure 9 illustrates the 
data analysis process of the research: 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Data Analysis Process 
 
3.3.5 Trustworthiness  
In qualitative research, “how accurately the account represents participants’ 
realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them”, determine the 
validity and rigour of a study (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p.124-125). For 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), when demonstrating the effectiveness of their work, 
constructivists should use a different terminology from the conventional one, 
in order to distance themselves from positivists.  ‘Trustworthiness’ rather than 
the common positivist term ‘validity’ is the term to be used by qualitative 
researchers. The criteria that a research must meet to achieve trustworthiness 
are credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Table 10 
summarises the different tactics available to researchers to meet these 
criteria. 
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Criteria Description Tactics 
Credibility Refers to the accuracy of 
data in terms of the research 
questions, and the methods 
of data collection and 
analysis. Also the extent to 
which the studied people see 
the study’s findings as an 
accurate description of their 
worldview. 
Field experience; reflexivity 
(field journal); triangulation; 
participant checking of data; 
peer examination; interview 
technique. 
Dependability Refers to the extent to which 
the research instruments 
would produce the same 
results overtime across 
multiple occasions of their 
use.  
audit trail; description of 
research methods; stepwise 
replication; triangulation; peer 
examination. 
Transferability The extent to which the 
study’s findings can be 
generalised. 
Nominated sample; dense 
description of research 
participants and context. 
Confirmability The extent to which the 
findings can be traced back 
to the data without subjective 
biases. 
Triangulation; audit trail; 
reflexivity. 
Table 10: Tactics to Establish Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research 
(Krefting, 1991; Denscombe, 2007) 
 
To ensure credibility and conformability in this research, triangulation - the 
analysis of a research question from multiple perspectives - was used to 
corroborate facts and confirm the accuracy of data collected (Jick, 1979; 
Guion, 2002). The value of triangulation lies in providing better evidence to 
have alternative understandings of a situation and build meaningful 
explanations about the phenomenon. Nevertheless, there is always a risk of 
inconsistency of data from multiple sources, which can be ambiguous and 
contradictory. Moreover, even when there is convergence of data, it does not 
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guarantee the cancelation of biases inherent in the source, methodology or 
the researcher (Mathison, 1988). For instance, a participant could recall a 
Critical Event and provide evidence from his/her perspective, but another 
participant could state different facts for the same event. To overcome 
conflicting statements from participants, Guion (2002) describe five types of 
triangulation useful to researchers:  
1. Data triangulation: the use of multiple sources of information to 
increase the trustworthiness of a study. 
2. Investigator triangulation: the use of different investigators in the data 
analysis phase of the research.  
3. Methodological triangulation: the use of multiple qualitative and/or 
quantitative methods.   
4. Theory triangulation: the use of professionals from different disciplines 
to interpret a single set of data. 
5. Environmental triangulation: the use of different settings or locations 
related to the environment in which the research takes place, such as 
time, day, or season.   
  
Since this research is a PhD thesis, a training in academic research that 
requires the researcher to work alone, investigator and theory triangulations 
were not appropriate. Only methodological triangulation (interviews and 
document reviews), and data triangulation (different data sources in multiple 
case studies) were used. The participants’ statements were compared and 
cross-checked against each other and documentary evidence during their 
collection and analyses (Yin, 2003).  
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To reinforce credibility, I have also controlled the interview technique. Each 
interview was recorded with a digital audio recorder with the consent of the 
participant. The fact that the participants were guaranteed anonymity 
increased data credibility as it gave them more confidence to talk about the 
phenomenon. Often when transcribing the recorded conversation, some of the 
participants’ exact words were inaudible, but did not prevent from 
understanding the meaning of the full sentence. Each interview was 
transcribed and sent to the participant for review, approval and comment. In 
doing so, participants helped to correct the researcher’s mistakes and 
misunderstandings, guaranteeing an accurate description of events from the 
participant’s perspective. Reports from documents, and statements from 
participants, are presented in the form of quotes in the case studies. These 
show the phenomenon from the participants’ perspectives, not the 
researcher’s.  
 
Some may argue that not checking for inter-coder reliability undermines the 
study’s credibility. However by nature of the PhD research program, I had to 
work alone. Moreover reliability does not guarantee the validity of results 
(Dorussen et al., 2005). “There are as many ways of ‘seeing’ the data as one 
can invent” (Dey, 1993, pp. 110–111). As shown by Jehn and Doucet (1996, 
1997), the use of different coding techniques on the same data by the same 
researcher can produce different categories, which lead to different results. 
Hence more coders do not guarantee more reliability or trustworthiness. I 
consider that my knowledge of the construction industry based on my 
professional experience, and the knowledge of the CSR and CPP fields based 
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on the literature review and interviews, gave me sufficient insight to code and 
analyse data better than several coders with less knowledge of the fields and 
industry (Milne and Adler, 1999). 
 
Regarding the confirmability of the research, it must be recognised that 
whatever the philosophical position adopted for a research, data are always 
the product of a process of interpretation because, “no research is ever free 
from the influence of those who conduct it” (Denscombe, 2007, p.300). The 
explanation of steps taken at each stage of the research, plus the original 
interview transcripts should constitute an audit trail for the readers who can 
check the confirmability of the research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
 
The use of pattern matching, achieved by the constant triangulation of data 
gathered contributed to enhance the dependability of the research (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985). Regarding the transferability of the study, statistical 
generalisation is not the goal of the case study research. Instead theoretical 
generalisation is sought to develop analytical frameworks that explain 
phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989; Marsh and Smith, 2001). There are four types 
of generalisations possible from case study research (Walsham, 1995): 
1. The development of concepts: a concept is a new idea that emerges 
from data analysis. 
2. The generation of a theory: a theory, often expressed as a conceptual 
model, is a collection of concepts and propositions. 
3. The drawing of specific implications: implications are suggestions of 
what might happen in other similar instances. 
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4. The contribution of rich insight: rich insight is anything else that we 
might learn from a case study that does not fit the three types above. 
 
We may say that the conceptual model developed by this study through 
several case studies develop a theory on the link CSR-CPP. The same way 
that multiple experiments strengthen experimental research findings, the use 
of multiple case studies in this research strengthened research findings, so 
the prospect of transferability is possible (Yin, 2003). The question the reader 
should ask him/herself is not ‘to what extent are the findings likely to exist in 
other instances?’ but ‘to what extent could the findings be transferred to other 
instances?’ (Denscombe, 2007). Because there has been little research on 
the phenomenon investigated, readers will have to consider their own 
experience, the prior studies related to the phenomenon, the interviews and 
the descriptions of the contexts surrounding each case study to answer this 
question. 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented the philosophical orientation of the research, the 
methodology and methods applied to it. How the research was designed to 
ensure its rigour and robustness has also been described, through the 
explanations of decisions made at each phase of the research. The following 
table summarises the important elements adopted: 
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Elements Researcher Position 
Ontology Subjectivism 
Epistemology Constructivist-realism 
Research Methodology Exploratory and qualitative multiple case 
studies 
Research strategy Retroductive 
Unit of Analysis Case company 
Data Collection Methods Semi-structured interviews and 
documents 
 
Table 11: Summary of Dimensions of Research Methods 
 
In the next chapter, the key findings derived from the three case studies are 
presented. 
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Chapter 4 
Within Case Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The cases are an account of a collection of themes that emerged from 
interviews and documents collected as described in Chapter 3. The report 
format of case studies is the same, structured around the core categories to 
make their comparison easier in the next chapter. The format consists of five 
sections: a description of the case company background followed by a 
description of the Key Event and subsequent Critical Events, the state of the 
company’s CSR and political activities at the time of the Key Event, and finally 
the effects of the Key Event and Critical Events on the company’s CSR and 
political activities. The case ends with a discussion of the effects of CSR on 
CPP and a summary of the main findings.  
Following insights from the literature review, prior to a presentation of the 
three case studies, the political environment of the case companies and the 
construction industry in general must be put in the national context. It will 
provide the background and a better understanding of the determinants of 
each case company’s Key Event and Critical Events. Thus the next section 
will describe the industry’s characteristics and the rise of CSR awareness 
within it. The section will present the macro and meso Critical Events that had 
a major influence on the case companies to integrate CSR in their operations, 
and the types of CSR practised. The time period is up to 2005 in this section 
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because by that time, practitioners, scholars and participants agree that CSR 
had become mainstream in the industry (Doane, 2005; Greenbiz, 2006; 
Maguire, 2011; Dashwood, 2012). The within case analyses in the 
subsequent sections will emphasise the Critical Events and Key Event at the 
company level. 
 
4.2 Industry Background  
4.2.1 Characteristics of the British Construction Industry 
The construction industry is large and diverse. It is characterised by the 
temporal nature of work (a construction project can last from a few weeks to 
several years), the fierce price competition between suppliers, the quasi-
monopoly position of the public sector as a client (it accounts for 30 to 40 
percent of the industry Gross Value Added each year), and the long-term 
impact of the end-products (e.g. new dwellings and office buildings) in 
communities such as energy consumption and the health, work and social life 
of residents (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009; Martinuzzi et al., 
2010; Maer, 2011). The most striking feature of the industry is its highly 
fragmented nature. Any given construction project requires professionals from 
different trades to work together (architects, main contractors, civil engineers, 
electricians, material suppliers, etc.). Each trade represents a mini-sector 
within the industry, and faces particular challenges of its own. Because each 
mini-sector pursues its own interests, the result is an industry made up of 
coalitions of different trade groups, where conflicts of interest are rife. Due to 
this fragmentation and the low barrier to entry, over 90 percent of registered 
British construction firms are small enterprises that employ less than 14 
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employees. The top 10 contractors have less than 15 percent of market share 
altogether, with the largest one, Balfour Beatty, having three and a half 
percent (Carassus, 2004; Jones and Comfort, 2006; House of Commons - 
Business and Enterprise Committee, 2008). By way of comparison, the UK 
grocery market has four companies (Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda, Morrison’s) 
that account for 75 percent of the market (Kantar Worldpanel, 2012). The 
fragmentation and large number of small firms in the construction industry 
make it difficult to politically organise the industry, and lobby the government 
collectively by speaking with a single voice. In addition, small firms lack the 
slack resources to invest in CPA by themselves. For these reasons, collective 
action through trade associations is the main method of political engagement 
by the industry as a whole. Individual political activities only take place by the 
few large contractors when they pursue a government contract in competition 
with others, or when they try to lead trade associations, and by analogy their 
business sector, in a particular direction on a public issue (the case 
companies selected undertook individual CPAs).  The following comments by 
participants capture these characteristics of the industry: 
 
They’re lobbying as an industry not as individuals. So it is 
different to say, the oil sector, where you have BP and Shell who 
will have different interests. For the industry it is rare now for an 
individual company, because they don’t have time, they are not 
big enough, to lobby a particular point which will directly affect 
that company compared to others. (ID#[anonymised])  
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It’s very rare that [civil servants and ministers] will just come to 
you, particularly in the construction industry, because the 
companies are not big enough. […] There are a half a dozen 
banks that I go to because they represent the market. That’s 
absolutely not true in construction. That’s a major issue. 
Whereas if you’re the Chairman of HSBC and someone wants to 
talk about banking regulation, they’ll go and talk to you because 
they have to. If they want to go [to construction], 'oh, there’s an 
issue that influences the construction industry. Who do I go and 
talk to?' It’s not easy. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
The participants agreed unanimously that the fragmentation of the 
construction industry made its CPAs less effective than those of other 
industries, such as banking, oil or automobile, which are more concentrated 
and have an oligopolistic structure.  
On CSR, Martinuzzi et al. (2010) and Brown (2012) analysed the CSR 
activities and reporting of construction firms. They found that companies 
operating in that industry, particularly the main contractors who are 
responsible for the delivery of projects, are very conscious that they operate in 
a dangerous industry that has a high fatality rate and causes damage to the 
environment. So construction firms are very active in CSR. Since they face 
the same CSR issues and external pressures, these scholars found 
homogeneity in their CSR activities. These activities can be classified into 
three major themes summarised in Table 12: 
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CSR Themes Main CSR Activities Drivers 
Environment Adoption of codes of 
practices; certifications; 
employee training; waste and 
carbon footprint tracking; 
energy and water 
consumption monitoring; 
‘green’ materials purchase; 
driving standards through the 
supply chain. 
Environmental regulations 
(building material waste; air 
and water pollution; energy 
usage); climate change 
awareness in the industry; 
desire to reduce 
organisational costs and 
demonstrate efficiency by 
using fewer resources. 
Social Community programmes 
(charitable giving in cash and 
non-cash donations; school 
mentoring schemes; 
collaboration with local 
charities; promotion of local 
employment) 
Desire to be a good 
neighbour because on-going 
construction projects have 
adverse effects on 
communities. There is a 
belief in the industry that 
dialogues and philanthropy 
prevent alienation and 
conflicts with local 
communities where projects 
take place.  
Economic Career in construction 
promotion (diversity and 
gender policies; staff training) 
Skill shortage in the industry 
Health and safety promotion 
(employee training; safety 
record reporting) 
Highest fatality rate of all 
industries in the UK 
Bribery and corruption 
reduction (corporate policies 
and procedures) 
UK regulations 
 
Table 12: CSR Activities in the UK Construction Industry 
                      (adapted from Martinuzzi et al., 2010; Brown, 2012) 
 
4.2.2 The Construction of CSR Awareness in the Industry 
The election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979 led to a 
liberalisation of markets and a less active role of the state in the UK (Wilding, 
1992). The waves of riots in Britain’s inner cities in 1981 encouraged her 
government to promote CSR to business. Michael Heseltine, Minister for the 
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Environment at the time, organised inner-city tours for business leaders and 
asked them to help the government solve community issues. He told them 
that the Government did not have the financial resources or the technical 
expertise to solve them, only the private sector had (Moon, 2004; 
ID#[anonymised]). Business leaders accepted his arguments because they 
wanted to retain their license to operate in communities where the riots took 
place, but also prevent potential regulations. 
 
Companies fear that if they make no attempt to find solutions to 
community problems, the government may increasingly take on 
the responsibility itself. This might prove costly to employers 
both in terms of new obligations and greater intervention in the 
labour market. Many companies prefer to be one step ahead of 
government legislation or intervention, to anticipate social 
pressures themselves. (Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 
1981, cited in Moon, 2004, p.10) 
 
The Thatcher government, which was redefining the function of the state in 
the economy, began redefining the social responsibility of business in Britain. 
Many now well-known civil society organisations were set up at that time, 
such as the Groundwork Trusts in 1981, Business in the Community (BITC) in 
1982, and Tomorrow’s People in 1984. These government-sponsored 
charities, all business-led, were designed to stimulate business involvement 
into communities and reduce unemployment. This initial promotion of CSR by 
the Government targeted social issues only. From the mid-1980s onwards, 
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environmental pollution became more a salient issue for government ministers, 
fuelled by the activism of NGOs like Greenpeace. The Bhopal disaster in India 
in 1984, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985, 
and the nuclear incident in Chernobyl in 1986, alerted the European 
community to the danger of nuclear and environmental health hazards. The 
year 1987 was Britain’s presidency of the European Community, and 1987 
was designated the European Year of the Environment. Prince Charles was 
appointed the UK’s Patron of this international event, aimed at raising public 
awareness on the environment and its conservation (Third Way, 1987; Duiker 
and Spielvogel, 2008). From that time on, Prince Charles aggressively lobbied 
the Government, overtly and covertly, to regulate and protect the environment. 
He formed a core team of environmental advisers who helped him to “put as 
much pressure on international agencies, governments, and so on, via 
speeches, lunches and dinners as possible” (Dimbleby, 1995, p.666). 
Members of this core team included directors of WWF and Friends of the 
Earth; Sir Crispin Tickell, the British ambassador to the United Nations; and 
Christopher Patten, the Environment Minister and later Chairman of the 
Conservative Party. The team carried the message within the government and 
the media about the risks of global warming, created by the greenhouse effect. 
The emerging theory was that carbon dioxide (Co2) emissions were 
associated with the level of industrial activities, and contributed to climate 
change. To preserve the environment, the Government had to curb business 
growth. Thatcher took the issue seriously and the lead on it as she thought 
the environment was being used as a “Trojan horse” by the leftists for their 
anti-capitalism agenda (Thatcher, 2002; Monckton, 2010; Booker, 2010). In 
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October 1988, she made an iconic speech at the Conservative Conference, in 
which for the first time she stressed the need to protect the environment, but 
without sacrificing economic growth.  A year later, at the United Nations, she 
urged industrialised nations to curb carbon emissions due the greenhouse 
effect, although the science was not settled on the risk for the planet yet 
(Thatcher, 1989). Following Thatcher’s speeches, global warming became 
politicised. Governments around the world began publishing policy documents 
to find solutions to this global issue. In September 1990, the UK Government 
published its first environmental strategy in the White Paper6 This Common 
Inheritance. It suggested that to maintain economic growth whilst 
simultaneously reducing pollution and carbon emissions, the Government had 
to engage in a strategic dialogue with business on environmental issues. Self-
regulation had to be promoted to business (Marinetto, 1995; Moon, 2004). 
Some charities like the BITC, which had been originally setup to address 
social issues in communities, began asking its corporate members to address 
environmental issues too (Grayson, 2007). 
 
During the 1990s, the events and press coverage on the need to protect the 
planet from global warming (e.g. the Rio Summit of 1992), and the various 
high profile “name and shame” campaigns by environmental groups (e.g. 
Brent Spar in 1995), made the CSR debate centred on the environmental 
performance of companies. To engage the construction industry in the CSR-
environmental debate, the British government and civil groups began framing 
                                                
6 In the UK, following a public consultation, a government department sets out details of future policies 
on a particular subject in what is called a White Paper, which will be the basis for a new law. The 
White Paper gives the Government an opportunity to gather additional feedback from the public and 
other actors before it formally presents the policies as a Bill before the Parliament for approval 
(Parliament, 2014). 
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their messages in terms of economic opportunities in their dialogue with the 
industry’s trade associations. For instance, pollution was to be seen as a form 
of waste due to business inefficiency. To care about the environment meant to 
care about business efficiency during construction projects to reduce costs. 
Construction clients with large property portfolios, such as local authorities 
and retailers like Marks & Spencer, would be more attracted to purchase 
buildings with higher environmental performances to save on their energy bills. 
Therefore, the ability to design and build greener houses and buildings could 
be used as a commercial argument when bidding on projects (Guy, 1997). 
With the arrival of Tony Blair in Government in 1997, the Government as a 
regulator and the industry’s largest client began promoting CSR more 
aggressively to business, as seen in the appointment of a CSR minister 
(Timms, 2002, 2004). Jon Mendelsohn, a prominent lobbyist embroiled in the 
cash-for-access scandal after the General election, advised his clients to 
“green” their image. In his own words: “Tony [Blair] is very anxious to be seen 
as green. Everything has to be couched in environmental language – even if 
it’s slightly Orwellian” (Palast, 1998). According to Mendelsohn, companies 
that “greened” their operations had more opportunities to have access to 
government ministers.  
During the same period, European procurement rules increasingly required 
companies bidding for government contracts to report on their environmental 
performance. The combination of regulations and commercial pressures 
gradually led construction companies to engage in environmental related CSR 
activities dictated by clients and policy-makers (Spring, 2003). A summary of 
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the notable macro and meso Critical Events that shaped the industry is 
presented below. 
 
1. Environmental Protests:  
During the 1990s, major protests took place against the construction of 
new motorways in the UK because of the environmental damages they 
caused (see case study 1). The high profile conflicts between the 
industry and environmental civil groups made construction executives 
more sensitive to the need for developing an environmental friendly 
image. The protests had the ‘butterfly effect’ to fuel the wider 
environmental and anti-globalisation movements of the 1990s. 
Throughout the country, campaigners staged protests on all major road 
projects and McDonald’s stores were attacked. Due to the sympathetic 
media coverage of protests, the Government gave more consideration 
to CSR. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Government established 
the British Government Panel on Sustainable Development, and the 
UK Round Table on Sustainable Development to provide independent 
advice on CSR to the Prime Minister. 
 
2. Name and Shame Campaigns: 
In 1996, BITC began publishing in the Financial Times an annual CSR 
index of FTSE 100 and FTSE 350. The index benchmarked companies 
against their peers on the basis of their environmental performance in 
key management areas (BITC, 2011). The publication aimed at (1) 
raising awareness of environmental issues, (2) subtly naming and 
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shaming companies with a poor environmental performance, and (3) 
initiating environmental competitiveness between companies (Innovest 
Strategic Value Advisors, 1996). The rationale was that the chief 
executives of companies that were ranked at the bottom of the index 
would be pressurised into engaging with CSR. To raise their public 
image among their peers and investors, they would have to become 
more pro-active in CSR.  
The publication had the desired psychological effect. The result was a 
profound change of attitude among property developers and main 
contractors, as confirmed by one participant: 
 
 The work [BITC] did on their survey was very influential—what 
they did for the first time was, undertake a survey and then 
publish the results in the FT [i.e. Financial Times].  So people, in 
a sense, were named and shamed.  They didn’t like it at all.  
That was the beginning of all my work in environmental 
governance, because I had a client who was in the FTSE 100, 
and I was talking to him one day—this is [anonymised]—and the 
then chief executive said, “We scored very badly in this.  I’m not 
at all pleased about it, and I don’t think it fairly represents what 
we’re doing”.  I said to him, “Well, why don’t we try and find a 
way of expressing what you do better, and why don’t we get a 
whole group of companies like yours to come together into a 
specialist property survey of this kind and benchmark each 
other”. That was the beginning of what was called the Property 
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Environment Group, […] The Major Contractors Group [a trade 
association in which the three case companies were members], I 
persuaded them that it would be interesting to develop some 
kind of benchmark, for the response of major contractors to 
environmental governance, because in those days one must 
remember that “sustainability” as a topic had not really begun to 
kick in.  It was mainly about environmental management. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
In 1998 the Major Contractors Group (MCG) began benchmarking the 
environmental performance of its members, and issuing guidance on 
CSR to all contractors in the industry. This created peer pressure on 
each member to invest in environmental management systems and 
develop higher standards of CSR. 
 
Another name and shame event took place between 1998-2001, 
initiated by Michael Meacher, UK Minister for the Environment. He 
threatened to make environmental reporting mandatory if companies 
did not do it voluntarily. The result was an increase in the number of 
CSR reports published by large companies across industries (Adams, 
2002).  But this was not enough for the minister who carried out his 
threat. In 1999, the Environment Agency published a league table of 
the worst corporate polluters in the country. Balfour Beatty, the largest 
UK contractor, and a member of the MCG, was listed (Vidal, 1999). To 
protect the image the industry and prevent new actions from 
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environmental groups after their protests against road constructions in 
the 1990s, environmental assessments before large construction 
projects became a sine qua non for MCG’s members. 
 
3. The CSR Consultancy Industry:  
This niche business sector that profits from promoting CSR to 
governments and businesses, emerged on the back of the ‘name and 
shame’ campaigns of the 1990s, e.g. the McLibel campaign (1990-
2000); the Twyford Down and A34 Newbury Bypass anti-road protests 
(1992-1999); the Shell boycott (1995-1996); the sweatshop campaigns 
against Nike and Gap (1995-1998), and the Battle of Seattle (1999) 
(Klein, 2000; Bennett and Lagos, 2007; McSpotlight, 2010; Third Battle 
of Newbury, 2010).  
60 percent of British CSR consultancy firms that exist today, ranging 
from sole proprietors to dedicated branches of multinational firms and 
civil groups like KPMG and WWF, were founded during that period 
(Fernandez-Young et al., 2003; Sadler and Lloyd, 2009). By the mid-
2000s, CSR had become a new publishing field for traditional book 
publishers and academic journals. Specialised magazines were 
created and trade associations in various industries published articles, 
books and events on the topic. This constant promotion of a “CSR 
ideology” had the subtle and discursive effect to gradually 
institutionalise new norms and values in the social and political 
structures of the country. Slowly companies adjusted their behaviour to 
meet the new expectations of the British society. 
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4. Regulations:  
Numerous regulatory events contributed to the institutionalisation of CSR in 
the UK. The main ones are presented in the table below. 
 
Year & Event Detail 
1990 – Section 106 Since 1990, the Section 106 of the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990 allows a local authority to ask a 
developer to provide social contributions to a 
community in the form of cash or benefit in kind, such 
as the provision of affordable homes, open spaces 
and funding for schools, in order to offset the 
negative impacts caused by the construction project. 
The use of Section 106 agreements has always been 
controversial as citizens see it as a tool by property 
developers to legally bribe government official, 
whereas the construction industry accuses elected 
officials to use this law for extortion and fund public 
services, from social housing to public parks, at no 
costs (BBC, 2012; Wainwright, O. 2014; 
ID#[anonymised]). 
1996 to 2000 – 
Environmental Taxes 
The Government introduced a landfill tax in 1996, 
followed by the Climate Change Levy in 1999 and the 
Aggregates Levy in 2000. These environmental taxes 
forced contractors to become more resource efficient. 
1997 – Kyoto Protocol The newly elected British government ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol, pledging to reduce the country’s Co2 
emissions. 
1999 – CSR Reporting The Government announced plans to make 
mandatory the publication of CSR reports. The 
legislation came into effect in 2005, but a year later 
the law was repealed after intensive CPAs by the 
business community and BITC, which favoured a 
voluntary approach to CSR reporting. 
1999 – Corporate 
Governance 
Recommendations 
The Government and the London Stock Exchange 
published the “Turnbull Report”. This corporate 
governance report recommended that companies, for 
 149 
risk management purpose, maintain a system of 
internal control (reputation, environmental and social 
audits). The document pressured executives of public 
listed companies to take CSR into consideration in 
their decisions. 
1999 – Pension Act The new Pensions Act required institutional investors 
to take companies’ sustainability credentials into 
account when making investment decisions. As 
pension funds came to demand more information 
from business on their social and environmental 
performance, more companies published CSR 
reports. This legislation was a driver for the creation 
of the FTSE4Good share index in 2001 by The 
Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange. It 
is an index for socially and environmentally 
responsible investment. 
1999 – Government’s 
CSR Agenda 
The Government published its CSR agenda in the 
White Paper A Better Quality of Life: a Strategy for 
Sustainable Development for the United Kingdom 
(Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions, 1999). Tony Blair wanted to give more 
prominence to the social aspect of CSR, which since 
1989 had been centred on the environment. In 
addition most corporate executives did not like the 
term “CSR” (ID#[anonymised]). The strategic 
document brought together corporate governance, 
environmental and social responsibilities under the 
umbrella term “Sustainability”. Since then, 
“sustainable construction” has become a term widely 
used in the industry to refer to CSR. 
2000 – CSR Minister The Government appointed the world’s first CSR 
Minister. It sent out a strong message that the British 
government was taking CSR seriously.  
2006 – The Code for 
Sustainable Home 
After three years of consultation with the industry, the 
Government launched the Code for Sustainable 
Homes. It provided a new set of standards for the 
design and construction of all new private homes and 
public buildings in England (ODPM, 2004a; 2004b; 
House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 
2006). 
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Table 13: Macro and Meso Regulatory Events 
 
The 1999 White Paper A Better Quality of Life was an important 
document for the construction industry. For the first time since the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the Government set out 
clearly its CSR agenda and identified the CSR themes for UK 
construction companies: design for minimum waste, minimise energy 
and pollution, preserve and enhance biodiversity, conserve water 
resources, respect people and local environment, monitor and report 
these CSR benchmarks (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004a, 
2004b). Later the Government used these themes as criteria to select 
suppliers, and most construction companies also used them as 
guidelines to design their CSR reports.  
After the publication of this White Paper, trade associations such as the 
Institution of Civil Engineers began promoting the “business case” for 
sustainable construction to their members. As regulations increased, 
more companies hired CSR consultants and trained their employees in 
environmental management (Sustainable Construction Task Group, 
2000, 2003). Industry events reflected this new CSR consciousness, 
with the appearance of league tables and CSR awards by trade 
publications, for the most sustainable construction firms. All of these 
gradually institutionalised CSR in the industry, as companies came to 
integrate CSR within their business: 
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 I think the shift from having to be persuaded to saying “Oh well, 
of course we have to do this”, I don’t think that really kicked in 
until about 2003, […] from about 2003 through to about 2005 it 
all changed.  And within a very short period of time, it became 
clear that this was a serious issue and people had to take [CSR] 
seriously. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
This change in attitude from 2003 came particularly from a change in 
public procurements rules in the UK, which gave an advantage to 
companies able to showcase their environmental and social credentials 
(Spring, 2003). As some participants explained: 
 
 One of the reasons that they needed to do [CSR], and this is 
important, is that of course local authorities began to insist upon 
sustainability briefs on planning applications. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
 It’s very hard to quantify, but we know that [CSR] gives us a 
benefit. When we’re applying for work, we have to fill in some 
quite complicated long questionnaires which we’re marked 
against, and quite often the difference in scoring between 
various people who are bidding for work is 1% or 2% or 3%. So 
if you can score highly on the environment, sustainability, that 
might just give you the extra one or two marks over your 
competitors to get you in the door to price the work. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
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By the mid-2000s, expertise in sustainable construction techniques 
was acknowledged in the industry as a source of competitive 
advantage. Being able to provide sustainable buildings to clients 
allowed to price up products and services, without being affected by 
the traditional low cost competition that characterises the industry 
(Martinuzzi et al., 2010). One effect of construction firms becoming 
CSR-conscious for commercial reasons, was that CSR became a 
sensitive topic by trade associations ‘ members who used to share best 
practice: 
 
 We look at areas where we can add value by all the companies 
coming collectively around the table and talking about 
something…but we can only do that where there is no major 
competitive disadvantage to companies doing that. Now, in 
Health & Safety the companies have all said that there are no 
competitive issues. We’ll share everything. In the area of 
sustainability and the environment, I still sense there are 
competitive issues…What isn’t happening is companies coming 
together and talking so much about [their CSR] products, 
because I think there the elephant in the room is commercial 
tension. (ID#[anonymised]) 
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The final notable meso Critical Event that contributed to the institutionalisation 
of CSR within the construction industry is the Private Finance Initiative PFI) 
scheme. 
 
5. The Private Finance Initiative:  
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) scheme, launched in 1992, is a 
government policy programme in which the public sector leases an 
asset or service provision (water, waste, telecommunications, transport, 
energy, education) from the private sector for a period of time, 20 to 30 
years on average. At the end of the contract, the government can 
purchase the asset or own it depending the terms of the initial 
agreement. The advantage of PFI from the perspective of contractors 
is that it generates exceptional profits. In comparison to traditional 
construction projects where the average profit margin is two to four 
percent, in a PFI project the margin is 15 to 60 percent and even more 
if the contractor refinances its loans (Allen, 2001; McAlister, 2003; 
Public Accounts Committee, 2007).  The three case companies in this 
study have all pursued PFI business opportunities. 
By the end of the 1990s, with the Blair government that championed 
CSR and greater use of PFIs to fund public projects, the PFI scheme 
and Section 106 had given local authorities more opportunities to 
secure the provision of public goods (Pollock, 2005). CSR became a 
feature of PFI as the appointed companies had to operate in a 
community for decades. To win PFI contracts, construction companies 
had to accommodate the needs and requests of local policy-makers in 
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their bids (more details in case study 2 and 3). Therefore, in exchange 
for being awarded a PFI contract, a company had to engage in CSR 
activities that provided political goods negotiated with government 
officials. This observation is in line with the conceptual model in Figure 
3, but brings attention on the understanding of the data collected: 
unknown to researchers, and the public at large, the provision of some 
public goods and services that construction firms present often as 
voluntary initiatives from themselves in their publications, are in fact 
legal and commercial requirements under Section 106. Because of the 
secrecy of commercial negotiations, an external observer cannot easily 
disentangle the discretionary CSR activities from the mandatory ones 
by reading government and business publications. The discovery of 
this fact during data collection was not much problematic because, as 
per the definition of CSR used and the extended pyramid of CSR in 
Figure 2, the understanding of what constituted a CSR activity was not 
restricted to voluntary CSR initiatives in this study. 
 
To conclude, this section has presented the industry characteristics and the 
main macro and meso Critical Events that influenced the case companies and 
other firms in the industry to integrate CSR in their business operations. The 
main CSR themes and activities in the industry have also been reviewed. The 
changes observed in corporate social and environmental practices for the last 
three decades have been strongly influenced by external pressures from civil 
groups and policy-makers. The Government from the 1980s onwards used 
business to resolve social issues in communities. Then by making global 
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warming a policy issue, the Thatcher government propelled CSR from social 
to environmental management. It broadens the ranges of CSR activities that 
businesses undertook. The subsequent British governments continued to 
promote the phenomenon to construction businesses by combining regulatory 
threats, legislations and commercial pressures. CSR became gradually 
institutionalised and by 2005, construction firms had accepted CSR activities 
as part of their normal business operations. This finding supports the claim in 
the literature that CSR is a substitute for the welfare state in countries with a 
strong liberal economy (Matten and Moon, 2008; Gjølberg, 2009, 2011; 
Kinderman, 2012).  
 
Having established this background on the industry, the next sections present 
the case studies, and focus on micro Critical Events. 
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4.3 Case Study 1 
 
4.3.1 C1 Background 
C1 is a public listed multinational construction company, specialised in the 
development and maintenance of public infrastructure. The major 
shareholders are investment banks and pension funds. Because most of its 
revenues come from regulated public sector clients, the company considers it 
critical to maintain regular consultations with policy-makers from central and 
local government, in order to contribute to the development of public policies 
that may affect its activities (C1 Annual Report and Accounts, 2009). The 
contractor was a pioneer in the industry to embrace CSR, and had a long 
experience of it by the time the interviews were conducted. All of these made 
C1 an interesting case with the potential to be both theoretically and 
empirically rich for the understanding of the relationship between CSR and 
corporate political power. 
 
4.3.2 The Key Event: Protests Against Motorways (1990s) 
After years of consultation with the Government, C1 began work on a new 
motorway. But the contractor met physical resistance from NGOs and local 
citizens on the site, who opposed the project on environmental grounds. C1 
with the support of its client, the Department of Transport, used private 
security guards to protect its employees and remove protesters from the site. 
The violent confrontations that followed marked the beginning of 
environmental awareness in the British construction industry. 
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[It] was a learning curve for us, because we didn’t really know 
what was going on. I mean, nothing like that had happened 
before. Building roads used to be a respectable thing to do. 
Then all of a sudden people were questioning why were we 
doing this and why were we doing that. We were saying, ‘well, 
the Government wants a road there. We build the road and we 
get on with it’. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
The protests on the construction site ended only when C1 and the 
Department of Transport won a court case against environmentalists. But by 
that time media reports of the confrontations, and the environmental damages 
caused by the project, had drawn criticism from the public and some 
politicians against C1. The company, and by analogy the entire construction 
industry, faced a damaged reputation for their economic activities that 
destroyed green fields. 
 
4.3.3 State of CSR and CPA at the Time of the Key Event 
 
CSR – Determinants and Activities: 
Before the Key Event, C1 did not consider social or environmental issues the 
responsibilities of the firm. Legal compliance and corporate philanthropy were 
its only CSR activities. Still, it was strategic philanthropy because donations 
were only given when there was a clear benefit to the firm, or when the 
beneficiary was a favourite charity of the CEO. 
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[The Chief Executive] followed the things that he was personally 
interested in...he was not a great philanthropist. I can assure 
you of that. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
[C1’s] divisions were giving the money away if it would’ve been 
seen to be appropriate to that business. In other words, if the 
[anonymised] division was supporting charities, it had been 
motivated by self-interest. It would be basically buying 
relationships with whoever that could be helpful to them in terms 
of their [anonymised] operations. [...] You’d give money to local 
charities wherever you were operating so that they thought well 
of you. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
CPA – Determinants and Activities: 
The determinant of C1’s political activities was the Government agenda. The 
Government has always been C1’s main client because of its core activity, 
public infrastructure. The revenues of the company are therefore proportional 
to the level of expenditure by public sector clients, which themselves are 
dependent of Government’s policies. For this reason, C1’ s executives met 
regularly with clients, ministers and civil servants, not only to discuss their 
needs in infrastructure, but also to influence their investments in capital 
projects. 
 
There were huge government contracts going on all the time 
[during the 1980s], but whether it was in the roads or in defence 
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or in those sort of things, we were always on the tender list and 
we were always keen to make sure that people thought well of us. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
C1 proactively lobbied the Government when it pursued commercial 
opportunities. A participant gave example of a construction project: 
 
The [Project X] was really pursued by the then [director] of the 
[anonymised] division. He sort of believed in it, and he had sat at 
dinner somewhere—a slightly apocryphal story but nonetheless, I 
think, has a basis in truth—and he was talking to the old chairman 
of [anonymised] who had been involved in the Labour government 
scheme of the early ‘70s. They sort of discussed the fact that it 
was a shame that it wasn’t resurrected. In parallel were these 
sorts of thoughts and coming up—so [C1] took on the lead role to 
see if they could resurrect the idea of [Project X]. They joined 
forces with [anonymised - another construction firm]... I was at the 
meeting at [anonymised]’s headquarter office when we had the 
then [anonymised], who was the Minister of [anonymised] — and 
we tried to persuade him that it’d be a jolly good idea. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
C1 won work on [Project X] and throughout the 1980s, continued to pursue 
market opportunities by political means. As the Thatcher government 
privatised industries to reduce its expenditures, the context was favourable to 
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companies that behaved like what Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985) call 
“corporate political entrepreneurs”. Seizing the opportunity presented by the 
Government agenda, C1 with other companies used its social capital 
developed during [Project X] to persuade the finance ministry to create the 
Private Finance Initiative scheme: 
 
I’ve been lobbying since about 1980 [for the PFI]. I can remember 
an interview with [anonymised], the Minister of [anonymised] 
in ’89. […] [C1] was right at the forefront of pushing the thing. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Other than higher profits, another benefit of PFI for C1 was more political 
reputation: Due to its membership of the Government appointed Task Force 
that supervised the PFI scheme during the 1990s, C1 was an adviser to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. The contractor gained in social capital as it 
developed close relationships with senior civil servants in the finance ministry. 
A decade later, these political ties would help C1 to be recommended as the 
main Government adviser on sustainable procurement for the public sector 
(more details below). 
 
The political activities of C1 at the time of the Key Event are best understood 
in the political context of the time. Political scientists agree that since the 
advent of neoliberalism in the 1980s, the successive British governments 
under Thatcher, Major, Blair and Brown, have promoted business interests 
and encouraged multinational companies to participate in the public policy-
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making process (Grant, 2000). Policy-makers were keen to meet and 
exchange ideas with business leaders, and C1 was one of the leading 
construction firms: 
 
It was part of the general procedure. There were meetings 
between ministers and industrialists. We used to organise such 
meetings from [anonymised] and we used to invite ministers to 
come to breakfast and talk to them about things that we 
regarded as important. It wasn’t any sort of conscious effort to 
rearrange priorities. It was just regarded as the right thing to do 
to have industry advising the appropriate people in government. 
One was encouraged as an industrial leader to play a part in 
whatever the government wanted to talk about. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
C1, like many leading companies in their respective industries, took 
advantage of the Government attitude to promote its interests, chiefly 
securing government contracts. CPAs used to meet and persuade policy-
makers included requesting face-to-face private meetings, invitations to 
corporate and industry events, responding to governmental consultations, 
testifying at Parliamentary Select Committees, and participations to PPP 
programmes. This latter CPA, PPP, was important because it gave 
opportunity to strengthen both C1’s political ties and political reputation (social 
capital). PPP also gave opportunities to C1 to demonstrate its technical 
expertise on the issues debated. In other words, membership of a public-
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private task group provided not only a political access to government officials, 
but also opportunities to practice "technical activity" to shape public policies. 
One example was with membership of the Advisory Council on Science and 
Technology (ACOST): 
 
ACOST chose its own subjects to investigate and reported to 
the Prime Minister, and the reports that they wrote were 
published or not according to the Prime Minister’s views of 
whether they should be or not. But [anonymised] had the nous, if 
you like, to make recommendations—the recommendations that 
were part of the reports that were written, to ministers privately, 
quietly, at dinner parties at [anonymised] headquarters. So the 
ministers could declare the advice that they had received from 
ACOST as their own ideas if they wanted to, without having to 
publicly admit that they’d been advised by ACOST to do it. It 
was a good way of promoting change—a very good way of 
doing it. It worked. A number of recommendations that were 
originally made to the Prime Minister and to her ministers by 
ACOST were implemented as ideas of ministers. Whereas the 
idea was actually planted in their heads, or reinforced one way 
or the other by ACOST, by this unofficial method. Maggie 
Thatcher knew that was happening, and sort of encouraged it 
really. (ID#[anonymised]) 
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Other political activities employed by C1 included financial donations to the 
Conservative Party, and the appointment of former government officials to the 
board of the company as Non-Executive Directors (revolving door). 
 
[With the political donation] we got the chance to talk to the Prime 
Minister and things like that. We got political influence.  
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
The construction industry generally was more in favour of a 
conservative government than it was in favour of a socialist 
government […] In those days, I don’t know what we used to give 
to the Tory Party, but we used to give them about £50,000 a year. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
It was the combinations of these political activities that allowed C1 to 
successfully participate in large construction projects and the PFI programme. 
But in the 1990s, shareholders complained about political donations as they 
view it as an unnecessary agency cost. They considered that the donations 
were made more for the personal benefits of the senior executives than for 
the company, and pressured the CEO to stop the practice: 
 
 [We stopped the donations] because you had to declare how 
much you were giving, and it was frowned upon by investors. [… 
They] didn’t see the benefit—absolutely. In fact, they thought 
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people like [the Chairman] were buying their knighthoods. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Corporate donations to the Conservative Party stopped, but documents from 
the Electoral Commission revealed that senior executives continued the 
practice as private citizens. Corporate political donations also continued in the 
form of political event sponsorships and table bookings at political party 
conferences. Classed as entertainment and marketing expenses, these 
disguised donations were less open to scrutiny by investors or members of 
the public. 
 
4.3.4 State of CSR and CPA after the Key Event 
 
CSR – Determinants and Activities: 
The Key Event had damaged C1’s legitimacy and the company wanted to 
rebuild its public image.  
 
 Our wakeup call for the environment was when we had press 
and publicity; we were on the news with policemen chasing 
protestors across one of our sites. That’s when the main board 
first woke up to the fact that environment mattered. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Because there were significant public protests against the 
building of the motorway […] Basically what that resulted in was 
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them taking the issue much more seriously, and that put 
environmental protection into the realms of corporate 
responsibility. (ID#[anonymised]) 
              
A new CEO was appointed after the Key Event. To restore C1’s public image 
and mitigate future risks, he decided to make CSR prominent in the firm’s 
operations, with an emphasis on environmental issues. 
 
[C1]’s ‘green’ credentials arose from a defensive 
strategy.  […C1] were suffering from protestor action against 
road building and quarrying, which were damaging the 
company’s reputation.  They hid initially behind the company’s 
actions were legal but began to realise that the public perception 
that [C1] was a destructive organisation needed to change. 
Therefore the environmental strategy evolved, which later 
became CSR and then Sustainability. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Whereas in the beginning the instrumental use of CSR by C1 was to defend 
itself from environmentalists, by the late 1990s with the emergence of the 
“sustainability” concept, the company began using CSR for branding purpose 
to differentiate itself from competitors. 
 
Our move in this area has been driven initially by branding 
issues externally, and more recently by a desire to gain 
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business benefit from doing this, as well as it being the right 
thing.  (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
To achieve these successive three objectives over time (improve public image, 
manage risks, differentiation from rivals), C1 undertook a range of activities 
during the decade that followed the Key Event, which involved a number of 
developments that transformed the firm. Firstly, after the Key Event, C1 
purchased two environmental consultancy firms to acquire quickly in-house 
expertise in environmental management. Then C1 used this new subsidiaries 
to train all its employees in environmental protection. Environmentalists who 
had protested against the company were invited to meet the management 
team to discuss how they could co-operate and learn from each other. Since 
the Key Event, C1 has had a policy to always conduct environmental 
assessments on all the construction projects it bids for. It has become part of 
the company culture. 
 
when we’re putting a bid in, we ask what is the environmental 
impact? What is the reputational situation vis-a-vis the 
environmental impact and do we really want to go ahead with it? 
[…] We started to make the organisation environmentally aware. 
(ID#[anonymised])  
 
Secondly, a few months after the Key Event, C1 recruited its first CSR 
manager and external environmental consultants to develop an environmental 
strategy. The company published its first annual environmental report a year 
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after these appointments. The report aimed at disclosing to the public the 
activities undertaken by C1 to protect the environment. The company also 
unveiled a new corporate identity with a new logo in green colours, to indicate 
its new environmental values.  
Thirdly, C1 joined the BITC and engaged in high profile philanthropic activities 
under the auspice of BITC. The media coverage aimed at convincing the 
firm’s stakeholders it had become a more CSR-conscious company. 
 
In May 1999, the new Labour Government published A Better Quality of Life 
(see Section 4.2). This white paper was an official guide for businesses 
across industries to know which dimensions of CSR the Government deemed 
important, and the issues to tackle. C1 decided to align its CSR strategy to the 
Government’s objectives outlined in A Better Quality of Life, and broaden its 
CSR activities, which had been since the Key Event focused on 
environmental issues. Since then, all C1’s CSR activities have been grouped 
under three themes, namely environment, economic and social similar to the 
Government’s White Paper. For marketing reasons, C1 also adopted the new 
terminology used by civil groups, the Government and clients to refer to CSR: 
“sustainability”. 
 
the word “sustainability” is just about beginning to get across—
not in the mid-‘90s, a bit later to be honest—but Sustainability is 
about to emerge as a subject. (ID#[anonymised]) 
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[C1’s CEO] was very keen that we move [from environment to 
sustainability]. As I said, putting the work we were doing with 
Business in the Community, with the work we were doing 
environmentally, and starting to talk about the Triple Bottom Line 
as opposed to just the bottom line. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
In the early 2000s, C1 was listed in a Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) 
index, and the company published its first CSR report. C1 won many awards 
in the industry and was recognised as the leading sustainable construction 
firm in the country. To develop greater expertise in CSR and enhance both its 
public image and social capital, C1 used the revolving door tactic and 
appointed a well-known government official as external adviser, named here 
“Paul”: 
 
Having people like [Paul] on the advisory committee was a very 
good signal to the outside world and also was real advice to 
us—genuine advice. He was a really pragmatic man. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
C1’s association with this high profile individual had a significant impact on the 
firm. It changed the firm’s perception of CSR.  The knowledge brought by Paul 
encouraged C1 to view CSR as a means to do well (better financial 
performance) while doing good (benefitting stakeholders). From reducing 
energy bills to attracting better qualified employees, Paul convinced the 
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company of the business case for CSR, and to stop doing it only for risk 
management purpose as they had been doing since the Key Event: 
 
The one thing that [Paul] always did from the time he sat on our 
sustainability committee right at the very beginning. He made 
sure we saw it all [CSR] as an opportunity. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
C1 began using CSR to achieve a competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
For instance, the company discovered that community engagements as a 
CSR activity could be used to improve the work satisfaction of its employees, 
and win contracts: 
 
One was that people doing it was good for their own individual 
motivation, and sometimes, indeed, for their personal 
development. And secondly, if we could then use those case 
records to put into work winning bids to when we were tendering 
for work, it would help us to win work. So the company was 
getting benefit out of doing it. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Since then, C1 has been putting more effort in its instrumental use of CSR to 
differentiate from the competition: 
 
It took until around 2005 to hone the agenda to a manageable 
level when [C1] decided the sustainability agenda had to pass 3 
key hurdles: 1) It would help win more work. 2) It would cut costs. 
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3) It would help attract and retain higher quality people. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Today the CSR themes and activities of C1 are representatives of the ones 
found in the industry described in Table 12. 
 
CPA – Determinants and Activities: 
There was no much change in the political drivers and behaviour of the 
company after the Key Event. The company continued to maintain regular 
consultations with policy-makers and contribute to policy development, either 
to win tenders or prevent regulatory threats to its activities. The only 
noticeable change was that as C1 tried to improve its public image, it became 
more supportive of the environment in its recommendations to the 
Government: 
 
What we would be doing would be lobbying on behalf of the 
construction industry or on behalf of the sustainability agenda. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
[The] Government would’ve just said bulldoze [the protesters] all 
away. They would be even further behind the curve [on CSR] 
than us, because they wanted a road and that was all there was 
to it and they wouldn’t have thought differently. I think they think 
differently now, but at that time they wouldn’t have. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
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By working with Paul, C1 came to understand that it could advance its long 
term interests by taking positions on public policies for CSR related issues. In 
the industry, C1 was considered to be at the forefront of best practices in 
sustainable construction. By advocating and adopting by itself higher 
standards than those prescribed by regulations, C1 believed it could gain in 
public image, legitimacy and political reputation in the eyes of the public, 
NGOs, clients and government officials. More importantly, raising the 
standards would hurt rivals that were laggard in CSR, or with a lesser 
reputations than C1 when bidding for work. 
 
We’re using the flexible framework [of the 2005 Sustainable 
Procurement Taskforce] as our own measure, and by the end of 
2010 we’re expecting to be on level four on the flexible 
framework, which will have been in advance of where 
government is. So we’ll be at a commercial advantage by taking 
advantage of legislation that’s coming through. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
The type of political activities practiced by the firm did not change after the 
Key Event, but they were aligned to the new public image of environmentally 
friendly contractor that C1 attempted to create. C1 aligned its CPAs and CSR 
activities. The firm actively promoted its new stance on environmental 
protection. For instance, after the publication of C1’s first environmental report, 
the CEO began speaking publicly at political party events on the need of more 
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CSR consciousness by government officials when drafting policies. As one of 
the leading contractors in the industry, C1 was often invited to private events 
and meetings organised by policy-makers, where he conveyed the same 
message. 
[C1’s CEO] would probably end up in Downing Street once a 
year to see the Prime Minister […] he was somebody who would 
regularly be invited along to a Permanent Secretary sort of away 
weekend type thing. Be able to talk directly in each of the 
government departments. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
The triangulation of data revealed that the “away weekend” was the 
Sunningdale conference. The Sunningdale conference is an exclusive three-
day private event for the state and business elite that takes place once a year 
(Rollings, 2014). The data collected indicate that since the 1980s, one of C1’s 
directors or commercial partners (e.g. an investor or co-opetitor in a 
construction project), has been attending the Sunningdale conference each 
year. During the event, senior civil servants and business leaders of the 
largest companies in the UK from all industries, develop a mutual 
understanding of salient issues facing the country through debates, while 
socialising in a private setting. It is a policy-making event outside the official 
policy-making arena that gives companies a privileged access to policy-
makers without interference. Hidden CPP is exercised as the event gives time 
to build social capital and frame the agenda of future public policies. This is 
illustrated by the comments of a corporate manager after attending the event: 
‘I have already taken advantage of the fact that we got to know people at 
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Sunningdale in smoothing out a little local difficulty – much quicker than would 
have been prior to Sunningdale!’ (cited in Rollings, 2014, p.924). Fooks et al. 
(2011) also found that British American Tobacco used the Sunningdale 
conference to meet the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health and 
afterwards, developed a CSR strategy that aligned to and supported this 
policy-maker’s political agenda. Although the data collected do not give details 
on the benefits brought by the Sunningdale conferences to C1, we may 
nevertheless be certain that the attendance to the event contributed to the 
social capital of the firm.    
 
4.3.5 Political Outcomes and Impacts of CSR  
 
The Key Event affected C1’s public image. To repair it, C1 used its financial 
resources to acquire technical expertise in sustainable construction 
techniques such as lean construction (reduction in the use of material and 
waste during projects) and the protection of bio-diversity during projects. This 
knowledge in minimising its environmental impact benefited C1 politically from 
1999 onwards, when the newly elected Government gave more importance to 
CSR. Supporting the Prime Minister’s green agenda became important for 
governmental suppliers. The agenda of the Blair Government for more CSR 
practices by businesses advantaged C1, because it had already acquired a 
considerable expertise since its Key Event years earlier. The Blair 
Government used intensely the PFI scheme to finance public infrastructure, 
and C1 had the commercial advantage to be one of the major contractors in 
the PFI market it had helped to create. Because the company was by nature 
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politically active and benefited of a political reputation, policy-makers were 
inclined to meet and listen to C1’s recommendations on CSR-related policies 
for PFI projects, and the construction industry as a whole.  
 
I remember being called in by [anonymised], Secretary of State 
for [anonymised], in early 1997 when we were just about to win 
the first [PFI project] that had ever been [anonymised], and the 
necessary legislation was not in play to enable the legal 
contracts to be completed, and [anonymised] the Tory minister 
basically said to me, “Look. Don’t give up on us. Although you 
worry about whether the socialists, when they come in” because 
by then the Tories knew they were going to lose [the General 
Election], “but don’t worry. I know that my successor wants this 
[project] to go ahead and they will put the legislation in place”... I 
suppose at the time and as a cheerleader for a government-type 
initiative [PFI], we must’ve been looked upon with favour. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
From 1997, politicians believed C1’s expertise in CSR and PFI could help 
them achieve their own political agenda. For instance, during the 
implementation of the PFI scheme in the NHS, one of C1’s directors was 
seconded to the Ministry of Health. His duty was to advise and supervise the 
use of both PFI and CSR criteria in all the construction projects by the NHS. 
The PFI scheme and Section 106 benefited policy-makers, but also gave a 
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competitive advantage to companies like C1 with the expertise and reputation 
for CSR when bidding for projects. 
 
The Key Event forced the company to transform its public image from a 
traditional builder to an environmentally friendly one. This image was in 
accord with the new expectations of society. Thus gradually, the company 
regained the legitimacy damaged by the Key Event. Between 1999 and 2004, 
trade associations from the industry produced a multitude of reports, case 
studies and events, which supported the Government’s sustainable 
development agenda. They aimed at demonstrating the “business case” for 
CSR, and at changing the industry’s perception on CSR, that it was no longer 
a cost but an opportunity. In many of these publications, C1 was portrayed as 
the leading sustainable firm that others should be inspired by. 
 
Those companies that were seen to be taking [CSR] seriously 
and managing it well, their reputations grew at least within their 
own area of operation, amongst their own peer group, amongst 
the professionals that they worked with, amongst the people 
who they were trying to hire—that’s quite important—so that 
they were thought to be good companies, the kind of company 
you’d want to work for, and I would think it was quite likely that 
they gained access to places which other companies might not 
have gained access to. (ID#[anonymised]) 
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Concerning the political impacts of CSR activities after the Key Event, when 
viewed from a long-term perspective, the Key Event had the serendipitous 
positive effect to strengthen not only C1’s corporate legitimacy, but its CPP 
too. As CSR became institutionalised in the late 1990s, construction clients 
increasingly looked for contractors with environmental credentials. C1 had a 
competitive advantage over its rival in this domain, with the technical 
expertise it had been forced to learn years earlier after its Key Event. In the 
industry, the firm was a pioneer on the instrumental use of CSR, gradually 
moving from risk management to branding and differentiation purposes:  
 
In the late 90s, where we were really in the environmental phase, 
virtually nobody else in the construction industry was interested 
[in CSR]. They weren’t interested. At best somebody paid a bit 
of lip service to it. We were by far and away the people who 
believed in it and intended to do something about it. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
CSR helped C1 win more contracts from clients in the public and private 
sectors, and reduce its costs by becoming more resource-efficient:  
 
We saw all this environmental issue as a threat when we started 
on the journey, but I think with the likes of [Paul] and others, 
we've begun to see it as an opportunity, really, and we’ve 
definitely seen improvements within the company in terms of 
things like staff morale, cost of recruitment, as well as by 
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enthusiasm and getting them educated in this area. We’ve been 
cutting our energy...we have had clients tell us that our 
sustainability approach was the reason they gave us the job. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
C1 was a politically active firm due to the nature of its business, and the three 
political outcomes of CSR observed (i.e. technical expertise, public image, 
social capital) allowed C1 to have an impact on public policies. The following 
example will illustrate this impact. In the mid-2000s, the Government 
appointed a director of C1 as lead adviser of a PPP committee on “green” 
procurement. The recommendations from this committee were to be used to 
design new policies on public procurement for government agencies. 
According to participants, the rationale for this revolving door could be found 
in three serendipitous effects of the Key Event years earlier: firstly, C1 had 
gained considerable technical expertise not only in CSR, but in PFI projects 
too. The company was one of the architects of the PFI scheme and had good 
knowledge of public procurement. Secondly, C1 had a public image of leader 
in CSR throughout the UK, as seen in the prestigious awards won by the firm. 
Thirdly and more importantly, since the advent of the PFI scheme, C1 had 
built social capital for years with government officials in the finance ministry. It 
is the policy-makers in the Treasury Department who recommended C1 as 
lead adviser.  
The participation of C1 to this policy-making process allowed the company to 
exercise hidden CPP by framing the agenda of the PPP, and by setting the 
recommendations to the Government. In other words, leading the PPP was a 
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“technical activity”. A participant acknowledged the exercise of CPP by C1 in 
this context: “In that strategic document, there were a lot of [C1] words in [...] 
so we have our influence there”. (ID#[anonymised]) 
The PPP’s recommendations that were accepted by the Government 
benefitted C1 in two ways. Firstly, having early knowledge of Government’s 
intentions on these future policies gave a competitive advantage to C1. The 
contractor revised its business operations in advance of the implementation of 
the recommendations. As put by a participant, C1 got “a commercial 
advantage by taking advantage of legislation that’s coming through” 
(ID#[anonymised]). Secondly, heading the governmental advisory group gave 
the opportunity to strengthen C1’s social capital. This mechanism of CPP 
could be leveraged in the future. One participant explained that the entire 
success of C1’s political activities had always relied on its social capital: “it’s a 
network, isn’t it?” (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
To date, through events, meetings and publications of reports, the 
recommendations of the PPP are still promoted to policy-makers by C1, trade 
associations and think-tanks that act like front groups for the firm to lobby the 
Government. 
 
A surprising finding from this case study is that C1 has never been able to 
quantify in detail the contribution of CSR to its financial performance. It 
explains why its annual reports and CSR reports contain only descriptive 
accounts of its CSR activities. The belief in the existence of the business case 
nurtured by C1 rely on stakeholders’ feedbacks and logical deduction, e.g. if 
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the company reduces its waste by five percent a year it should save money, 
but by how much exactly C1 does not know. 
 
4.3.6 Case Study 1 Conclusion 
Legal compliance and philanthropy were the only CSR activities of C1 until 
the Key Event. The incident forced the company to add environmental 
management as a new CSR practice.  Whilst this activity was initially a tool for 
risk mitigations, it turned out to be a source of competitive advantage when 
from 1999, the government began promoting actively CSR/sustainability. 
Environmental performance became a criterion to appoint government 
suppliers. C1 reviewed the scope of its CSR activities, renamed them under 
the umbrella term “sustainability”, the term used by the Government, and 
aligned its CSR activities to the Government’s objectives published in A Better 
Quality of Life. The CSR activities of the firm produced technical expertise, 
public image and social capital. These three political goods intertwined as one 
led to another. Together, they facilitated access to the policy-making process. 
By serendipity, C1 benefitted from its early engagement in CSR financially 
(e.g. winning of government tenders) and politically (access to policy-makers 
to give them technical advice on CSR; influence on public policies). We can 
therefore conclude that CSR had a positive impact on C1’s CPP. The 
evidence of this case study suggests that in the political realm, the political 
outcomes of CSR activities strengthen CPP when these activities are 
congruous with policy-makers’ agenda.   
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Table 14 presents the CPP mechanisms employed by C1 after its Key Event: 
 
Forms of CPP Visible Hidden Invisible 
Instruments 
(CPAs) 
Financial types of 
CPA by the firm 
and managers; 
informational and 
relational types of 
CPA 
Front groups and 
third party 
sponsorship (e.g. 
trade 
associations); 
political ties; 
revolving door; 
participation to 
events for elite; 
PPP 
Neoliberal 
ideology in the 
UK 
Instruments 
(CSR 
Activities) 
Philanthropy 
(event 
sponsorships; 
community 
programmes); 
membership of 
BITC and SRI 
index; PPP; 
revolving door; 
self-regulation 
Technical activity; 
PPP; revolving 
door 
Technical activity 
 
Table 14: CPP Framework for C1 
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4.4 Case Study 2 
 
4.4.1 C2 Background   
C2 is a large private family-owned construction firm. The founding family is 
the major shareholder, and the current management team is a minority 
shareholder. The family business does all types of construction work for 
corporate and public sector clients, excluding public infrastructure projects. It 
only operates in the UK from a network of regional offices.  
 
4.4.2 The Key Event: The 1999-2005 Public Policies 
During the 1990s, C2 did not feel directly concerned by the environmental 
debate because its operations were not affected. It is only after the New 
Labour government published in 1999 its CSR strategy in A Better Quality of 
Life (see Section 4.2) that the contractor took interest in CSR.  
 
[C2] was thinking about a sustainability strategy but when the 
Blair Government produced the White Paper in 1999, then we 
took it seriously. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
The publication of this document led C2 to anticipate more emphasis on 
environmental criteria by clients from the public sector in their selection of 
suppliers. Consequently the contractor began implementing environmentally 
friendly solutions in construction projects. This new approach to work raised 
the company’s public image. For instance, in early 2000s it was praised in a 
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joint report by the industry and the Government for its CSR practices. In 2005 
the reporting of CSR became mandatory (see section 4.2), and the Climate 
Change Bill was introduced in Parliament. The bill made it legally binding for 
the UK to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions by 60 percent from 1990 levels 
by 2050 (the Bill was enacted in 2008). The Government had identified the 
construction industry as a major polluter in the country, with 27 percent of total 
greenhouse emissions in the UK coming from houses and buildings 
(Environment Agency, 2003). To make the industry provide more energy 
efficient dwellings, that same year the Government prepared the Code for 
Sustainable Homes as a voluntary rather than mandatory policy after 
consultation with the industry. The Code provided a set of voluntary standards 
for the design and construction of all new private homes in England (House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2006). 
 
In view of all these major changes in its external environment, in 2005 C2 took 
the strategic decision to fully embrace CSR and put it at the core of all its 
activities. The firm moved from a defensive and reactive attitude to a strategic 
and proactive one (Carroll, 1979; Wartick and Cochrane, 1985).  
 
The more we saw of it, the more convinced we were that we had 
to be a carbon-reduction company. That’s what we did and that’s 
what we stuck to. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
[C2] simply recognised [the CSR debate] was not going away, 
and because it was not going away, they recognised that if they 
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addressed it well, it would be good for the business, and I think 
that is part of the tipping point—when they realised that this isn’t 
simply about complying with legislation and not doing anything 
you shouldn’t. But when they realised it can make them money or 
it can win them contracts or it can improve planning 
permissions—all sorts of things like that—then that’s when they 
became seriously engaged with it. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
4.4.3 State of CSR and CPA at the Time of the Key Event 
 
CSR – Determinants and Activities: 
As a family-owned firm for generations, C2’s values are rooted in those of the 
founding family. By tradition, the contractor has always tried to contribute to 
the economic and social well-being of communities where it operates. Legal 
compliance, improving the health and safety of employees through training, 
charitable giving and educational sponsorship (e.g. apprenticeships for the 
young unemployed, college endowment) were the main CSR activities of the 
firm. 
  
[C2] engaged in a lot of social activities and particularly they 
took on a whole lot of 30 or 40 management trainees every year 
and then paid them properly, but they also looked after various 
other charities. (ID#[anonymised]) 
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The company’s values can be explained by the importance the family 
attaches to its reputation, like most family firms. Research shows that the 
preservation of socio-emotional endowment (e.g. identification with the firm 
that usually carries the family’s name, enjoyment of control and influence by 
family members over the business) is a feature of family-controlled firms 
(Berrone et al., 2012).  The firm is seen as extension of the family and 
therefore, family members try to maintain “a favorable perception of the firm in 
the public and thus enjoy the benefit of the positive spillover of public 
perception on the family” (Zellweger et al., 2011, p.3).  
 
CPA – Determinants and Activities: 
The data indicate that during the 1980s and 1990s, the CEO of C2, referred 
here as “Smith”, was responsible for the political behaviour of the firm 
because he was himself a political activist. Smith had a personal interest in 
politics and was very active in this domain. A strong supporter of the 
Conservative Party, he was a high profile individual in the industry. As a board 
member of several trade associations, he met senior civil servants and Prime 
Ministers to brief them on the issues faced by the industry. C2 made an 
average annual donation of £10,000 to the Conservative Party according to 
the record of the political party. Smith also made personal donations to the 
Party himself; he was close to John Major and “spent a lot of his money 
supporting [him]” (ID#[anonymised]). When Major became Prime Minister in 
November 1990, Smith used his personal ties with him to gain more access 
within central government. Between 1991 and 1997 when the Labour Party 
got elected, the political reputation of C2 grew as Smith gave the industry 
 185 
unprecedented access to senior government officials. A notable political 
activity was a series of fortnightly meetings between industry’s 
representatives and ministers at the Treasury and Environment departments. 
C2 and its co-opetitors successfully promoted their common interests on 
issues that affected the industry, such as health and safety regulations, lack of 
funding for apprenticeships and training, and lack of government investment 
in public infrastructure. The result of this lobbying was what has been called 
the “Reform Movement” of the 1990s (Adamson and Pollington, 2006). Critics 
like Monbiot (2001) described it as the period of regulatory capture by the 
construction industry, as the Major Government responded positively to the 
industry’s requests. Some public policies created to support the industry 
included the creation of the PFI scheme in 1992 (see case study 1); financial 
subsidies to export construction services and materials; the publication in 
1994 of the Latham Report that sets the framework for the political reforms 
that the industry had requested for many years; and the secondment of C2’s 
directors in government departments to supervise the implementation of these 
political reforms (Latham, 1994; House of Commons, 1995; Adamson and 
Pollington, 2006). During that period, C2 made use of the revolving door to 
appoint a reputed former government official as a Non-Executive Director of 
the company. He is referred below as “Brown”.  
 
When Smith retired in the 1990s, his legacy to C2 was not only to have 
transformed the family firm into one of the leading private contractors in the 
country, but also to have made it a very politically active company with 
considerable political ties and political reputation.  Although at the time of 
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writing this case study Brown is no longer on the board of C2, he remains an 
adviser because he adds credibility to the public image and political reputation 
of the firm among clients and policy-makers (ID#[anonymised]). 
 
4.4.4 State of CSR and CPA after the Key Event 
 
CSR – Determinants and Activities: 
Although C2 engaged pro-actively in CSR primary due to regulatory threats 
and trends in the market, another driver was the new belief by C2 in the 
business case for CSR. Gradually the firm came to view these external 
pressures no longer as threats or costs, but business opportunities. 
Influenced by industry leaders like C1, trade associations like MCG and the 
work of the CSR consultancy industry (see Section 4.2.2), the company came 
to believe that developing a public image of a sustainable contractor could 
become a differentiating factor to attract more customers. In the words of one 
manager: “sustainability creates one of the most significant opportunities for 
our business to create further differentiation between us and our competitors 
[…] Once carbon is a currency, governments and others will have to reduce 
their emissions” ([anonymised]). Another said:  
 
What is the business case? Increasing reputation is all very well, 
but... you know, for example, as soon as you go to the board 
and say ‘if we do this, we are going to save a million pound at 
that date’, then they are all ears. Then, the next question they 
will ask is ‘that’s all very well, but how much do we have to 
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invest in order we can save?’  But once you go all over these 
questions where you can show that there is money to be saved, 
there is money to be made, then it is really a no brainer. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
C2 anticipated an increase in CSR related regulations for a low carbon future. 
The company believed that due to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the Climate 
Change Bill of 2005, the current and future British Governments would 
promote a low carbon economy. In addition, clients from the private and public 
sectors were increasingly interested in houses and buildings with lower 
carbon emissions. Based on this information, the company repositioned itself 
in the marketplace as an expert in low carbon solutions for the built 
environment. To gain the necessary technical expertise, C2 developed an in-
house CSR consultancy business unit and recruited people expert in 
environment management. A CSR Director was appointed to the Head Office. 
A few years later, CSR managers would be appointed for each regional office.  
The first task of the CSR Director was to institute a company policy to use the 
term “sustainable development” in all corporate communication. 
 
We ditched using corporate responsibility and corporate social 
responsibility from our vocabulary completely. I have never been 
keen on CSR on a personal basis [...] for me, the issue is about 
sustainable development and not about corporate responsibility. 
Corporate responsibility and CSR are part of sustainable 
development (ID#[anonymised]). 
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The CSR Director developed a five-year plan in which C2’s CSR activities 
were divided along three themes, economic, social and environmental. 
 
For anything under the environmental, we would have energy, 
waste, water, material, bio-diversity. For things under social, 
we’d have what we do in term of staff development, our policies, 
company values, and the way we deal with our health and 
safety… [for the economic] what we try to see is how we can 
increase [our] local spend in the area, which benefits in the local 
community. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
To have legitimacy in the communities where it works is important for the 
family firm. This explains why C2 encourages its employees at senior level to 
volunteer and get involved in community initiatives, including business 
mentoring, charitable activities, and local school governorships.  
 
A year after the appointment of the CSR Director, C2 published its first annual 
CSR report. 
 
CPA – Determinants and Activities:  
The legacy of Smith was to have made C2 a corporate political entrepreneur 
(Yoffie and Bergenstein, 1985). As C2 rebranded itself as a sustainable 
contractor and expert in low carbon building, it planned to enter the PFI 
market. To succeed, C2 enlisted the services of a public affairs agency that 
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aligned its political and CSR strategies. The political objectives were two-fold. 
By promoting its new public image in the ministries where the company 
planned to submit its bids, C2 would raise its profile and would be seen in a 
more positive light ahead of tenders. A positive public image and reputation 
for CSR would increase the chances to win PFI contracts. The second 
objective was to leverage the company’s new expertise by developing political 
ties with policy-makers, and educating them on sustainability issues faced by 
the industry. The company would exploit the Government’s sustainability 
agenda by lobbying for CSR policies that could give an advantage to C2, but 
were still in line with the objectives of the Government.  
Like C1, C2 was a member of the trade association MCG (renamed the UK 
Contractors Group (UKCG) in 2009), which represented all the major general 
contractors in the country. The collective view of the members was that CSR 
could benefit their business, and lobbying for stricter CSR related regulations 
could be a win-win situation for the Government, society and their industry: 
regulations would force public and private sector clients to invest in greener 
houses and buildings; the contractors would benefit financially from the 
additional expenditure; and the UK would lower its carbon emissions as per 
the Government agenda. 
 
I think all those things [regulations] if you address them, they are 
opportunities. If you don’t address them, they’re threat. So it is 
how you then look at all those different things as opportunities. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
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 If you have a government that says, for example, ‘our overriding 
policy is a more sustainable economy’ whatever that might 
mean, you are bound to—if you’re lobbying for a change in tax 
law or a change in employment law or a change in health and 
safety law, you’re bound to use that hook, because that’s how 
you capture—and if you can demonstrate to a minister that this 
tax regime means that you can’t be so sustainable because the 
tax regime is a barrier or it’s getting in the way or it’s distorting 
the market in a sense, then you’ve got a chance maybe…So 
whatever we’re lobbying on, and whatever the colour of the 
government or whatever, we would want to try and find hooks to 
hang our arguments on which relate to something that they want 
to produce. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
To reach their two political objectives, C2 and its public affairs agency 
monitored governmental consultations and Bills, and decided which ones to 
respond to: 
 
There are lots of consultation documents that are coming from 
government, and we do not respond to all by any means, but we 
look at them and decide if this is a document we are going to 
respond or not. And the ones we respond, we basically 
challenge the process in terms of what we think should happen. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
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The company had a culture to encourage its senior executives, including the 
CSR Director, to spend “an appropriate amount of time” (ID#[anonymised]) 
lobbying the Government: 
 
Another example that I am encouraged to do in my job for [C2] 
is to sit on a number of government private-public working 
groups, looking to influence government policies. For example I 
sit on the [anonymised] Task Force. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
The CSR expertise in low carbon solutions facilitated access to the policy-
making process on related topics. Other than technical expertise, other 
traditional CPAs supported hidden and invisible CPP such as the funding of 
think-tanks, the organisation of meetings with policy-makers at events, and 
the placement of articles in trade journals and mainstream newspapers to 
create false consciousness and influence stakeholders’ opinion according to 
ID#[anonymised]. One political activity that stopped after Smith’s retirement 
was the practice of financial donations to political parties. C2 now claims to be 
apolitical, but it is unknown if the family members or managers continue the 
practice as private citizens. To avoid public scrutiny and criticism, all major 
construction firms stopped making political donations after the victory of the 
New Labour party at the 1997 General Election. 
 
The industry used to be heavily pro-Tory, and the Tories used to 
be pro-construction industry, big business. That changed a lot. 
We, as an industry, moved to much being sitting on the fence. 
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You don’t see anything like as much political contribution now, 
all of which have to be declared in the Company’s report and 
accounts.  Another thing: I do think that any political donation, 
you are in great risk of undermining the credibility of your CSR 
policies.  It won’t be good news if the local press says ‘xyz 
company is doing all this but don’t forget they are a major Tory 
supporter’. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Another CPA used by C2 was the revolving door. After Brown, a second 
government official was appointed as adviser (referred hereafter as “Green”). 
Whereas Brown had political connections within government, Green was 
renowned in both Government and civil society groups for his CSR activism. 
 
[Brown and Green on the company board help us] in terms of 
credibility. If [C2] were going to send a letter to a senior politician, 
or policy-maker, or senior civil servant or whatever, and we’ve 
had those letters signed by our Chief Executive and supported 
by either [Brown or Green], then I think these things are listened 
by the policy-maker because if they’re not, then they risk 
challenges. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
From 2009 onwards, C2 published position papers on how to achieve a low 
carbon environment in the British construction industry. The objectives of this 
thought leadership tactic were to demonstrate its expertise to all stakeholders, 
gain access to policy-makers, and advise them on the best methods to 
 193 
achieve sustainable development through public policies concerning the 
construction industry. In other words, C2 engaged in “technical activity”. 
 
In dealing with policy-makers specifically, what we’ve done 
recently is developing some papers, think pieces, on various 
subjects. [...] We then send these papers to the major political 
parties and senior civil servants, and do our best to meet with 
those people in order to demonstrate to them that perhaps there 
are better way to do things. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
One of C2’s recommendations to policy-makers was that public sector clients 
privilege suppliers that are environmental-friendly over those that are not. 
Another recommendation was to have stronger environmental regulations and 
penalties for companies that do not comply. These types of recommendations 
reveal the confidence the company had in its CSR expertise by 2009. They 
also show that C2 sought business opportunities through CSR related 
regulations. Stricter CSR regulations would benefit the company by (i) 
increasing the costs of laggard competitors in CSR and, (ii) by inciting 
construction clients to purchase low carbon consultancy services for the 
benefit of C2’s in-house CSR consulting arm. One example of this attempt by 
C2 to exercise CPP by leveraging its technical expertise in CSR, is the 
creation of the Energy Bill. When C2 began publishing position papers, it 
became a member of the UK Green Building Council (UK-GBC). UK-GBC had 
been setup as a think-tank and front group by a coalition of construction 
companies to campaign for low carbon regulations. The UK-GBC’s members 
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were motivated by the opportunities offered by the Government agenda to 
reduce the Co2 emissions of the UK. One opportunity contemplated by UK-
GBC’s members was the retrofitting of existing UK housing and building 
stocks. The low carbon retrofit market was estimated at £3.5bn - £6.5bn a 
year if “green retrofitting” was made mandatory (UK Green Building Council, 
2008).  
UK-GBC, funded by C2 and other construction companies, framed its 
messages to policy-makers in terms of economic growth opportunity, i.e. the 
existence of a low carbon retrofit market would create new jobs and reduce 
pollution. This followed the neoliberal ideology in the UK. The think-tank hired 
consultants to produce research that supported its arguments. One of the first 
UK-GBC’s reports presented to policy-makers was Low Carbon Existing 
Homes in 2008. It recommended the introduction of a range of financial 
incentives to encourage tenant to refurbish their homes with low carbon 
technologies.  One of the incentives suggested, later called the "Pay As You 
Save" (PAYS) scheme, was that homeowners should be given a loan to 
improve the energy efficiency of their house. The advocacy of UK-GBC 
succeeded and in May 2010, the elected government pledged to implement 
PAYS, renamed the “Green Deal”. In December 2010, the Energy Bill was 
introduced in Parliament. It included clauses for the “Green Deal” and the 
retrofitting of buildings. It was a victory for the members of UK-GBC. C2 was 
one of the members to be awarded government contracts to install retrofit 
solutions on public buildings. After the members of UK-GBC achieved this 
common objective on retrofit policies, they now have to compete with each 
other to secure retrofitting contracts. In order to gain a competitive advantage 
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over its rivals in this new market created by regulations, C2 appointed 
government advisers who had worked on the Green Deal policy. They brought 
to the firm technical expertise and easy access to policy-makers by their 
social capital. As put by an participant: 
 
If you have a reputation—you’re known by people and positively 
thought of by people; when you talk as an expert or with an expert view, 
then they’re much more likely to notice of what you say, rather than just, 
well 'who are you?' (ID#[anonymised]). 
 
The creation of the “Green Deal” illustrates how the alignment of CPAs and 
CSR activities can have impacts on public policies. 
 
4.4.5 Political Outcomes and Impacts of CSR 
The first political outcome of CSR was technical expertise. After the Key 
Event, the strategic decision by C2 to fully engage with CSR led the firm to 
revamp its way of doing business by integrating the CSR concept into the 
company’s culture and operations: 
 
What we’re trying to do in the Sustainable Development strategy 
is to build it as the umbrella and then everything, and I mean 
EVERYTHING, fits beneath it. So nothing fit outside the 
Sustainable Development agenda. And that takes time, even at 
[C2] we’re still have like ‘Sustainable Development ideas over 
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there, and we’ve got some other things over here’. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
To achieve a competitive advantage over its rivals, the company invested in 
new skills by recruiting experts in different areas, such as waste management 
and sustainable building engineering. By becoming an expert in low carbon, 
C2 created a platform that allowed it to gain easier access to politicians by 
“hooking its political arguments” to their agenda. C2 was able to provide 
critical resources needed by policy-makers in the political market, i.e. 
technical expertise to design public policies or to achieve sustainable 
construction projects. 
 
There are some companies that for a variety of reasons have 
very large access [to policy-makers], and you could say that 
paying lip service to Government aspirations on sustainability 
actually helps them retain that access rather than sort of 
appearing to go head-to-head in opposing the Government. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Regarding the public image of the firm, C2 has always made use of charitable 
giving, a tradition for the family firm, to create this political outcome. Each 
regional branch of C2 in the country sponsors local charity events, and 
organises networking receptions attended by local MPs and Council Leaders. 
These CSR related events provide opportunities to meet policy-makers and 
develop another political outcome, social capital. However philanthropy has 
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become more strategic over the years as public sector clients came to see 
community engagement programmes as a norm by contractors. Construction 
companies are expected to be philanthropist. The PFI scheme and Section 
106 contributed to the institutionalisation of philanthropy in the industry: 
 
[CSR in communities], I’m not sure it’s philanthropic. I would say 
it’s in the context more of things like planning gain. It’s a bit like 
“I’m going to give you this contract and, therefore, what I want 
around it is, more that goes into the community than you just 
building a building. I want you to be part of that 
community.”…PFI has added to that, but it’s not just PFI. It’s 
become a de facto standard in terms of client bidding processes 
to ask what you do in these areas. Again this comes back to 
being driven by clients and wanting more value out of that 
relationship than just building a building. Obviously, on PFI 
projects you’re not just building a building. You’re then probably 
going to go and run if for 25, 30, 40 years, whatever it may be. 
Therefore, your attitude as a citizen is fundamentally changing. 
You’re not just a contractor who is delivering something for a 
client. You are actually going to be there and responsible and 
customer facing, which is very different. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
When C2 bids for public sector projects, it identifies the community issues 
faced by the potential client, and includes in its bid the community projects 
that it will do to address those issues. The majority of C2’s CSR activities are 
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market driven and therefore, strategically designed to achieve predefined 
objectives to satisfy the client. 
 
What you are saying in term of influence [when you bid] is: ‘If 
you choose us, we will be providing a number of apprenticeships 
on this particular scheme which will last for two and a half years. 
If you choose us, we will be providing a certain amount of 
money that will go into local projects. We will have an 
ambassador scheme, we will be linking into the local community, 
we will have one of our senior staff to volunteer to be a governor 
of a local school. So there are a lot of things that if you choose 
[C2], we will be doing in the local community.’ (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Therefore the community programmes of C2 are done with the expectation of 
winning business in that community. C2 uses these CSR initiatives as tools to 
create indebtedness and trade with policy-makers: 
 
There is no way [C2] is going to provide these things to a 
community out of the goodness of our heart if there is no work 
for us in that community. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
A practice used by the company to create indebtedness is to make donations 
to charities designated by government officials themselves.  
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One scheme we have is that on a city centre site, we are 
charging everybody that comes to our site, and everybody else 
that park their car each day near to. We then work with the 
council to decide which charity, from the money that is raised 
from this exercise during the project, the money is donated to. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
It is not illegal but the client says ‘if you want to be in our 
frameworks, you have to pay £10,000 to [anonymised]. One of 
the water companies is up to £100,000. Never mind, 
[anonymised] is a very good charity [...] so we will support 
charities that are relevant to either our client’s industries, which 
[anonymised] is, or our own industry which will be something like 
Business Action on Homelessness [a BITC’s program] 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
This CSR practice transforms charitable giving into an indirect financial 
donation to policy-makers, while creating indebtedness. Even if it is the policy-
maker/client who requests these disguised donations to the contractor, 
indebtedness is still created.  
 
To support its new public image after the Key Event, C2 became a member of 
BITC. By then, with the support of the Prince of Wales, BITC had become the 
most reputed charity in the promotion of CSR to businesses. Ministers have a 
high esteem for the organisation, which organises regularly events where 
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corporate leaders and policy-makers meet. For a company that desires to be 
portrayed as a leader of CSR in the UK, a BITC membership is an unofficial 
sine qua non. 
 
 Whether people have bought the BITC agenda directly or not, I 
don’t know. I’m slightly cynical about it. […] I think it’s been 
successful in becoming a benchmark by which you are judged. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Moon (2004) commented that companies that were members of organisations 
that promotes CSR such as BITC, received in exchange a symbolic badge of 
their public commitments for all stakeholders to see. The badge improves 
their public image and helps build good relationships with policy-makers and 
civil society. It mitigates regulatory and reputational risks, and at the same 
time enhances corporate legitimacy. As a corporate member, BITC advised 
C2 on its CSR strategy and a year later, the firm was listed in the influential 
BITC’s annual index of Britain’s top CSR companies. In addition to having 
Green on its board who already gave credibility to the environmental image of 
the company, the BITC’s listing reinforced C2’s public image as a sustainable 
business. 
 
Regarding the political impacts of CSR, data indicate that the combination of 
political activities and the four political outcomes of CSR activities by C2 
helped the company attracts new clients, improves the efficiency of its 
operations by eliminating wastes, and contributed to the creation of new 
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public policies such as the “Green Deal”. The company believe that CSR had 
a positive impact on its financial performance over the years since the Key 
Event, however the company C2 has only qualitative evidence.  
 
[The benefits of CSR are] I think reputation, in terms of how we 
are seen in the marketplace by existing clients and new clients. I 
think in demonstrating economic benefits in terms of reduction of 
waste to landfill. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
The first job we did for Marks & Spencer is an example of how 
we were asked to do a job because of our sustainable 
development reputation. [...] we think by the time we get by 2012 
we will have saved at least £2m between 2010 and 2012 and 
moving toward zero waste landfill. (ID#[anonymised]) 
  
Another impact of CSR activities has been on its workforce. According to the 
participants, the involvement in community initiatives raised the employees’ 
morale and job satisfaction. It also contributed to the company’s public image 
of a good employer, which helps to attract and retain a qualified workforce. 
 
4.4.6 Case Study 2 Conclusion 
The retroductive research strategy employed for this study consists in moving 
back and forth between emerging empirical data. Therefore, by taking into 
account findings from the first case study at this stage, C2’s results support 
the proposition that the political outcomes of CSR activities are CSR-based 
 202 
mechanisms of CPP. The pressure from regulatory threats was the catalyst 
for a pro-active engagement in CSR by C2. As CSR became prominent on 
politicians’ agenda, companies with CSR activities that could support 
politicians’ objectives had an advantage for political access and for winning 
government contracts. The provision of political goods valued by government 
officials, sustainable construction techniques and low carbons solutions, was 
only possible after C2 had acquired technical expertise, a critical internal 
resource. In exchange of its political goods produced from its expertise in 
CSR, C2 obtained from politicians government contracts and some public 
policies that advanced its interests. Finally, the findings from this second case 
study revealed that CSR outcomes could be produced by the same CSR 
activity. For instance, a donation to a mayor’s favourite charity could result in 
social capital, public image and indebtedness, all at the same time or one 
after the other. As already observed in the first case study, CSR outcomes 
intertwine. All of these make it difficult to attribute a CSR outcome to a 
particular CSR activity.   
 
Table 15 presents the CPP mechanisms employed by C2 after the Key Event: 
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Forms of 
CPP 
Visible Hidden Invisible 
Instruments 
(CPAs) 
Informational and 
relational types of CPA 
Front groups and 
third party 
sponsorship (e.g. 
trade associations, 
think-tanks); 
political ties; 
revolving door 
Neoliberal 
ideology in the 
UK; advertising 
and articles in 
the press 
Instruments 
(CSR 
Activities) 
Philanthropy (event 
sponsorships; 
community 
programmes); school 
endowment; 
environmental 
management and 
employee development 
programmes; 
membership of BITC; 
PPP; revolving door; 
self-regulation 
Technical activity; 
PPP 
Indirect 
financial 
contributions; 
technical 
activity  
 
Table 15: CPP Framework for C2 
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4.5 Case Study 3 
 
4.5.1 C3 Background   
C3 is a multinational construction company whose major shareholders are 
pension funds. From civil engineering services to property development, the 
company operates across the full spectrum of the construction and property 
industries. It is one of the largest contractors in the UK by turnover and the 
majority of its revenues come from public sector clients.    
Over the decades, the company has grown by acquisitions and it is structured 
differently from other construction companies. Its regional offices around the 
UK are autonomous in their management and there is little control from the 
head office. In the words of a participant, C3 is “like a series of federal states. 
[...] They’re basically run as separate business units with some guidance from 
the centre” (ID#[anonymised]). This federal structure enables the company to 
respond quickly to local market conditions. 
 
4.5.2 The Key Event: Demands from Investors (2005) 
In the early 2000s, it became a requirement from the Blair Government for its 
suppliers to have environmental credentials such as ISO 14001. Despite 
meeting the conditions, C3 did not communicate much on its CSR activities 
with stakeholders. The firm’s annual reports contained scarce details of its 
social and environmental activities and performances. In 2005, with CSR 
mainstream as described in Section 4.2.2, the major institutional investors of 
C3 demanded that the management team be more pro-active, transparent 
and communicative on CSR. 
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It’s the shareholder demand bit which is quite interesting. And 
that came through some of the trustees and advisers for pension 
funds who hold big shareholdings in [C3] saying to us: “We’ve 
been having a look, and we don’t see you in FTSE4Good, and 
we don’t see you in the [BITC] CR Index. Why is that?” 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
It wasn’t that the City said, “Oh, you’re not doing anything about 
sustainability. You need to get your act together”. We were 
always doing [CSR] over the last probably seven, eight, nine 
years. We’d just never tell anybody, and that is a big failing of 
[C3]. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
The pressure from shareholders forced C3 to review its CSR activities and 
methods of communication. The company moved from a passive stance on 
CSR to a proactive one. 
 
4.5.3 State of CSR and CPA at the Time of the Key Event 
 
CSR – Determinants and Activities: 
Until 2001, CSR at C3 consisted of community programmes and compliance 
with the law. Engaging with the communities helped to legitimise the company 
activities around construction sites and maintain a positive public image in 
communities: “[Community engagement] was the right thing to do […] some of 
our [regional] offices have been around for hundred years. We employ local 
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people. We know the communities well” (ID#[anonymised]). The CSR 
activities of C3 were similar to those of other contractors. They consisted in 
hiring local workers, recruitment of ex-offenders through apprenticeship 
programmes, financial donations to local charities, and providing work 
experience to unemployed and students from local colleges. One CSR activity 
that has become the norm in the industry for contractors with slack resources 
like C3, is to encourage their employees to be governors of the schools that 
their children attend. The types of philanthropic activities C3 undertook were 
largely determined by politicians’ expectations as they used the regulation 
Section 106 to obtain political goods: 
“If you let us build that supermarket there, we’ll build you a 
community hall across the road”…. that whole system stinks. 
There is just no other word for it. It is just largely corrupt, in small 
“c”. [It’d be better to give cash officially] and it’s up to the local 
authority to spend that properly, and if they don’t spend it 
properly, the theory is they don’t get elected next time round. So 
it’s political accountability for money. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
But overall, the company had a passive attitude towards CSR: 
 
[We were] probably more reactive [about CSR], but basically 
what we would be looking at is probably more legal compliance 
[…] the issues that aren’t covered by legislation, which is 
reducing waste, reducing energy, enhancing biodiversity wildlife, 
looking after local communities, didn’t really kick in until the early 
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2000s. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
A few years before the Key Event, a director of C3 chaired a trade association 
that promoted CSR to its construction members. Because of this membership, 
C3 had begun taking a closer look at its environmental performance.   
 
 What we did with [this trade association’s members] was to help 
them write their environmental policies [...] Then we helped them 
to set specific targets that they would aim to achieve in relation 
to protecting and conserving the environment. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
While chairing this trade association, C3 published its first environmental 
policy. The objective was to satisfy private and public sector clients:  
 
One of the drivers then was from our clients asking us, “Have 
you got an Environmental Management System? Have you got 
14001?” [...] So that’s around about the beginning of 2002, 
probably 2003. Business started to realise that environmental 
issues were important. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
After the publication of this policy, C3 nominated environmental champions 
among its employees within each regional office and the head office to 
implement the group's environmental policy. The policy emphasised the 
training of employees in environmental management; monitoring of 
 208 
environmental issues; creation of a central database for waste inventories; 
and reporting of the environmental performance in the annual reports 
(ID#[anonymised]). 
 
CPA – Determinants and Activities: 
According to the interviewees, because the government is the main client of 
the construction industry, market and political activities cannot be separated. 
Large construction companies like C3 maintain close contact with government 
officials to be aware months ahead of any governmental initiatives, and give 
their technical advice to their public sector clients. Lobbying has therefore 
always been embedded in the economic activities of C3. 
 
 I would just say it’s the way we do our business. It’s just how we 
trade. We work with local authorities and then say, “yes, this is a 
really good service”. So in that way, maybe it’s indirectly 
influencing [their policies]. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
 We do receptions in House of Commons and you get, obviously 
policy-makers and MPs there, and we talk about the industry 
and talk about things that we’re doing. […] We do stuff with the 
local government task forces... So we’re pretty plugged into 
what’s going on. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
The company used a public affair agency, but also the services of trade 
associations and professional bodies of which it was member, to watch over 
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government affairs and alert it on regulations that could affect its activities. 
When they did, the company co-operated with its rivals to co-ordinate their 
response and defend their common interests: 
 
 We tend to go as either UKCG. If there’s any environmental 
issue, we tend to get together and decide what our policy should 
be. Obviously there’s some disagreements sometimes, but we 
usually get a consensus, and we’ll put together what we think —
with legislation changes — what we think they should be 
(ID#[anonymised]). 
 
Whereas this passive approach to CPA tended to be at the national level for 
policies that may affect the entire industry, C3 was proactive politically when it 
pursued local opportunities. When it bid on government contracts, such as 
PFI or local authority frameworks, C3 acted alone, in competition with other 
contractors. For large contracts of the PFI type, the head office hired the 
services of a public affairs agency to identify the key political stakeholders that 
could affect the final decision. C3 and the agency would then engage in a 
dialogue with these important stakeholders in private meetings to understand 
their needs, adapt its bid accordingly and lobby these key stakeholders to win 
the tender.  
 
 What we’re doing under those circumstances is very much 
looking at who are the audiences that are going to effect a 
decision. […] Clearly some of those audiences have very 
differing agendas and they’re part of the broader decision-
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making process on any given project. It can be a particular 
council with a particularly green agenda. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
4.5.4 State of CSR and CPA after the Key Event 
 
CSR – Determinants and Activities: 
The demands from shareholders compelled C3 to centralise the CSR function, 
and no longer let each regional office develop its own strategy. A few years 
later, as the company had become familiar with the CSR concept, the belief in 
the business case for CSR became the determinant.  
 
The biggest single benefit is that it’s contributed to our success 
in winning public sector work and, indeed, some private sector 
work, because it is becoming the discriminating factor, because 
they say if you take three or four of the main contractors, you 
can’t really sort of differentiate between them because the price 
is all about the same, the programs all about the same, so 
what’s different? [CSR] can be the discriminator. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
To be perceived proactive in CSR by its shareholders and customers, C3 
undertook a series of actions. Firstly, a year after the Key Event, a dedicated 
section on CSR appeared for the first time in C3’s annual reports. A few years 
later C3 published its first stand-alone annual CSR report. Secondly, after the 
Key Event the company published its first CSR strategy. The document was 
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distributed to all stakeholders (employees, investors, clients) and outlined the 
company’s approach to deal with three themes of CSR, namely environment, 
social and economic. Thirdly, the company entered industry awards related to 
CSR. Following the demands from shareholders, C3 became a member of 
BITC in order to be included in the annual BITC’s Corporate Responsibility 
(CR) Index. This index is the symbol of CSR achievements in the UK, and 
C3’s investors expected to see the firm listed in the Index. The company 
adopted the BITC’s CR framework, and started using the term ‘corporate 
responsibility’ instead of ‘CSR’. 
  
 [Our CSR] framework and structure was driven, (a) by what the 
company wanted to do, and (b) by shareholder demand […] if 
you look in our [corporate annual] report and accounts for the 
year before, CR is a bit of a wishy-washy couple of paragraphs 
and a few pictures of some kids with hard hats on, whereas now 
we’ve kind of got it structured and got it organised, and that’s 
been a big achievement. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Lastly, to manage and co-ordinate the CSR activities of all its regional offices 
from the head office, the firm promoted internally one of its employees to the 
newly created post of CSR Director. This director from then onwards 
represented C3 on all the CSR committees of trade associations and public-
private task groups. 
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Since this series of actions took place, C3 has been included each year in the 
BITC’s CR Index to the satisfaction of its shareholders. But the attempt to be 
listed in the FTSE4Good Index has been unsuccessful. Its application was 
rejected because the company has interests in nuclear power generation, 
which make it ineligible for inclusion in the FTSE4Good Index7. 
 
CPA – Determinants and Activities: 
The Key Event did not change the political behaviour of C3, which continued 
to rely on trade associations for CPA concerning regulatory changes at the 
national level. Like other members of UKCG, C3 believed in opportunities 
brought by climate change (ID#[anonymised]). With other UKCG’s members 
C3 lobbied the government, relying on its technical expertise in CSR to have 
regulations that would promote a low carbon economy, and the company 
would still benefit financially: 
 
 We have pushed sustainability through every opportunity that we’ve 
had because we see the built environment as being able to make a big 
contribution to sustainability, because the statistic that the most Co2 
that gets pumped out into the atmosphere everyday comes out of a 
building somewhere. So there’s a huge issue there. It’s socially 
responsible to do something about it, and it’s also commercially 
sensible to do something about it because you can make money doing 
it. ((ID#[anonymised]) 
                                                
7 Since the data collection, the FTSE Good Index has changed its screening criteria 
and now includes companies involved in nuclear power generation. However C3 is 
still not included in the Index. 
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In their common interests, C3 and other UKCG’s members jointly lobbied 
politicians to promote what they believed to be better CSR related regulations 
than the ones suggested by the British government: 
 
We put [CSR] first […] and if government policy we thought was 
wrong, and we think they’re wrong on a number of things, we 
will write and tell them. We won’t look at government policy and 
make our [CSR] fits that. It’s the other way round. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Like C1 and C2 before, once C3 discovered the economic opportunities 
offered by CSR, either by market competition (branding) or by using public 
policies to create new markets, the firm took a higher stance on sustainable 
construction standards than those recommended by the Government. This 
attitude aimed at giving C3 the image of a sustainable contractor, and 
therefore more credibility when dealing with policy-makers or clients: 
 
It shows clients that we’re proactive and that we’re engaging 
with Government, but these aren’t things that are done on an 
individual basis. We tend to do them as groups of contractors. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
  
According to the participants, C3 is very active politically. The company does 
all known types of political activities except financial donations to political 
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parties: “We are apolitical. We just kind of support the Government of the day” 
(ID#[anonymised]). The CPAs of the firm include meeting face to face with 
policy-makers to give the company’s point of view on issues affecting the 
industry; having managers sitting in Government’s advisory committees; 
responding to government consultations; sending letters to policy-makers; 
funding think-tanks and inviting policy-makers to corporate and industry 
events. In addition the company provides free research assistants to 
politicians, which is an indirect financial contributions as the assistants are 
paid by the contractor (ID#[anonymised]). 
Despite all these political activities, some C3’s managers believe that the 
political power of C3 remains latent and is less effective than smaller 
competitors like C2, which have a more entrepreneurial culture and are 
proactive in the political arena: “I think to be fair traditionally, [C3] has been 
punching below its weight in terms of politics” (ID#[anonymised]).  
 
 
4.5.5 Political Outcomes and Impacts of CSR 
The four political outcomes of CSR were found in this case study. The first 
was technical expertise in CSR. The more C3 developed in-house its CSR 
expertise by training its employees in social, environmental and economics 
management, the more it acquired a political reputation by sharing this 
expertise with government officials during meetings. For example, C3’s CSR 
Director was appointed chair of a steering committee of a PPP on sustainable 
construction techniques. The role gave opportunities to access policy-makers, 
practice “technical activity”, and build political ties and a political reputation. 
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I chair what’s called [anonymised], which links with construction 
to government looking at [environmental] issues, and also 
through our membership of CBI, we lobby government. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
The most effective CSR activities of C3 in politics were those that benefitted 
politically policy-makers.  
 Whenever you’re doing something that government is interested 
in, it’s easier to get access. [...] where you can have a 
conversation with government is where you can say, “I’m not 
here to complain to you as a minister that something isn’t fair. 
We come here actually ready to help you, because we as the 
construction industry could offer work experience placements to 
50, 100, 500 kids that are long-term unemployed because they 
haven’t got the skills—the employable skills”. And I think it will 
be the same on sustainability. If government said suddenly ‘we 
want to have all buildings in London reduce their carbon 
consumption by 20 percent in the next five years’, we could 
have conversations with the government as to how that might be 
practically done. (ID#[anonymised]) 
Hence a gain in social capital, and to an extent a gain in CPP, requires a 
convergence of interests between the policy-buyer and seller. One activity 
that benefited politicians, and at the same time allowed C3 to exercise 
invisible CPP, was a mixture of revolving door (CPA) and technical activity 
(CSR) through the provision of free public services. One such service was the 
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provision of free technical assistance to government officials. This peculiar 
political activity is an indirect financial contribution. It is effective in obtaining 
government contracts and influencing the draft of public policies because, it 
creates indebtedness on the part of the recipients. On one hand, politicians 
are pleased to have access to more experts subsidised by C3 to design public 
goods and services. On the other hand, C3 builds social capital and increases 
its chances of having political support from the recipients when it bids on 
government contracts or lobby government. Politicians, having worked closely 
with the firm, feel not only the obligation to take into account C3’s 
recommendations in their final decisions, but if possible award a contract to 
C3 to implement its recommendations. An example was in 2009, during the 
government consultation for the Carbon Reduction Commitment scheme: 
 We acted as consultees on quite a bit of stuff with [a 
government department]  and we do quite a bit with BSRIA [an 
industry consultancy service] where we use our experts and we 
just chuck them in for free, so to speak, so that they can 
participate in these sort of working programmes [...] So we 
actually tried to influence regulation through education. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
This tactic also gave C3 a competitive advantage over its rivals when it bid on 
a project: 
 The stuff we did with [anonymised] in [CSR] really helped us win 
that bid, and that was in terms of more about the educational 
stuff, about seconding our educationalists into the [anonymised] 
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and the stuff they were trying to do. [The local authorities] were 
trying to plan their stuff and we get the people to help them plan 
it. And that was enlightened self-interest really, they got a better 
scheme because the people we had were better quality than the 
people that they had access to, and so at the end of the day, 
everybody was going to win. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Since the Key Event, C3 has won many industry awards for its CSR initiatives 
in construction projects. The awards raised C3’s profile in the country. To 
preserve this environmentally friendly image, C3 developed stakeholder 
dialogue management systems to mitigate risks associated with its activities. 
The self-regulated systems made regulators more lenient towards the 
contractor. This leniency due to self-regulation indirectly contributed to the 
financial performance of C3: 
 As in any large business, [the Environmental Agency] is always 
going to come when there’s a problem on a site somewhere, 
and we’ve always addressed it. The classic one recently being a 
noise issue [...] we got served a Section 18 notice against us, 
which means the local authority would prosecute us, but as soon 
as we were issued with this, we called a meeting with them and 
reviewed our procedures with them in a couple of days. 
Changed our procedures, showed them what we did do across 
the group, and they were so amazed at our quick response they 
said [...] “That’s brilliant. We’re not going to prosecute you” 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
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One participant described how all companies that had developed a CSR-
friendly image, had to impose on themselves self-regulation practices to 
maintain that image. Government officials were aware of this quid pro quo and, 
given that implementing and monitoring public policies is expensive to 
government ministries, they tried to make companies commit to CSR publicly 
in exchange of no or less mandatory regulations. It is a trade. Public 
commitments force companies to self-regulate because if they do not, their 
reputation and legitimacy would be in jeopardy. Public commitment to CSR is 
therefore a cost effective tactic used by policy-makers to achieve their political 
objectives: 
The better strategy in many ways is to get businesses to commit 
to much higher standards than you could ever impose through 
regulation, then to cascade it through their supply chain but 
have those as public commitments to which they are then held 
to account—so if Marks & Spencer says ‘we are not using 
chemicals in cotton that we grow from resources of Ghana’ and 
whatever stuff like that, then you know that there will be people 
working for civil groups out there who will go in and check those 
claims. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
From the perspective of government officials, the most trustworthy companies 
are those that brand themselves publicly “sustainable company”, promise to 
self-regulate, and have a long supply chain like C3. Policy-makers reward 
these companies with more and easier political access to them. For instance, 
 219 
the UKCG prevented regulations in waste management by promising 
[anonymised] that its members would self-regulate: 
The most high profile, ongoing initiative, over the last five years 
has been UKCG’s involvement in establishing a voluntary portal 
to benchmark waste generated within the construction sector. 
[…] Through the establishment of the portal, the industry has 
been able to show its commitment to reducing waste generated 
along with increasing the amount diverted from landfill. The 
introduction of voluntary reporting, along with the establishment 
of reduction targets, has prevented the need for government and 
clients to introduce a mandatory system. (ID#[anonymised]) 
  
The impacts of CSR on C3 after the Key Event were two fold: its new public 
image and provision of free technical assistance not only attracted new clients 
from the public sector, but also helped the firm participate in policy-making 
and influence policies as described above. 
 
 [CSR] helps us to win work. This is always my argument when I 
stand up and speak to directors and main board. Despite the 
recession, clients are still asking us very detailed questions on 
what are we doing on waste, on water, energy, sustainability, 
training, apprenticeships. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
In addition, the company’s CSR initiatives made it more efficient:  
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From a financial point of view, it’s made us a lot more aware of 
what our costs are for energy, and also just how much our waste 
costs were. It was something nobody really looked at. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
Despite this knowledge, C3 has never been able to quantify the contribution of 
CSR to its financial performance:  
 
 I know that on a couple of major frameworks that we’ve bid on 
and been successful, you can’t put it down just to the 
environment or sustainability because there are other things that 
we’re good at, but basically had we scored badly on the 
sustainability side […] perhaps we would’ve still got on the 
frameworks, but you don’t really know—there’s the view in the 
business that the fact that we’ve been proactive [on CSR] and 
we’re doing our best and we could get a lot better, has helped 
us secure work. (ID#[anonymised]) 
 
4.5.6 Case Study 3 Conclusion 
The pro-active engagement in CSR by C3 is driven today by the business 
case. Like its rivals, C3 has come to view CSR has a means for differentiation 
and competitive advantage. The results of this case study show that when 
CSR activities address societal issues of interest to policy-makers, the 
political outcomes of CSR activities facilitate political access. The following 
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impacts can influence the awarding of government contracts and public 
policies to the advantage of the firm. 
  
Table 16 presents the mechanisms of CPP employed by C3 after its Key 
Event: 
Forms of CPP Visible Hidden Invisible 
Instruments 
(CPAs) 
Informational and 
relational types of 
CPA; chairing of 
trade associations 
Front groups and 
third party 
sponsorship (e.g. 
trade 
associations); 
political ties; 
revolving door. 
Neoliberal 
ideology in the 
UK 
Instruments 
(CSR 
Activities) 
Philanthropy (event 
sponsorships, 
community 
programmes); 
apprenticeship 
programmes; 
membership of 
BITC; revolving 
door; self-regulation; 
environmental 
management; PPP;  
Philanthropy; 
PPP; technical 
activity 
Indirect financial 
contributions; 
technical activity 
 
Table 16: CPP Framework for C3 
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Chapter 5  
Cross-Case Analyses and Discussion 
 
The purpose of a cross-case analysis is to present the salient themes across 
the individual case studies to answer the research question, and provide 
insights into the phenomenon studied in light of the existing literature. In line 
with this research’s epistemological approach of constructivist-realism, in this 
Chapter the findings from the three cases are compared to uncover the 
mechanisms of the phenomenon analysed. Their similarities and differences 
are also discussed in light of the literature. To find answers to the research 
question, I first explore the salient themes of the determinants of CSR 
engagement. The same analysis is then made concerning CPA, followed by 
the political outcomes and impacts of CSR activities. Finally, by merging these 
findings, answers to the research question of the study are presented. The 
discussion of the cross-case analyses concludes with a presentation of the 
final conceptual model that captures the relationship between CSR and CPP. 
 
5.1 Cross-Case Analyses 
 
5.1.1 CSR – Determinants and Activities 
The case studies revealed three salient drivers for the case companies to 
proactively pursue CSR activities, namely activism from institutional 
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shareholders (external pressure), market trends (external pressure) and 
legitimacy threats (external pressure). 
 
1) Shareholder Activism: 
Regulations raised awareness of CSR and Socially Responsible Investment 
(SRI) among investors.  For instance, the SRI index FTSE4Good was created 
in 2001 as a result of the 1999 Pension Act that required institutional investors 
to be aware of public companies’ social and environmental performances. 
Institutional investors began demanding that public companies report on their 
CSR activities. By that time, C1 was already engaged in CSR reporting since 
its Key Event. However C3’s pro-active engagement in CSR activities and 
reporting was a result of this 1999 public policy. C3 found itself targeted by 
institutional shareholders who pressured it to become involved in a broader 
range of social and environmental issues, and be more communicative in 
these areas. Like C1 and C2 before, C3 succeeded being included in the 
influential BITC’s CR Index but not in any SRI index, because of its activities 
in the nuclear power sector. Among the three case companies, C1 is the only 
one to date to be listed in a SRI index. C2 cannot be listed in SRI indices 
because it is a private company. It is unknown if this ineligibility for inclusion in 
SRI indices made some investors divest their holdings in C3, or deterred 
potential ones to invest in the firm. What the three case studies indicate is that 
the real value of membership of a SRI index like the FTSE4Good index, or of 
a CR index like the BITC’s one, lies in public image and reputation. The 
membership is a badge of social legitimacy that helps to protect the public 
image of members (Clark and Hebb, 2005). 
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2) Market Trends: 
The three case studies show that changes in the market motivated the 
construction industry to invest in the technical expertise of sustainable 
methods of construction. Regulatory forces drove this new trend in the market 
from the mid-1990s onwards. C2 is exemplar of this adaptation by the industry 
to meet the new demands of clients, with the largest one being the 
Government. The move of C2 towards CSR was motivated by the political 
agenda of the Government and its demand for greener products and services.  
It was an instrumental use of CSR without moral or ethical consideration. All 
three case companies undertook CSR for instrumental reasons. C1 was the 
first contractor in the industry to eagerly communicate on its environmental 
activities, but only after its Key Event had damaged its public image. It was at 
first a re-branding exercise for risk management purpose. Following the 
recommendations of a CSR expert and adviser a few years later, C1 began 
using CSR as a tool for branding and differentiate from rivals, but also to 
influence public policies through its CSR related expertise. In the case of C2, 
it was an entrepreneurial move. After years of monitoring trends in the 
economic and political marketplaces, the company decided to seize the 
opportunities presented by CSR by becoming an expert in low carbon 
solutions. For C3, the initial motive was to please institutional investors. But a 
few years later, once the company noticed that CSR activities could support 
its bids on government tenders, it decided to strategically undertake CSR 
activities in order to enhance its financial performance. 
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The first and third case studies show that communication and promotion of 
CSR activities to stakeholders, particularly regulators, shareholders and 
customers, are as important as doing those activities. Perception is reality; the 
awareness by these stakeholders of some sort of CSR engagement, even if it 
is “green-washing”, mitigates threats to corporate legitimacy.   
 
3) Legitimacy Threats: 
A company impacts and is reciprocally impacted by its stakeholders (Gray et 
al., 1995; Freeman et al., 2007). This view of business-society relation is 
found in ECC theory that supports the claim that a social contract exists 
between business and society. Unless a company shares with its 
stakeholders the economic, social, and political benefits it derives from its 
activities, its legitimacy and existence will be eventually threatened (Shocker, 
1973). For C1, it was the pressure from the activism of environmental civil 
groups that affected its public image and threatened its legitimacy. In the case 
of C2, it was the Government’s “green” agenda and clients’ demands driven 
by regulations that threatened its legitimacy and existence, if the company did 
not adapt to the changes. For C3 it was shareholders’ demands also incited 
by regulations. The three case studies show that to maintain their legitimacy 
after their Key Event, each case company undertook a series of actions that 
met their key stakeholders’ expectations. Those expectations are temporal 
because they are dependent upon socially constructed norms that evolve. So 
businesses are not always aware of their legitimacy gap until complaints of 
key stakeholders arise (Lindblom, 1993; Deegan, 2006). The first and third 
case studies put this in evidence: the quotes of participants in these cases 
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indicate that until the Key Events occurred, C1 and C3 believed that the way 
they had operated for decades was still acceptable.  
 
Considered altogether, the three salient determinants for CSR engagement 
echo the findings of Bansal and Roth (2000) and Aguinis and Glavas (2012), 
namely that companies engage in CSR activities because of external 
pressures from their primary stakeholders. In all three case studies, these 
pressures were all directly or indirectly related to governmental regulations. 
The fear of losing revenues or legitimacy, associated with the loss of access 
to the resources they needed to exist, dictated companies’ responses. For all 
case companies, CSR engagement was initially a defence strategy against an 
external pressure. Gradually, as each company gained knowledge of the 
concept, the practice of CSR evolved into a market differentiation strategy. 
Accordingly, CSR activities became managerial instruments to manage their 
market and non-market environments (Frankental, 2001; Harjoto and Jo, 
2011). Whether it is legitimacy threats, market trends or shareholder activism, 
the results point to enlightened self-interest as the underlying motivator of 
each case company. They all practiced corporate social responsiveness 
(Carroll, 1979), a four-phase sequential managerial approach to stakeholder 
management without moral connotation: reaction, defence, accommodation, 
and proaction. The series of social actions undertaken by C1 and C3 after 
their Key Event show clearly the rolling out of these four phases. 
 
The CSR activities of the three case companies were found to be similar and 
encompass all the domains of responsibilities included in the Extended 
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Pyramid of CSR (Figure 2). These covered the ones reported in previous 
studies (see Table 12). According to the literature (e.g. Baum and Oliver, 
1992; Campbell, 2007; Hillman et al., 2009), the isomorphism found in CSR 
practices can be explained by the fact that companies belonged to the same 
industry and were subjected to the same institutional pressures. The events 
discussed in Chapter 4 illustrate the links between regulative (coercive), 
normative, and mimetic mechanisms that produced this isomorphism. Initially 
macro and meso events created regulative mechanisms that threatened 
corporate revenues and legitimacy and coerced companies to undertake pro-
actively a range of CSR activities. They were then followed by normative and 
mimetic pressures that compelled the case companies to review their internal 
rules and structures (new corporate policies and activities; creation of CSR 
executive and non-executive positions; training of employees in new 
environmental skills; publication of CSR reports, etc.). As demonstrated by 
Cialdini (2007), individuals and corporate members of a group judge one 
another by conformity to the values set by the group by fear of exclusion. The 
three companies were all member of the MCG/UKCG and the BITC that 
promoted CSR engagement. Thus group pressure and mutual scrutiny 
assured CSR activities were similar among group members. 
 
The three determinants (shareholder activism, market trends and legitimacy 
threats) explain the rationale for CSR engagement at the organisational level. 
However an unexpected finding is that the personal values of senior 
executives, especially the CEO, played an important role in establishing 
corporate policies and activities, including social and political. For instance C1, 
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before and after its Key Event, engaged in philanthropic activities that related 
to the personal interests of the CEO. C2’s CSR initiatives leaned heavily 
towards education (apprenticeships and scholarships), and the company was 
politically active, because Smith personally believed in the education of young 
people and was a political activist. The personal values of these CEOs had an 
impact on the social and political orientations of their companies. According to 
Waldman et al. (2006), because the CEO plays such a determining role in the 
CSR activities of a firm, this manager should not be ignored in research. This 
claim is supported by studies that found a positive correlation between CEOs’ 
characteristics and CSR activities (Thomas and Simerly, 1994; Manner, 2010; 
Marquis and Lee, 2011), but also with CPAs. For instance, Chin et al. (2013) 
demonstrate that CEOs’ political values (social/liberal or conservative) are 
reflected in their companies’ CSR practices and financial donations to political 
parties. The correlation provides support for Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) 
Upper Echelons theory. According to the theory, organisational outcomes are 
a reflection of the intrinsic characteristics (age, managerial experience, social 
values, personalities) of the firm’s top managers. Hence a CEO’s decisions in 
times of crisis such as a Key Event, are strongly influenced by his or her 
personal values. However we should not completely discard corporate culture 
as Barney (1986) remarked. For instance, after their Key Events, C1 and C2’s 
CEOs were proactive and personally determined to make CSR central to their 
corporate strategy. To quickly develop an expertise, following their corporate 
culture of entrepreneurship, C1 purchased two environmental consultancy 
firms whereas C2 created its own. Both firms appointed external advisers on 
their board, and recruited experts from outside their organisation. They 
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communicated intensively to “sell” a new public image to stakeholders. In 
contrast, C3’s CEO chose to do everything internally and publicised little of 
the company’s CSR activities. He followed the corporate culture to “keep 
everything for itself” in the words of a participant. 
 
In conclusion, regarding CSR there is much congruence across the case 
studies and support for the existing literature and for the three interwoven 
theoretical lenses used for this study. “RDT+RBV” is supported because the 
three companies undertook CSR activities firstly to mitigate external threats to 
their legitimacy and revenues, and secondly to develop a competitive 
advantage by developing a public image of expert in sustainable construction 
techniques. There is also support for the institutional theory. The fact that the 
three case companies had similar CSR activities after their Key Event (more 
precisely after CSR had become mainstream by 2005), is evidence of 
institutional isomorphism. To these three theoretical frameworks that explain 
corporate social behaviour, Upper Echelons must be added. The three 
companies may have come to have similar CSR activities over time, but their 
practices differed because they did not have the same corporate strategy and 
organisational culture. The CEO influences both. 
 
An unexpected finding that comes to support the limited empirical evidence on 
the history of CSR in the UK (Moon, 2004; Albareda et al., 2008; Kinderman, 
2012), is that the social, environmental, and economic issues addressed by 
(construction) companies in this country have been strongly influenced by the 
Government and civil groups. For the last 30 years, the British government 
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has been framing the agenda of CSR programmes to address specific issues: 
During the 1980s, the CSR activities of construction firms targeted social 
issues. The Thatcher government encouraged this emphasis on social issues 
with the establishment of a number of PPP initiatives to reduce unemployment 
in deprived communities. During the 1990s, companies’ CSR activities 
broadened and put emphasis on environmental issues. Due to the growing 
interest of governments around the world in the issue of climate change, and 
the negative publicity surrounding C1’s Key Event in the UK, construction 
clients began raising concerns about the environmental damages caused by 
the industry’s practices. Clients asked for more environmental friendly 
solutions, whilst the Major Government introduced environmental taxes. 
Finally from 1999 onwards, the term “sustainability” gained popularity in the 
lexicon of the CSR literature as the government and practitioners found it 
more appropriate to reflect the issue of climate change. The new emphasis of 
CSR activities was to achieve a balance in the “triple bottom line” 
(performance in the social, environmental, and economic dimensions).  
In view of this, the CSR phenomenon seems to be a socio-political construct 
constantly redefined by political institutions in a perpetual shifting historical 
context. This conclusion is substantiated by the comments of a practitioner in 
Moir’s (2004) study, who advanced that historically in the UK, a firm’s CSR 
activity had to suit the Government’s ideals or agenda in order to be deemed 
valuable as a political good: 
“during the 1970s when the then incumbent Government was very 
favourable towards the arts in terms of private patronage, opera 
especially actually had a good run. I’ve heard people who were working 
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in that period tell me that if a corporate wanted to get close to the 
Prime Minister, opera was something which didn’t hurt to be seen to be 
associated with. Now the tack is very much if you want to get into the 
inner circle or near to a cabinet minister, then association with socially 
responsible works, that is to say community-based works or works 
which contribute to ethnic diversity, etc. are in a sense more attractive.” 
(A Head of Corporate Giving, cited in Moir, 2004, p.166) 
 
 Figure 10 illustrates this framing of CSR by periods. Each period emphasises 
a particular type of societal issue faced by institutional stakeholders, and 
these issues are expected to be addressed by businesses. Over time, new 
issues arise. Companies still have to address the former societal issues, but 
stakeholders expect it to prioritise the new ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Focus of CSR Activities, 1980-2010 
 
 
 
1999-present: ‘sustainability’ with an 
emphasis on climate change issues 
 
1980-1989: social issues 
1989-1999: environmental issues 
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5.1.2 CPA - Determinants and Activities 
The cases companies shared the same determinants for political advocacy: 
(1) revenue seeking by the pursuit of government contracts, (2) revenue 
seeking by the pursuit of public policies that would provide more public 
investment in infrastructure and government subsidies, and (3) the prevention 
of regulatory threats to their activities. The first and second determinants are 
quite similar as the Government is the industry’s largest client and therefore, 
its level of public procurement spending affects companies’ revenues. For this 
reason, a common political objective for all contractors in the industry has 
been the promotion of long-term investment schemes to increase public 
sector expenditure such as the PFI. Regarding the third determinant, 
companies did not like regulations and so, sought to pre-empt any through 
negotiations with the Government (lobbying) and engagement in self-
regulation. 
 
From the perspective of the three case companies, the characteristics of the 
construction industry made that market and politics could not be divorced. 
Policy-makers were at the same time clients, legislators and regulators, 
therefore CPA was embedded in everything the companies did to please and 
influence politicians.  
Like CSR activities, the political activities of the three companies were similar 
and at the same time, the companies differ in their practice of these activities. 
Organisational and managerial characteristics guided the political behaviour 
of case companies. C1 and C2 had a culture of “political entrepreneurship”, 
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and their respective CEOs and other top managers sought opportunities 
through regulations. In contrast, C3 relied to a greater extent on trade 
associations for regulatory changes. It was the political activism and social 
capital of C1’s senior executives that contributed to the creation of [Project X], 
the PFI scheme, and the prominent role of C1 in the PPP committee that 
advised the Government on sustainable procurement. Similarly it was the 
keen personal political interest of Smith, and his social capital, that gave C2 
and the construction industry unprecedented access to senior government 
officials during the 1990s. C2 continued this pursuit of business opportunities 
through regulations after its Key Event by lobbying for stricter CSR related 
regulations. The research on C3 did not find its senior managers to have a 
political entrepreneurship spirit, although they admitted that CPA was a 
standard feature of their activities because of the industry’s characteristics. 
These differences in managerial and organisational characteristics might 
explain why a participant said that C3 “punched below its weight in public 
affairs” [ID#anonymised]. 
 
The findings did not provide evidence that any of the case companies 
engaged in CPAs to advance the interests of a stakeholder for the sole benefit 
of that stakeholder (Government, communities, clients, employees, etc.). 
Political advocacy in support of a stakeholder was always because the case 
company had a vested interest in the outcome. The companies admitted that 
initially, they undertook CSR by commercial and legitimacy concerns due to 
external pressures. However with time, once they had subdued the pressures 
and became comfortable with the concept of CSR, they came to believe in the 
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business case for CSR and undertook CSR activities to benefit financially 
from them. As such they supported in principle the Government’s agenda on 
sustainability, and aligned their CSR activities and CPAs to advance their 
interests. Thus CSR activities became political instruments. 
The fact that the three case companies, all members of MCG/UKCG, 
supported the Government’s green agenda by adopting voluntarily higher 
environmental standards than those prescribed by the law, and then lobbied 
for stricter environmental regulations themselves or through their trade 
associations, meant that they had successfully adapted to the changes in their 
political environment. As prescribed by RDT, this self-regulation practice that 
consisted in adopting higher standards aimed at pre-empting future 
regulations and therefore, aimed at making the companies less dependent on 
the government. The practice also allowed for the alignment of CPAs and 
CSR activities, and lobbying for stricter CSR related regulations that would 
restrict competition by limiting the number of contractors eligible to bid for 
government tenders. The case companies clearly attempted to benefit from 
public policies derived from the Government’s agenda. The conclusion to 
draw from this finding is that the CSR activities that may have furthered the 
interest of the British public or a community where a case company operated 
(that is not a single and specific stakeholder), are positive externalities from 
the companies’ attempts to benefit financially from the Government’s green 
agenda. The case companies did not do community programmes to advance 
the communities’ interests but because of local politicians’ interests in these 
communities. Therefore if the Government’s green agenda did not promote 
the interest of the public, the political outcomes of CSR activities might have 
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benefited the Government or individual politicians with whom the case 
company traded political goods, but this benefit would have had no positive 
ripple effects for the public.  
 
5.1.3 Political Outcomes and Impacts  
A serendipitous consequence of the Key Event for each case company, was 
the technical expertise gained in the process of meeting the expectations of 
stakeholders. This expertise, coupled to the privileged position of construction 
companies in society (i.e. to build houses we need experts), made politicians 
dependent on contractors to advance their political agenda on sustainability 
(e.g. the construction of sustainable houses). This finding is in line with 
Foucault’s (1977) claim of the existence of a circular power-knowledge 
relationship: policy-makers were aware that houses and buildings were 
responsible for much of Co2 emissions in the country, but they had little 
knowledge of techniques to make dwellings “greener”. Thus they had to rely 
on the advice of companies reputed for their expertise in sustainable methods 
of construction. Data also show that sometimes it was a local politician who 
sought advice from a case company, to avoid having his or her political 
decision adversely affect that company’s contributions to his or her community. 
As put by a participant, “politicians don’t like to look stupid [and want to avoid] 
the law of unintended consequences” (ID#[anonymised]). This need of 
companies’ expertise highlight their hidden (structural) CPP (Lindblom, 1977).  
 
The need for this technical expertise in CSR provided opportunities to the 
case companies to meet policy-makers, build social capital, advise them and 
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have some influence on public policies and government bids as the case 
studies show. Other than technical expertise, the results of case studies also 
indicate that all the political outcomes of CSR activities helped companies to 
have easier access to policy-makers and thus, contributed to CPP. The 
homogeneous CSR activities of the case companies explain the quasi-similar 
political outcomes and impacts of CSR identified in the case studies. They 
support on the observation that to persuade policy-makers and shape their 
decisions, the most important corporate resource to have is technical 
expertise, and the use of informational type of CPA to transmit to policy-
makers the knowledge derived from this expertise. A participant summarised 
this finding as follows: 
 
 If you haven’t got anything intelligent to say then it doesn’t 
matter whether you’re paying money [i.e. political donations] or 
doing events or whatever else [to get access to politicians]. 
People will know who you are, but it isn’t going to influence 
policy. The way you influence policy is by having something 
intelligent and intelligible to say that actually makes the policy 
better or richer, points out a glaring error, stops them doing 
something stupid, has public opinion supporting it. 
(ID#[anonymised]) 
 
 
Due to the fragmented nature of the construction industry, none of the case 
companies believed that they had much influence over the Government. 
Nevertheless all acknowledged that their CSR activities could influence policy-
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makers’ decisions, especially in small communities. The reason was that the 
activities of a company at the local level were more noticeable than at the 
national level. When a member of parliament, Council Leader or a town Mayor 
considered important the contributions made by a case company to the 
economic and social development of his or her constituency (e.g. employment, 
tax revenues, or provision of free public services as part of a CSR initiative), 
the company earned goodwill. It was then easier to organise a meeting to 
lobby that local politician to influence local policies in its community, rather 
than attempting to meet with a senior civil servant in central government in 
London and change national policies. 
 
To conclude this cross-case analyses section, the undertaking of both CSR 
and CPAs were instrumental, primary driven by external pressures. CPA is a 
standard practice by all companies in the construction industry due to its 
characteristics. The similitude found in CSR and political activities by the case 
companies is due to their belonging to the same industry. The outcomes of 
CSR activities, in particular technical expertise, contributed to political access. 
The demonstration of this expertise when lobbying increased the odds of 
orientating the decisions of government officials in the direction that benefited 
companies. In other words, the strategic alignment of CPAs and CSR 
activities contributed to the strengthening of their CPP. This last point is 
discussed in more details in the next section. 
 
 
 
 238 
5.2 Discussion 
In this section, the key findings of the research are discussed in comparison 
with established theories and concepts in the literature. With regards to the 
epistemology of the study, the discussion is structured around the initial 
conceptual model presented in Figure 3. The CSR-CPP relationship is 
described in the empirical, actual and real domains starting with the 
determinants, followed by the mechanisms and impacts. The insights drawn 
from the discussion address the two objectives of the thesis (the identification 
of the mechanisms of the CSR-CPP relationship, and the identification of the 
political impacts of CSR), and provide answers to the main research question, 
‘how does CSR contribute to CPP?’ 
 
CPA and CSR Determinants: 
The empirical results of the research reveal some overlaps between the 
determinants of CPA and those of CSR activities, which allows a 
categorisation into two types: external pressures and organisational 
characteristics. In addition, the social and political activities of case 
companies were also found to be influenced the personal values of the CEO, 
and the environment in which they operated (competitors’ activities that 
encouraged isomorphic practices, the political ideology of the country and the 
expectations of government officials).  
The personal characteristics of the CEO as a determinant factor on how 
companies responded to external pressures is an unexpected finding because, 
my analysis of the business-government relationship was at the organisational 
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level. Yet the empirical results indicate that to fully comprehend organisational 
outcomes, the ascendency of a CEO on a firm’s social and political behaviour 
cannot be dismissed. Previous studies have made a similar observation that 
research at the individual level is necessary to understand the mechanisms of 
CSR (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). Wood (1991) 
argued that “managers are moral actors…A company’s social responsibilities 
are not met by some abstract organizational actor; they are met by individual 
human actors who constantly make decisions and choices” (pp.698-699). This 
finding supports the Upper Echelons theory, and calls into question the claim 
made by the real entity and corporate personhood theories that the firm is a 
distinct person, separate from its members. As argued by Friedman (2003), 
we have to see the company as an amoral and “aresponsible” legal person, 
but whose actions and behaviours may at best in part be a reflection of the 
CEO’s personality, values and experiences.  
A second surprising finding related to the environment of the firm, is the 
effects of the industry’s characteristics on the political behaviour of case 
companies. The fragmented nature of the industry, and its dependence on the 
Government as the main client, require all construction companies to work 
together when they exercise CPP to shape policies at the national level. As a 
result, coalition building through trade associations and think-tanks is the 
principal political activity of all contractors. The case companies undertook 
political activities by themselves only when they pursued a government 
contract or regulatory changes at the local level. The industry does not have a 
monopolistic or oligopolistic structure, so no contractor has the resources to 
seek regulatory changes by itself. Due to this approach to business-
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government relationship in the industry, no contractor can ever be the single 
beneficiary from a public policy. Competitors will benefit too. For this reason, 
any public policy that may have advanced the interest of a case company (e.g. 
PFI, Green Deal) did not provide a sustained competitive advantage as per 
RBV’s definition, but a (temporary) competitive advantage only. As Dahan 
(2005) remarked, a public policy is a “public good” in the sense that it affects 
all companies in the industries concerned by the policy, including free riders.  
 
Some academics (McWilliams et al., 2002, 2006; Sims, 2003; Richter, 2011; 
Fooks et al., 2013; Hond et al., 2014) and practitioners (Köppl, 2012) have 
argued that CSR activities can support a firm’s political activities in developing 
a competitive advantage, or removing a competitive disadvantage, through 
public policies. The political advocacy by the case companies for more 
binding CSR regulations that suit their CSR performance, and their 
participations in PPP advisory groups on CSR related policies, are evidence 
they attempted to use CSR as a means to improve their competitiveness 
through public policies. This instrumentalisation of CSR for political ends 
constitutes the “political case for CSR”; it supplements the “business case for 
CSR” usually found in the literature. There are of course areas of congruence 
between the two because, corporate gains obtained by political means 
achieve the same objective to procure an economic advantage to the firm. For 
theoretical however, there is a need to keep distinct the business case from 
the political case for four reasons: 
1. The business case encourages the undertaking of CSR activities on 
economic grounds, i.e. CSR activities can provide economic 
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advantages to the firm (legitimacy by risk mitigation, cost reduction, 
and public image). In contrast, the political case for CSR justifies CSR 
engagement on political grounds, i.e. CSR activities can provide public 
policies that give economic advantages to the firm (competitiveness 
through public policies; pre-emption of mandatory regulations). To 
paraphrase Wilks (2013), the business case showcases CSR as a 
reputation management tool, whereas the political case invites to see it 
as a tool for the privatisation of regulations.   
2. The political case brings to the fore the political nature of CSR and the 
political role that companies play when they undertake CSR activities. 
This emphasis is reflected in the still embryonic ECC literature (Scherer 
and Palazzo, 2011; Whelan, 2012).    
3. The literature review indicated that despite the efforts to find evidence 
of the business case for CSR, the results of the research are 
inconclusive. The arguments in favour of the business case, all based 
on economic grounds, lack empirical evidence (Vogel, 2005; Orlitzky et 
al., 2011). The findings of this study indicate that the arguments for the 
political case, which are based on political grounds, can be applied to 
any politically active company. The political case draws attention to the 
mechanisms by which CSR contributes to CPP. The impacts, such as 
government contracts, affect corporate performance. For researchers 
that seek evidence for the business case, the analysis of the political 
outcomes and impacts of CSR provides a novel framework to research 
an indirect link between CSR and CFP. 
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4. The claim from business case theorists (e.g. Porter and Kramer, 2006) 
that CSR activities are a “win-win” for business and society is 
challenged by the political case. There is no evidence from this study 
and the literature that companies engage in CSR or political advocacy 
to defend or advance the public interest before their own. Hamilton and 
Hoch (1997) who argued that CPA is a political responsibility also 
admitted that "ethical CPAs" – which is the promotion of the public 
interest and corporate self-interest at the same time through political 
activities – was unheard of. Therefore it is doubtful that politically active 
companies, even if they have the public image of a good corporate 
citizen, prioritise the public interest when they lobby governments 
(Anastasiadis, 2006, 2014). There is a risk that the political power that 
companies gain with their CSR activities could be used to promote 
public policies that harm directly or indirectly their stakeholders. The 
political case for CSR highlights this latent risk, the business case do 
not. A notorious example was the company Enron. While stakeholders 
celebrated it for its CSR activities, the company used its CPP to obtain 
public policies that were detrimental to the beneficiaries of its CSR 
activities (Stohl et al., 2007). 
 
The Political Outcomes of CSR (i.e. The Mechanisms of CSR-CPP): 
The framework used to operationalise the political power of the firm, proposed 
that any corporate activity that sets in motion one of the three mechanisms of 
power had to be considered an instrument of CPP (Table 3). The political 
activities listed in Table 2 were the only instruments found in the literature. My 
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argument was that CSR activities could be instruments too. To explain the 
mechanisms by which CSR contributes to the political success of the firm, I 
borrowed Medcof’s (2001) RDT+RBV framework underpinned by the 
institutional theory. The framework proposes that the political environment of 
the firm is similar to a marketplace where businesses and government officials 
trade political goods (Bonardi et al., 2006). The political outcomes of CSR 
activities produce four political goods (technical expertise, social capital, 
indebtedness and public image). In exchange for these political goods, 
government officials grant to the firm access to the policy-making process. I 
therefore came the conclusion that the political goods constitute the 
mechanisms that link a corporate activity to political power. It is by their 
creation and provision to policy-makers that CSR activities contribute to CPP.  
However CPP is a two-step process and access is only the first step towards 
CPP as defined in this study. To complete the second step, the persuasion of 
policy-makers, empirical findings point to the demonstration of technical 
expertise as the most important resource of a company. This evidence 
contradicts the popular belief that financial resources are the most important 
assets for a firm to successfully exercise political power (Beetham, 2011). The 
four political goods of CSR provide political access, but only technical 
expertise was found to be effective to complete the second step of the CPP 
process. 
The four political goods/mechanisms are now discussed in details. 
“Technical expertise” was identified as the most important political good to 
contribute to CPP, not only because it contributes to complete the second 
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step in the CPP process, but because it reinforces the structurally privileged 
position of the firm in policy-making. To not hamper economic growth when 
drafting policies, it is common practice for politicians to seek companies’ 
advice, which is grounded in areas of interest to the Government (e.g. 
sustainability). Corporate actors benefit from a structurally privileged position 
supported by their technical expertise needed by the Government, and the 
neoliberal ideology endorsed by the Government. As already revealed by Ellis 
(2008) and Strong (2010) in their research on the making of sustainable 
development policies in the UK, since the Thatcher Government, successive 
British governments have encouraged economic growth by seeking the 
participation of business in policy-making, and by adopting policies generally 
on terms favourable to corporate interests. Given the nature of policy-making 
at the national and European level, the British government must find 
compromises between competing interest groups, and business does not 
always get the policies it desires. The literature and data presented in Chapter 
4.2 show that macro and meso events can cause regulations that affect 
business revenues, at least on the short term. Thus the exercise of CPP is not 
always effective. Nevertheless, for the period under analysis, neoliberalism 
explains the preference by the Government to promote CSR as a market-
based solution negotiated with business, rather than a constant use of 
mandatory regulations. The Government encouraged companies to adopt 
voluntary codes of conduct and self-regulated CSR practices instead of 
mandatory regulations. So the scope of CSR activities was negotiated 
between business and the Government. There is therefore a relationship 
between regulatory threats and CSR activities (Fooks et al., 2011). CSR 
 245 
activities help pre-empt regulations and in so doing, create financial benefit for 
companies because, legal compliance with regulations would impose costs.  
“Indebtedness” and “social capital” are two closely related political goods 
essentially produced by corporate philanthropic activities that deliver public 
goods, including training and employment of youngsters, support for the 
favourite charities of politicians, children’s playgrounds and other benefits in 
kind in local communities. The provision of public goods constitutes an 
indirect financial contribution to politicians because without these CSR 
activities, politicians would otherwise have to fund the provisions of these 
public goods themselves (or forego them). The data did not provide enough 
information to know if the satisfaction brought by these CSR activities to 
members of communities helped local politicians to stay in office, however 
they were found to contribute to the development of the public image of 
companies in those communities. 
A positive “public image” was as much promoted by the case companies as 
by the Government. The companies sought to be seen “sustainable” and 
“good corporate citizens” for marketing reasons and to deter government 
regulations, while the Government encouraged businesses to communicate 
on their CSR programmes because they would then have no choice to self-
regulate their behaviour to maintain the legitimacy associated with a public 
image. The benefit of self-regulation for the Government is that it avoids the 
costs and difficulties associated with creating and enforcing regulations. 
Companies that brand themselves CSR-friendly are believed to be more 
legitimate and trustworthy. For this reason, government officials grant to these 
companied more and easier political access. This empirical result confirms the 
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proposition made by some scholars on the positive impact of a CSR-friendly 
image on political access (Sims, 2003; Lyon and Maxwell, 2008; King and 
McDonnel, 2012; Hadani and Coombes, 2012; Rehbein and Schuler, 2013). 
Sims (2003) and Hillman et al. (2004) suggested that interest groups with 
more and easier access to policy-makers had more influence on public 
policies than those with less access. The study’s results do not provide 
enough evidence to confirm or disconfirm this claim. But by theorising from 
the data, the claim ought to be true because it relates to what psychologists 
call “the illusion of truth effect”, on which rely advertisers (Begg et al., 1992; 
Weaver et al., 2007). When an actor is exposed to a message more 
frequently than another (e.g. “CSR is more effective when voluntary than 
mandatory”), the actor will come to believe that message and act according to 
that belief. Thus, if politicians meet and work more frequently with business 
representatives than competing interesting groups, they are more likely to be 
exposed to and believe the arguments of business, which already benefit of a 
privileged position. 
A crucial insight that emerges from the research is that the needs and 
objectives of policy-makers are central to the relationship between CSR and 
CPP. CSR contributes to CPP only when it provides political goods valuable 
to policy-makers. What is valuable depends on the policy-makers’ needs. The 
concept of the political market implies that policy-makers are autonomous 
agents with personal agenda of their own. However rare are the studies that 
approach the relation between business and government at the individual 
level, and from this perspective. One exception is Ceton and Liston-Heyes 
(2007), who concluded that politicians use CSR to fulfil their political promises 
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at a lower cost, and increase their chances of re-election. My results indicate 
that policy-makers have a strong influence on the types of CSR activities 
undertaken by construction firms, especially in small communities. One 
contributing factor is the policy Section 106. Policy-makers have learnt to 
solve issues on their political agenda by framing and embedding their political 
ideas in the CSR discourse. As put by a CPA practitioner, since the 1990s his 
corporate clients had “to jump train and adopt [CSR] at least as an umbrella 
strategy for bringing forward the business’ interests […and] meet the 
politicians expectations” (Köppl, 2012, pp.178-180). By way of example, once 
C1 and C2 decided to strategically align their CSR activities and CPAs by 
“wrapping and hooking” these activities around policy-makers’ sustainable 
development agendas, they got easier political access, won government 
contracts and obtained some favourable policies less threatening to their 
activities.  
Generally the literature explores CSR and the power of business without 
reference to the influence of policy-makers on business decisions, as if policy-
makers were passive actors with no personal agenda of their own. Clearly, if 
the obtainment of CPP is based on an exchange of political goods with 
politicians, companies cannot be deemed more powerful than governments 
like some authors have claimed (e.g. Monbiot, 2001). The existence of a 
political market opposes claims made by some ECC proponents that 
governments can no longer regulate companies, or pursues public policies 
that diverge from business’ interests (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011).  
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The Political Impacts of CSR: 
The study found that the political goods created by CSR activities contributed 
to CSR having three political impacts that built on one another. Firstly, CSR 
strengthened the privileged structural position of companies as technical 
experts. Secondly, CSR helped companies having easier access to policy-
makers, which is a sine qua non for CPP. Thirdly, these first and second 
impacts gave opportunities to generate revenues by lobbying policy-makers 
that awarded government contracts, and by lobbying for public policies that 
encouraged government expenditures and mitigated costly mandatory 
regulations. For reasons given in Section 2.4.5, it is difficult to assess the 
success and failure rate of the political activities directly attributable to CSR by 
the companies investigated. Nevertheless the data obtained were sufficient to 
indicate that CSR activities helped companies win government contracts and, 
obtain favourable policies such as the Green Deal due to their expertise in 
CSR related issues, although these effects could take years to materialise. 
Overall, the findings support Fooks et al.’s (2013) thoughtful observation that 
the combination of CSR and political activities help companies to “broker 
access to public officials, influence the policy alternatives under consideration 
by elected representatives, break up opposing political constituencies, [and 
rebuild] companies’ reputations as providers of reliable information” (p.284). 
Having discussed the findings, we can now answer the research question of 
this thesis, how does CSR contribute to CPP? 
The mechanisms that link CSR to CPP rely on a system of exchange between 
the firm and policy-makers. In exchange for doing CSR activities that produce 
political goods valuable to policy-makers, the companies gain easier access 
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to politicians and hence to public policy debates where their arguments are 
heard. But not only does CSR facilitate access to the policy-making process, it 
also reinforces the structurally privileged position of companies as experts on 
which policy-makers rely for technical advice to take decisions. Because 
companies only enter the political arena to advance their interests, they use 
their privileged political access obtained from CSR activities to lobby policy-
makers, and orientate their decisions in ways that generate new revenues or 
reduce costs. 
 
To conclude this section, the main finding of this research, the strengthening 
of CPP by CSR, supports the findings of the rare empirical studies of the 
CSR-CPP relationship that have been done in other contexts (Sims, 2003; 
Fooks et al., 2011). The paradoxical effects of CSR is that it can end up giving 
more political power to companies than to the stakeholders affected by the 
issues addressed by CSR activities. Since it was found that the scope of 
social and environmental problems addressed by CSR are negotiated 
between business and policy-makers, the paradox of CSR occurs only when 
policy-makers fail to protect the interests of all stakeholders by including the 
demands of these stakeholders in the scope of CSR practices.  
Considering that the underlying motive for the undertaking of CSR and CPA is 
the desire by companies to protect or advance their interests, as I have 
argued in the description of the “political case for CSR” above, there is no 
guarantee that companies will use their enhanced political power for the 
public interest if this interest conflicts with their revenue-seeking nature. As 
argued by Karnani (2010, 2011), when business objectives and government 
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policies are at odds, companies are more likely to attempt to shape the 
policies in their favour rather than change by themselves their commercial 
activities. Considering the empirical findings, it can be argued that CSR is a 
“velvet curtain”, that is “something smooth and seemingly benign that 
nonetheless can act to screen from awareness the operation of power in 
producing the conditions and consequences that tend to be excluded from 
analysis” (Khan et al., 2007, p.1056). 
 
Based on the empirical evidence from the case studies, the initial conceptual 
model derived from the literature has been revised. Figure 11 presents the 
final conceptual model that depicts the research findings (the right part of the 
model with dashed arrows was the gap in knowledge investigated). The 
changes are in the “determinants”. 
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Figure 11: Final Conceptual Model of CSR-CPP 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions  
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis was prompted by the existence of a possible paradox concerning 
CSR that has gone unnoticed in the literature, namely that the encouragement 
by governments and civil society groups for more involvement of business in 
social and environmental issues, might give more political power to business 
at the expense of their stakeholders and the public at large. A review of the 
literature indicated that the political dimension of CSR is under-researched in 
comparison to the economic dimension. In the emergent ECC literature, CSR 
activities are compared to political activities, and propositions were that 
charitable giving helped companies to have access to policy-makers, which is 
a proxy for CPP (Sims, 2003; Richter, 2011; Wang and Qian, 2011; Fooks et 
al, 2011; Werner, 2014). However there is a gap in knowledge regarding the 
mechanisms of that relationship between CSR and CPP. The opportunity 
therefore existed to fill the gap in the context of the British construction 
industry. The research sought to find answers to the research question “How 
does CSR contribute to CPP?” Following the literature review, a conceptual 
model that captured the CSR-CPP relationship was developed. In line with the 
philosophical perspective of constructivist-realism, the model did not attempt 
to represent an objective truth, but to give an approximation of the reality it 
tried to represent within the specific context of the research. In this final 
chapter, I build upon the research findings in Chapters 4 and 5 to summarise 
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the key findings in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents the implications for 
theory, and identifies the contributions of the research. Finally the thesis is 
brought to a close in Section 6.4, which highlights its limitations and areas for 
further research. 
 
6.2 Summary of Key Findings  
The study aimed at identifying the mechanisms of CSR-CPP, and 
understanding the contribution of CSR to the political power of the firm. To do 
so, the study first sought to uncover the determinants of CPA and CSR for a 
better understanding of why companies seek political power and how. 
External pressures that threatened corporate legitimacy and revenues were 
found to be the primary drivers of both CSR activities and CPAs. The 
evidence from the case studies suggests that CSR was first a defensive 
strategy in response to external pressures.  However the companies gradually 
realised that CSR could be combined with their CPAs to improve their 
competitiveness by political means. 
Concerning the mechanisms of the CSR-CPP relationship, the political 
environment of the firm was identified to be analogous to a marketplace 
where companies negotiate and exchange political goods with policy-makers. 
CSR activities created four political outcomes identified as political goods, 
namely public image, technical expertise, social capital and indebtedness. 
When policy-makers deemed the political goods valuable to their political 
objectives, they rewarded the company with easier access to the policy-
making area. CPP was conceptualised as a two-step process and political 
access was only the first step towards CPP. To complete the second step, 
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that is persuading policy-makers to act in their favour, companies relied on the 
political good “technical expertise”. It was by demonstrating knowledge of the 
issue at hand, and by presenting convincing arguments to policy-makers, that 
companies were more effective in shaping public policies. Foucault’s (1977) 
claim that knowledge produces power and power produces knowledge was 
evidenced here. Not only the practice of CSR helped companies mitigate 
external pressures, but also the knowledge gained from addressing the 
societal issue reinforced companies’ privileged position as experts on those 
issues. Government officials sought their advice. Hence technical expertise 
strengthened CPP.  
The impacts of CSR on CPP were three-fold: CSR strengthened the 
privileged structural position of business; helped companies gain easier 
access to policy-makers; and this privileged access gave them more 
opportunities to influence regulatory outcomes.  
Contrary to Sims (2003) who called CSR a hidden source of CPP, the findings 
of this research present CSR not as a source of political power but as a 
political framework, the scope of which is negotiated between business and 
government. The framework guided companies in the transformation of their 
internal resources into political goods that addressed societal issues on the 
agenda of government officials. Politicians played a determinant role in the 
type of CSR activities undertaken by companies. Another related key finding 
was that organisational and managerial characteristics also influenced CSR 
and CPA practices.  
  
 
 255 
None of the case companies undertook CSR activities and CPAs for altruistic 
reason, rather they sought to protect or advance their interests. Because they 
used CSR strategically to achieve political goals, it can be argued that CSR is 
a ‘velvet curtain’ (Khan et al., 2007).  
 
6.3 Contributions of the Research 
 
Contributions to Theory: 
The thesis answered calls by scholars to move from the mainstream analysis 
of CSR from social and economic perspectives, to an analysis through 
political lenses (Conrad and Abbott, 2007; Gjølberg, 2011). It also answered 
calls to contextualise research in CSR and CPAs because societal issues, 
and the institutional environment of companies, differ by industries and 
geographic locations (Halme et al., 2009). The thesis focused on the British 
construction industry because it is a heavily regulated industry where political 
activities are high, and where little academic research has been conducted on 
its social and political activities. By addressing the political dimension of CSR, 
and by providing empirical evidence of a relation between CSR and CPP, the 
study contributes to the embryonic ECC literature where research is mostly 
theoretical. Further, by using multiple case studies, the methods employed 
contrast with the cross sectional analyses of secondary data of US companies 
usually found in the literature. It provides a richer longitudinal account of how 
the mechanisms and processes of CPP operate within and outside the policy-
making arena. 
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The study contributes to the CSR debate by exposing the political facet of 
CSR. CSR has to be understood as a political arena where interest groups 
(government officials, business, civil society) oppose and negotiate public 
policies. The attempt to understand CSR through the economic lens of the 
business case only fails to grasp the complex nature of this phenomenon. The 
study finds empirical evidence for Friedman (1970)'s proposition that CSR 
activities bring closer the economic and political powers of the firm. However 
there is no evidence that this bridge turns the firm into a dictator with 
legislative and jurist abilities that make the firm politically more powerful than 
a government or its stakeholders as Friedman (1970) suggested. The 
mechanisms by which CSR activities enhance CPP are dependent on policy-
makers’ objectives, which can from time to time be hostile to corporate 
interests (Vogel, 1989). CSR becomes problematic for corporate stakeholders, 
and the public at large, if the objectives of policy-makers that the firms attempt 
to meet are at odds with stakeholders and the public interest. This is why 
corruption of government officials is a serious concern in the construction 
industry (Transparency International UK, 2008).  
 
The conceptual model of CSR-CPP in Figure 11 contributes to knowledge as 
it fills the gap in the literature on the underlying mechanisms linking CSR with 
political power. The mechanisms described by the model provide a new 
approach to studying the outcomes and impacts of CSR activities on 
corporate performance. 
Another contribution made by the conceptual model is its depiction of the 
overlaps and complementarity of CSR and CPA, two corporate activities 
 257 
considered to be distinct by most scholars. Researchers should integrate 
these two domains in their analyses of the activities of the firm in the political 
arena. The findings show they have much in common, and highlight the need 
for more cross-disciplinary research between the two. 
The study contributes to political power theories as it found technical expertise 
(knowledge) to be the most important corporate resource to have to 
successfully exercise political power. To prevail in policy-making, “what you 
know” is more important than “who you know” or “how much you give”. 
Finally to understand the engagement in CSR by politically active companies, 
the political case for CSR is suggested as a supplement to the business case 
for CSR. 
 
Contributions to Practice: 
This study is to my knowledge the first to provide empirical evidence of the 
mechanisms by which CSR activities strengthen the political power of the firm. 
The findings of this study should be therefore beneficial for managerial 
practice, but also government officials who are at the same time clients and 
regulators of the construction industry in which the study took place. 
 
CPA is generally seen as an attempt by companies to weaken or avoid 
regulations (Klein, 2000; Monbiot, 2001). However this negative connotation is 
undeserved.  As the case studies show, business participation in policy-
making can improve standards and even raise the level of regulations when 
companies believe it can improve their competitiveness. The negative 
discourse on CPA is fostered by the lack of openness by companies on their 
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CPAs and positions on public policies advocated behind closed doors. The 
implication for corporate managers is that if they want their stakeholders being 
less suspicious of their political activities, they must be more transparent. 
Transparency requires that companies accept to be consistent (i.e. ensuring 
that political activities by themselves or their trade associations conform with 
their ethical principles and related corporate policies), and accountable (i.e. 
accept responsibility for the direct and indirect impacts that political activities 
have on stakeholders on the short and long term). Put differently, 
transparency invites practitioners to look at their political responsibility and 
CSR simultaneously to maintain their legitimacy in society. To mitigate risks of 
conflicts, companies must communicate on their CSR and political advocacy 
efforts to their primary stakeholders (shareholders, employees, government 
agencies, clients, suppliers).  
Another implication of the study for practitioners is that they will learn from the 
“political case for CSR”, which is illustrated by the model in Figure 11, that the 
combination of CSR and political activities is more effective to influence 
political debates. 
 
On the implication of the study for politicians, the study shows that during the 
last three decades, companies have gone from a reactive and defensive 
stance on the concept of CSR, to a proactive and offensive position. Over the 
years, they have learnt to merge their CPAs and CSR activities to advance 
their interests. This study supports the findings of Marinetto (1995), Sims 
(2003) and Fooks et al (2013), who analysed the political effects of CSR in 
business-government relations. All these scholars concluded that CSR, in a 
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voluntary and self-regulated form, was a threat to democracy because it is a 
discursive medium of CPP and, altruism did not drive corporate social and 
political activities. As found in this study, the alignment of CSR and CPAs 
allows companies to frame political debates in such a way that regulations, 
and the expectations of business stakeholders, are less threatening to 
corporate legitimacy and activities. The social and political implications are 
important and call for the attention of government officials, civil society 
organisations (e.g. BITC), and members of the public who favour a neoliberal 
doctrine for the promotion of CSR to business. CSR yields CPP and they may 
fall victim of invisible CPP, created by CSR activities. Only pressures 
(regulations or regulatory threats) allow the alignment of corporate behaviour 
with society’s expectations. Companies’ stakeholders should try to lift the 
“velvet curtain” to find out if the benefits that business gains in exchange for 
CSR activities, work discursively and covertly against their interest in the short 
and long term. 
 
6.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The thesis has a number of limitations that provide a basis for future work. 
One limitation relates to methodology. In process-based studies such as this 
one, a full understanding of the Key Event and subsequent events requires 
interviewing the actors involved. Unfortunately this was not always possible 
because CPA is a sensitive topic that most practitioners do not like to discuss. 
And given the time period studied (1980-2010), some individuals could not be 
located. Moreover in retrospective interviews, participants have different 
memories of past events. The reconstruction of past reality is always 
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problematic for researchers. An event might have been more important than it 
seemed for a participant. However all events were treated equally in this study, 
when in reality they are not. For instance, a CSR activity that provided the 
opportunity to C2’s CEO to meet a senior government official at a breakfast 
meeting and have an informal discussion, may have been more important 
than a more formal political activity such as a financial donation.  
The study used process-oriented case studies, which departs from the 
quantitative analysis approach that prevails in research on CSR and CPA. 
Future research could use a different research design to explore the CSR-
CPP relationship, such as ethnography. 
 
A second limitation of this study relates to the generalisation of findings. 
Following the constructivist-realism paradigm of the research, the aim of this 
study was theoretical generalisation by the construction of a theoretical model 
that is close to reality (Figure 11). But context matters in realism research, 
especially for research on CSR and CPP. Hence the focus of this study was 
on companies operating in the UK and belonging to the same industry. Given 
the characteristics of the British construction industry, it would be interesting 
to replicate the research in other industries and/or countries, to determine if 
the model is particular to the context of this study or applicable to others. 
Researchers are also invited to empirically explore the theoretical arguments 
of this thesis by making cross-country analyses. 
 
The findings of the thesis invite to conclude that because companies have a 
privileged position in society that is reinforced by CSR activities, and because 
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CSR activities provide companies easier access to the policy-making process 
than other interest groups, the resulting informational asymmetry between 
companies and politicians, supported by the political outcomes of CSR and 
CPAs, bias policy-making in favour of business. However the research did not 
investigate the political effects of CSR activities on companies’ stakeholders, 
and therefore the CSR paradox was not tested. The study findings do not 
inform if gains in CPP make public policies more favourable towards business 
interest at the expense of the public as the paradox of CSR implies. What the 
evidence does show however is that CSR functions like a ‘velvet curtain’: 
CSR hides from the public its paradoxical positive effects on CPP (Khan et al., 
2007).  Given the social and political implications raised by the CSR paradox, 
future studies could investigate the paradox of CSR. The research question 
could be: is doing good, politically good (for stakeholders/the public)? 
 
The PFI scheme has often been decried for the large economic benefits it 
brings to business, in contrast to its long-term economic costs to the 
government (Pollock, 2005). However the PFI contributed to the 
institutionalisation of CSR in the construction industry, for the benefit of the 
British public at large. This positive ‘PFI externality’ has gone unnoticed 
among scholars, as there is no mention of it in the literature. This unexpected 
finding is maybe evidence against the CSR paradox as it stresses the 
importance of politicians’ objectives on the political marketplace. CSR 
activities might contribute to CPP, but if the political goods provided by CSR 
activities advance politicians’ objectives, and their objectives are in line with 
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the long-term interest of the public, there is no CSR paradox. This proposition 
is open to investigation for future research. 
 
The conclusions that business and government are structurally dependent on 
each other, and that policy-makers influence CSR and CPA practices, 
challenges the popular view that business has more political power than 
governments (Bernstein, 2000; Coy, 2003). This research investigated the 
relationship between business and government, from the firm’s perspective. 
To verify these conclusions, a similar study should be undertaken in the 
opposite direction, government-business. The rare studies that did conclude 
that policy-makers manipulate CSR in order to realise their own political 
agenda (Ceton and Liston-Heyes, 2007; Kinderman, 2012). Evidence from 
this thesis provides only partial supports for this claim as “CSR deals” were 
found between business and government officials. Thus the two parties 
benefit from CSR. To find a definitive answer to the questions “who 
manipulates whom on CSR?” and “are companies more powerful than 
government?”, an in-depth analysis at the individual level of the motives and 
objectives of all participants in the political marketplace is required. There is 
still a lack of understanding on how personal values influence decision-
making concerning CSR and political activities, and how those values affect 
the mechanisms that link CSR to CPP. 
 
To conclude, this study makes several contributions to knowledge on CSR 
and CPP. It provides new insights on the political determinants and outcomes 
of CSR. The model of the CSR-CPP relationship, and the political case for 
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CSR, open new lines of inquiry to conduct further empirical research in the 
political dimension of CSR, a neglected but important area of CSR. 
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Appendix 1: Semi-structured Interview Schedule 
 
 
Interview Questions 
 
Section 1: CSR 
 
1. When did you decide to take CSR seriously and become pro-active 
(i.e. the Key Event)? Which factors make you take this decision? 
 
2. What were the positive and negatives outcomes of the Key Event?  
 
3. How did you develop and promote your CSR strategy after the Key 
Event? 
 
4. Before the Key Event, which philanthropic and social-environmental 
activities did you engage in? How did these activities benefit your 
company? 
 
5. Today, how do you decide which CSR activity to do? Who is 
involved in the decision process? 
 
6. How do you measure the impact on your stakeholders of your CSR 
activities? 
 
7. How do you measure your ROI for each CSR activity? 
 
8. In your view, who benefits the most of CSR: the public, the 
government, or business? 
 
 
Section 2: CPP 
 
1. During the 1980s and 1990s, with the environmental protests 
against road construction, how did you choose the public policies 
you lobbied for or against?  
 
2. Were there any particular individuals who were influential in politics 
within the company? 
 
3. During that period, did your CSR activities have any impact on your 
political strategy? 
 
4. How do public affair agencies and trade associations help your 
company? 
 
5. What is your view on corporate political power: Does it exist and if 
yes, how does it manifest? 
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Section 3: Business-Government Relationship 
 
1. Have you in the past, or today, tried to align your corporate strategy 
with the government’s CSR strategy? 
 
2. Have you ever chosen to self-regulate in order to pre-empt an 
upcoming government regulation? 
 
3. How does the company benefit from its CSR activities, financially 
and politically? 
 
4. Do some of your social or environmental activities help you to gain 
favour from policy-makers? How? 
 
5. Do you believe that if your company had not developed a CSR 
strategy, it would be (i) weaker financially? (ii) won’t have strong 
relationship with government officials? 
 
6. Between 1980 and 2010, is there a time when your CSR 
performance had a negative impact on the company? 
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Appendix 2: Invitation to Participate in Research 
 
       Victor Tsemo 
       Doctoral Researcher 
       University of Wolverhampton  
       MN Building, room MN005 
       Nursery Street 
       Wolverhampton, WV1 1AD 
        
       27/06/2011 
xxxxxxxx 
 
Dear Mr xxx: 
 
Invitation to Participate in a Study on the Outcomes of Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
I am a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Wolverhampton. As part of my 
PhD, I am researching the interactions between Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activities, as well as the 
outcomes of CSR activities in the UK construction industry. My research for 
this PhD aims to improve knowledge among businesses, and the public, on 
sustainability.  
 
I am analysing the history of several construction and properties companies 
over the last 30 years, and I need your help. As a public affair specialist, you 
have a good knowledge of the political environment faced by construction 
firms. More importantly, you witnessed some key events that made them what 
they are today. 
 
I have already interviewed some current and former employees of various 
companies. Your input would be highly valuable to further develop insights 
into these case companies.  
 
I would appreciate it if you could offer me an interview with you, face to face 
or by telephone, in the coming weeks. The interview will last about an hour.  
 
To ensure confidentiality and privacy, all responses will be anonymised, and 
all data stored in compliance with the Data Protection Act. In addition, my 
thesis will be withheld from the public domain for 2 to 5 years after submission 
to the University of Wolverhampton. 
 
Please, let me know as soon as possible by email, xxx@wlv.ac.uk or by 
telephone, xxx, if you accept to participate in this study. 
 
May I thank you in advance of your cooperation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Victor Tsemo 
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Appendix 3: Sample Transcript 
 
In this transcript of ID#10’s interview, V refers to the researcher and D to the 
participant. 
 
 
V: How did you start working with [C1]? 
 
D: Well, this is quite a long while ago, and my recollection may be 
less than perfect, particularly as to detailed timings, but it was 
shortly after I set up [anonymous].  Certainly, I think—you may 
have it in your own records—but I would’ve said it would be 
1998-1999, something like that.  What had happened what that I 
was instructed by the Major Contractors Group.  Is that name 
familiar to you? 
 
V: Yes.   
 
D: The Major Contractors Group—I persuaded them that it would 
be interesting to develop some kind of benchmark for the 
response of major contractors to environmental governance, 
because in those days one must remember that sustainability as 
a topic had not really begun to kick in.  It was mainly about 
environmental management, and in 1997, I had set up 
something which was called the [anonymous], which was not 
house builders or contractors principally, it was commercial 
property companies—so that would be property companies and 
pension funds and insurance companies—the owners of 
commercial property.  People like Land Securities or Hermes 
and so on.  I started a benchmarking survey for them in 1997, 
and having done that, there was—I forget how it arose—but the 
opportunity arose to see whether or not the major contractors 
would like to go down a similar path, because I think they were 
all interested to know what everybody else was doing, and what 
was—as it were—expected of them and what was standard 
practice.  And I know that [C1] were one of the most enthusiastic 
about this and, I think, a leader amongst the major contractors, 
and it was then that through that survey that we began to do 
work with [C1] 
 
V: I remember the chief executive of [C1] was a chairman of 
[anonymised]. 
 
D: Ah.  Well, that would’ve been the reason.  Yes.  Now, his name 
has slipped my memory. 
 
V: [anonymised]. 
 
D: That’s it.  [anonymised].  Exactly so. 
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V: If you remember, [C1], back in [anonymised], had an incident at 
[anonymised] 
 
D: That’s right.  And the whole process of construction was slowed 
up. 
 
V: Yes. 
 
D: I wasn’t involved with them then, but I know that they did talk 
about it as a lesson that they learnt from that, which was really 
to be much more proactive rather than reactive so that they 
could try and foresee, at very least, as a kind of a risk 
management strategy.  But it was also very much caught up with 
the notion—which was beginning to emerge at that time of—of 
corporate responsibility. 
 
V: When I was looking at the chronology, I thought that [C1] set up 
a panel of environmental advisers.  It was in [anonymised], so I 
was wondering if you were— 
 
D: I don’t think—I think that is—they must have set that up before 
inviting me to become part of it.  There is a man called 
[anonymised], and I think he was already on the panel by the 
time that I joined it, and he had done work for [C1]. 
 
V: Okay.  I understand now. 
 
D: I think so.  I think I came on a bit later. 
 
V: Did you work directly with the chief executive? 
 
D: Yes.  [anonymised] was very much the driver of the initiative.  
Now, there were other directors and I think even senior 
members of staff who were on the panel and whom I might have 
dealt with on a day-to-day basis, but the person that sticks in my 
mind as being the prime mover was [the CEO], and my 
experience at that time was that it made an enormous difference 
if the chief executive or the chairman was an—as it were—
champion. 
 
V: So what were your duties then? 
 
D: Well, I’m trying to remember this, and I may not be quite 
accurate, but I had to attend a number of meetings during the 
time that it was there.  I would say from memory that they 
might’ve been quarterly.  And then I had to respond to any 
queries that might occur between meetings, but the role was 
very much a strategic role.  I think [anonymised]’s role was 
rather different.  I think he was more hands on, but my role was 
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much more of a strategic role with the experience, of course, 
that I then had both in the commercial property market and then 
amongst contractors as to what people were doing, what people 
expected people to do, how they were expected to report on 
these matters.  The whole reporting process was very important, 
and we got involved in that, and I think people - that's what  they 
drew on - they wanted to draw on from me.  I wasn’t on it for 
terribly long.  Three years was it? 
 
V: Yes.  When the company [anonymised]. 
 
D: That’s right.  Then I was replaced by [Paul]. 
 
V: Exactly.  Yes. 
 
D: I think that was because at that point they felt they needed 
someone with a higher profile than I had to—as it were—be 
seen as their adviser, because although they knew I was 
knowledgeable and had a reputation in the field, within the field, 
I wasn’t known in the way that [Paul] was known. 
 
V: Yes, yes, yes.  Actually, I will come to him a little bit later.  So 
before [anonymised], , before the incident at [anonymised], [C1] 
was doing nothing on the environment.  Then when they 
realised that- when [the CEO] decided to be proactive- in that 
five-year period between the first time they published their 
environmental report in [anonymised], the company changed 
completely.  [C1]’s image and their reputation came back, and 
they were seen as the leader on sustainability.  From your 
perspective, can you tell me, how you measured the success of 
[C1] at the time? How did you measure to make sure that you 
were making a good job as an adviser? 
 
D: That’s a good question.  I think that—because I think it also is 
relevant in terms of the period of my giving advice and then the 
change.  I think that I was keen to see, firstly, that they were in 
the leading pack of those who were taking environmental 
governance seriously, both in practice—in terms of good site 
management and so on—and in reporting.  They were already 
members of something call the Considerate Contractors 
Scheme.  Have you come across that? 
 
V: Yes. 
 
D: They were already members of that, so I saw their 
environmental management as an extension of that scheme but 
something that put all the environmental issues higher on the 
agenda.  Because, frankly, before that time, there wasn’t a great 
deal of attention given to this, because people simply didn’t have 
the information and the knowledge to work on, but there were all 
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sorts of things like waste management, for example—how they 
dealt with the recycling of waste on the construction site—
neighbourliness during the process of construction—how they 
took account of local people’s concerns—the movement of 
lorries on and off the site, the thought being given to whether 
they could reduce the mileage of their traffic.  Could they be 
more efficient? Could they do it in such a way that they had a 
lower number of lorry miles? The use of recycled materials, 
crushed concrete and so on—these were all basic, down-to-
earth things, which I’m sure if you were looking at the list of what 
people were thinking about at that time, they were trying to do. 
 
V: I understand. 
 
D: And also on some of their sites there were questions of 
biodiversity, which [anonymised] was particularly involved with. 
 
V: Yes.  He was. 
 
D: I didn’t get involved in that so much.  In order for me to feel that I 
was playing my role right and it had integrity, I needed to feel 
that they were listening, making reasoned judgments on 
information that they were given, and where possible and over a 
reasonable period of time, beginning to change their practices in 
accordance with new standards – and I thought they were.  I 
think the area which I couldn’t quite engage them with—and 
frankly this is something that I would say in true of the whole of 
the industry and still remains true—is to see environmental 
management as a part of the wider debate about sustainability, 
and in particular, to move beyond environmental and social 
sustainability into economic sustainability.  In other words, for 
them to begin to think of their business planning, in a financial 
and market sense, in terms of the doctrines of sustainability. 
 
V: Yes, I understand. 
 
D: Because I think it’s still the case that most companies think that 
what eventually became sustainability, is an additional issue, not 
a central issue. 
 
V: Yes, yes. I understand.  
 
D: They think it’s not at the core.  It’s not something that influences 
the whole rationale.  It is one of those things like good human 
resource management that they think they need to practice in 
order to be governed properly.  And I think that’s a mistake, 
because I think that until you see it as part of the whole ethos of 
business and the economy, you can’t really engage with it fully. 
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Appendix 4: Codes, Categories and Core Categories 
 
Note: A definition encompasses the concept that the category represents. 
Categories in italics are a priori codes; codes enclosed in quotation marks are 
participants’ own words. 
 
 
Categories   Definitions    Codes 
1. CSR Motives Reasons to engage in CSR activities opportunities, “business case”, 
“whitemail”, “blackmail”, community, 
awareness, clients, students, 
credibility, “responsible business”, 
trend, image/brand, pressure, 
shareholders, public, peers, 
government, “forward-looking”  
2. CSR Activities  Typology of activities pollution, “legal compliance”, noise, 
waste, landfill, training, “reducing 
waste”, “reducing energy”, “enhancing 
biodiversity wildlife”, “looking after 
local communities”, “engage with local 
communities”, “employ local people”, 
philanthropy 
3. CSR Metrics How the company assesses the 
success, or failure, of its CSR activities 
environmental management systems, 
Health & Safety, CSR Reports, 
stakeholders’ feedback, awards, 
“Business In The Community’s CR 
index” 
4. CSR Beneficiaries Who benefit of CSR and why Community, business, government 
5. CSR Benefits Typology of benefits cost savings, “bottom line”, expertise, 
reputation, “staff satisfaction” , 
credibility , differentiator 
6. Regulations How the company perceives the 
regulatory environment 
threats, opportunities, change 
corporate behaviour 
7. Political Motives Reasons to lobby the Government  threats, opportunities, Chief 
Executive’s personal values, 
Chairman’s personal values  
8. Political Approach Lobbying strategy reactive, proactive, credibility, non-
executive director, policy-maker, “win-
win”, lobby, “trade associations”, 
agenda setting, Prince of Wales 
9. Political Activities Typology of activities  revolving door, events, meetings with 
senior politicians, public relations, 
political donations,  
10. Beliefs on Corporate 
Power 
Participant’s views on the existence of 
CPP 
firm size, relationships, reputation, 
industry structure, inexistent, model of 
policy making in the UK,  
11. Beliefs on CSR-CPP 
Relationship 
Participant’s views on the CSR-CPP 
connection 
cover power, exchange, influence, 
lobby, never considered link, access, 
ethics, can make a difference, benefit, 
Prime Minister’s agenda, Prince of 
Wales  
12. Beliefs on CSR Participant’s views on the CSR concept competitive advantage, benefits, 
competitors, “discriminating factor”, 
please clients, personal satisfaction, 
macro environment, manipulation 
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Motivations (Why) 
1. CSR Motives 
7. Political Motives 
11. Beliefs on CSR-
CPP Relationship 
 
10. Beliefs on 
Corporate Power 
 
12. Beliefs on CSR 
Social Actors’ 
Personal Values 
Strategy 
 
Categories Core Categories 
Company’s Goals 
2. CSR Activities 
9. Political Activities 
8. Political Approach 
4. CSR Beneficiaries 
 
3. CSR Metrics 
 
5. CSR Benefits 
 
6. Regulations 
Strategy (How) 
 
Impact (What) 
 Impact  
Clusters Codes 
opportunities, 
“business case”, 
“whitemail”, 
“blackmail”, 
community, “reducing 
waste”, “reducing 
energy”, “enhancing 
biodiversity wildlife”, 
“looking after local 
communities”, 
“engage with local 
communities”, 
“employ local 
people”, philanthropy 
environmental 
management systems, 
Health & Safety, CSR 
Reports, stakeholders’ 
feedback, awards, 
“Business In The 
Community’s CR 
index” 
Community, business, 
government 
cost savings, “bottom 
line”,  
reactive, proactive, 
credibility, non-
executive director, 
policy-maker, “win-
win”, lobby, “trade 
associations”, agenda 
setting, Prince of 
Wales 
revolving door, 
events, , political 
donations,  
firm size,  
access, ethics, can 
make a difference, 
benefit, Prime 
Minister’s agenda, 
Prince of Wales  
competitive 
advantage, benefits, 
competitors, 
“discriminating 
factor”, please clients, 
personal satisfaction,  
